F 
198 


THE 


POWER  OF  CONGRESS 


OVER  TU2 


DISTRICT  OF  COLUMBIA 


BEPRIXTED    FROM   THE    NEW-YORK    EVENING   POST,   WITH    ADDITIONS  BY   THS 
AUTHOR. 


NEW-YORK: 

JOHN  F.  TROW,  PRINTER,  36  ANN-STREET. 
1838. 


Wf 


POWER    OF    CONGRESS 


OVER  THE 


DISTRICT    OF    COLUMBIA. 


A  CIVILIZED  community  presupposes  a  government  of  law.  If 
that  government  be  a  republic,  its  citizens  are  the  sole  sources,  as  well 
as  the  subjects  of  its  power.  Its  constitution  is  their  bill  of  directions  to 
their  own  agents — a  grant  authorizing  the  exercise  of  certain  powers, 
and  prohibiting  that  of  others.  In  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  whatever  else  may  be  obscure,  the  clause  granting  power  to 
Congress  over  the  Federal  District  may  well  defy  misconstruction. 
Art.  1,  Sec.  8,  Clause  18  :  "  The  Congress  shall  have  power  to  exer 
cise  exclusive  legislation,  in  all  cases  whatsoever,  over  such  District." 
Congress  may  make  laws  for  the  District  " in  all  cases"  not  of  all 
kinds ;  not  all  laws  whatsoever,  but  laws  "  in  all  cases  whatsoever." 
The  grant  respects  the  subjects  of  legislation,  not  the  moral  nature  of 
the  laws.  [The  law-making  power  every  where  is  subject  to  moral 
restrictionspwRether  limited  by  constitutions  or  not.  No  legislature 
can  authorize  murder,  nor  make  honesty  penal,  nor  virtue  a  crime, 
nor  exact  impossibilities.  In^thesejand[sirnilar  respects,  the  power  of 
Congress  is  held  in  check  by  principles,  existing  inj.the  nature 'of 
things,  not  imposed  by  the  Constitution,  but  presupposed  and  assumed 
by  ir>.  The  power  of  Congress  over  the  District  is  restricted  only  by 
thosw-principles  that  limit  ordinary  legislation,  and,  in  some  respects, 
it  has  even  wider  scope. 

In  common  with  the  legislatures  of  the  States,  Congress  cannot 
constitutionally  pass  ex  post  facto  laws  in  criminal  cases,  nor  suspend 
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  nor  pass  a  bill  of  attainder,  nor  abridge  the 
freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press,  nor  invade  the  right  of  the  people 
to  be  secure  in  their  persons,  houses,  papers,  and  effects,  nor  enact 
laws  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion.  These  are  general  lim 
itations.  Congress  cannot  do  these  things  any  where.  The  exact 
import,  therefore,  of  the  clause  **  in  all  cases  whatsoever,"  is,  on  all 
subjects  within  the  appropriate  sphere  of  legislation.  Some  legisla 
tures  are  restrained  by  constitutions,  from  the  exercise  of  powers 
strictly  within  the  proper  sphere  of  legislation.  Congressional  power 
over  the  District  has  no  such  restraint.  It  traverses  the  whole  field 
of  legitimate  legislation.  All  the  power  which  any  legislature  has 
within  its  own  jurisdiction,  Congress  holds  over  the  District  of  Colum 
bia. 

It  has  been  objected  that  the  clause  in  question  respects  merely 


M205631 


police  regulations,  and  that  its  sole  design  was  to  enable  Congress  to 
protect  itself  against  popular  tumults.  But  if  the  convention  that 
framed  the  Constitution  aimed  to  provide  for  a  single  case  only,  why 
did  they  provide  for  "  all  cases  whatsoever  ?"  Besides,  this  clause 
was  opposed  in  many  of  the  state  conventions,  because  the  grant  of 
power  was  extended  to  "  all  cases  whatsoever,"  instead  of  being  re 
stricted  to  police  regulations  alone.  In  the  Virginia  Convention, 
George  Mason,  the  father  of  the  Virginia  Constitution,  Patrick  Henry, 
Mr.  Grayson,  and  others,  assailed  it  on  that  ground.  Mr.  Mason  said, 
"  This  clause  gives  an  unlimited  authority  in  every  possible  case  within 
the  District.  He  would  willingly  give  them  exclusive  power  as  far  as 
respected  the  police  and  good  government  of  the  place,  but  he  would 
give  them  no  more."  Mr.  Grayson  exclaimed  against  so  large  a 
grant  of  power — said  that  control  over  the  police  was  all-sufficient, 
and  "  that  the  Continental  Congress  never  had  an  idea  of  exclusive 
legislation  in  all  cases."  Patrick  Henry  said  :  "  Shall  we  be  told, 
\vhen*about  to  grant  such  illimitable  authority,  that  it  will  never  be 
exercised  ?  Is  it  consistent  with  any  principle  of  prudence  or  good 
policy,  to  grant  unlimited,  unbounded  authority  ?"  Mr.  Madison  said 
in  reply  :  "  I  did  conceive  that  the  clause  under  consideration  was  one 
of  those  parts  which  would  speak  its  own  praise.  I  cannot  com- 
prehend  that  the  power  of  legislation  over  a  small  District,  will  involve 
the  dangers  which  he  apprehends.  .JVhen  any  power  is  given,  its  del 
egation  necessarily  involves  authority  to  make  laws  to  execute  it. 
*  *  *  *  The  powers  which  are  found  necessary  to  be  given,  are 
therefore  delegated  generally r,  and  particular  and  minute  specification 
is  left  to  the  Legislature.  *  *  *  It  is  not  within  the  limits  of  human 
capacity  to  delineate  on  paper  all  those  particular  cases  and  circum 
stances,  in  which  legislation  by  the  general  legislature,  would  be  ne 
cessary."  Governor  Randolph  said  :  "  Holland  has  no  ten  miles 
square,  but  she  has  the  Hague  where  the  deputies  of  the  States  assem 
ble.  But  the  influence  which  it  has  given  the  province  of  Holland,  to 
have  the  seat  of  government  within  its  territory,  subject  in  some  re 
spects  to  its  control,  has  been  injurious  to  the  other  provinces.  The 
wisdom  of  the  convention  is  therefore  manifest  in  granting  to  Congress 
exclusive  jurisdiction  over  the  place  of  their  session."  (See  debates 
in  the  Virginia  Convention,  p.  320.)  In  the  forty-third  number  of  the 
" Federalist,"  Mr.  Madison  says:  "The  indispensable  necessity  of 
complete  authority  at  the  seat  of  government,  carries  its  own  evidence 
with  it." 

Finally,  that  the  grant  in  question  is  to  be  interpreted  according  to 
the  obvious  import  of  its  terms,  and  not  in  such  a  way  as  to  restrict  it 
to  police  regulations,  is  proved  by  the  fact,  that  the  State  of  Virginia 
proposed  an  amendment  to  the  United  States  Constitution  at  the  time 
of  its  adoption,  providing  that  this  clause  "  should  be  so  construed  as 
to  give  power  only  over  the  police  and  good  government  of  said  Dis 
trict,"  which  amendment  was  rejected.  Fourteen  other  amendments, 
proposed  at  the  same  time  by  Virginia,  were  adopted. 


The  former  part  of  the  clause  under  consideration,  *'  Congress 
shall  have  power  to  exercise  exclusive  legislation',"  gives  sole  jurisdic 
tion,  and  the  latter  part,  "  in  all  case's  whatsoever,"  defines  the  extent  of 
it.  Since,  then,  Congress  is  the  sole  legislature  within  the  District, 
and  since  its  power  is  limited  only  by  the  checks  common  to  all  legis 
latures,  it  follows  that  what  the  law-making  power  is  intrinsically  com 
petent  to  do  any  where,  Congress  is  competent  to  do  in  the  District  of 
Columbia. 

STATEMENT  OF  THE  QUESTION  AT  ISSUE. 

Having  disposed  of  preliminaries,  we  proceed  to  argue  the  real  ques 
tion  at  issue.  Is  the  law-making  power  competent  to  abolish  slavery 
when  not  restricted  in  that  particular  by  constitutional  provisions — or, 
Is  the  abolition  of  slavery  within  the  appropriate  sphere  of  legislation  ? 

InJeVery_go.tjer£iment,  absolute  sovereignty  exists  somewhere.     In 
the  United  States  it  exists  primarily  with  the  people,  and  ultimate  sove 
reignty  always  exists  with  them.    In  each  of  the  States,  the  legislature 
possesses  a  representative  sovereignty,  delegated  by  the  people  through 
the  Constitution — the  people  thus  committing  to  the  legislature  a  por 
tion  of  their  sovereignty,  and  specifying ...  in  their  constitutions  the 
amount  and  the  conditions  of  the  grant.  (  That  the  people  in  any  state  } 
where  slavery  exists,  have  the  power  to  abolish  it,  none  will  deny,    If 
the  legislature  have  not  the  power,  it  is  because  the  people  have  re 
served  it  to  themselves.     Had  they  lodged  with  the  legislature  "pow 
er  to  exercise  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases   whatsoever,"  they    | 
would  have  parted  with  their  sovereignty  over  the  legislation  of  the 
State,  and  so  far  forth  the  legislature  would  have  become  the  peoplet   \ 
clothed  with  all  their  functions,  and  as  such  competent,  during  ike  con- 
tinuance  of  the  grant,  to  do  whatever  the  people  might  have  done  be*   j 
fore  the  surrender  of  their  power:  consequently,  they  would  have  the   ! 
power  to  abolish  slavery  v  The  sovereignty  of  the  District  of  Columbia  -* 

exists  somewhere — where  is  it  toJgecT? The  citizens  of  the  District 

have  no  legislature  of  their  own,  no  representation  in  Congress,  and 
no  political  power  whatever.  Maryland  and  Virginia  have  surren 
dered  to  the  United  States  their  "  full  and  absolute  right  and  entire 
sovereignty,"  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  have  committed  to 
Congress  by  the  Constitution,  the  power  to  "  exercise  exclusive  legis 
lation  in  all  cases  whatsoever  over  such  District." 

Thus,  the  sovereignty  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  is  shown  to  reside  X  * 
solely  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States;  and  since  the  power  of  the 
people  of  a  state  to  abolish  slavery  within  their  own  limits,  results  from 
their  entire  sovereignty  within  the  state,  so  the  power  of  Congress  to 
abolish  slavery  in  the  District,  results  from  its  entire  sovereignty  within 
the  District.  If  it  be  objected  that  Congress  can  have  no  more  power 
over  the  District,  ^han  was  held  by  the  legislatures  of  Maryland  and 
Virginia,  we  ask  what  clause  in  the  constitution  graduates  the  power 
of  Congress  by  the  standard  of  a  state  legislature?  Was  the  United 
States  constitution  worked  into  its  present  shape  under  the  measuring 
line  and  square  of  Virginia  and  Maryland  ?  and  is  its  power  to  be  bev- 


elled  down  till  it  can  run  in  the  grooves  of  state  legislation  ?  There  is 
a  deal  of  prating  aboiU  constitutional  power  over  the  District,  as  though 
Congress  were  indebted  for  it  to  Maryland  and  Virginia.  The  powers 
of  those  states,  whether  few  or  many,  prodigies  or  nullities,  have  noth 
ing  to  do  with  the  question.  As  well  thrust  in  the  powers  of  the  Grand 
Lama  to  join  issue  upon,  or  twist  papal  bulls  into  constitutional  tether, 
with  which  to  curb  congressional  action.  The  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  gives  power  to  Congress,  and  takes  it  away,  and  it 
alone.  Maryland  and  Virginia  adopted  the  Constitution  before  they 
ceded  to  the  United  States  the  territory  of  the  District.  By  their  acts 
of  cession,  they  abdicated  their  own  sovereignty  over  the  District,  and 
.thus  made  room  for  that  provided  by  the  United  States  constitution, 
which  sovereignty  was  to  commence  as  soon  as  a  cession  of  territory 
by  states,  and  its  acceptance  by  Congress  furnished  a  sphere  for  its 
exercise. 

That  the  abolition  of  slavery  is  within  the  sphere  of  legislation,  I 
argue,  secondly,  from  the  fact,  that  slavery  as  a  legal  system,  is  the  crea 
ture  of  legislation.  (/The  law  by  creating  slavery,  not  only  affirmed  its 
existence  to  be  within  th'e  sphere  and  under  the  control  of  legislation, 
but  equally,  the  conditions  and  terms  of  its  existence,  and  the  question 
whether  or  not  it  should  exist..'  Of  course  legislation  would  not  travel 
out  of  its  sphere,  in  abolishing  what  is  within  it,  and  what  was  recog 
nised  to  be  within  it,  by  its  own  act.  Cannot  legislatures  repeal  their 
own  laws  ?  If  law  can  take  from  a  man  his  rights,  it  can  give  them 
back  again.  If  it  can  say,  "your  body  belongs  to  your  neighbor,"  it 
can  say,  «'  it  belongs  to  yourself,  and  I  will  sustain  your  right."  If  it  can 
annul  a  man's  right  to  himself,  held  by  express  grant  from  his  Maker, 
and  can  create  for  another  an  artificial  title  to  him,  can  it  not  annul 
the  artificial  title,  and  leave  the  original  owner  to  hold  himself  by  his 
original  title  ? 

3.  The  abolition  of  slavery  has  always  been  considered  within  the  ap 
propriate  sphere  of  legislation.  Almost  every  civilized  nation  has  abol 
ished  slavery  by  law.  The  history  of  legislation  since  the  revival  of 
letters,  is  a  record  crowded  with  testimony  to  the  universally  admitted 
competency  of  the  law-making  power  to  abolish  slavery  .Vjj^isjso 
manifestly  an  attribute  not  merely  of  absolute  sovereignty,  Euteven 
of  ordinary  legislation,  that  the  competency  of  a  legislature  to  exer 
cise  it,  may  well  nigh  be  reckoned  among  the  legal  axioms  of  the  ci 
vilized  world.  Even  the  night  of  the  dark  ages  was  not  dark  enough 
to  make  this  invisible^  "V" 

The  Abolition  oj&CWe  of  the  great  council  of  England  was  passed 
in  1102.  The  memorable  Irish  decree,  "  that  all  the  English  slaves 
in  the  whole  of  Ireland,  be  immediately  emancipated  and  restored  to 
their  former  liberty,"  was  issued  in  1171.  Slavery  in  England  was 
abolished  by  a  general  charter  of  emancipation  in  1381.  Passing 
over  many  instances  of  the  abolition  of  slavery  by  law,  both  during 
the  middle  ages  and  since  the  reformation,  we  find  them  multiplying 
as  we  approach  our  own  times.  In  1776  slavery  was  abolished  in 
Prussia  by  special  edict.  In  St.  Domingo,  Cayenne,  Guadaloupe 


and  Martinique,  in  1794,  where  more  than  600,000  slaves  were 
emancipated  by  the  French  government.  In  Java,  1811  ;  in  Ceylon, 
1815;  in  Buenos  Ayres,  1816;  in  St.  Helena,  1819;  in  Colombia, 
1821  :  by  the  Congress  of  Chili  in  1821  ;  in  Cape  Colony,  1823; 
in  Malacca,  1825  ;  in  the  southern  provinces  of  Birmah,  1826  ;  in 
Bolivia,  1826  ;  in  Peru,  Guatemala,  and  Monte  Video,  1828  ,  in  Ja 
maica,  Barbadoes,  Bermudas,  Bahamas,  the  Mauritius,  St.  Christo 
pher's,  Nevis,  the  Virgin  Islands,  Antigua,  Montserrat,  Dominica,  St. 
Vincents,  Grenada,  Berbice,  Tobago,  St.  Lucia,  Trinidad,  Honduras, 
Demarara,  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  on  the  1st  of  August,  1834. 
But  waving  details,  suffice  it  to  say,  that  England,  France,  Spain, 
Portugal,  Sweden,  Denmark,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Germany,  have  all 
and  often  given  their  testimony  to  the  competency  of  the  law  to 
abolish  slavery.  In  our  own  country,  the  Legislature  of  Pennsylvania 
passed  an  act  of  abolition  in  1780,  Connecticut,  in  1784  ;  Rhode  Island, 
1784  ;  New-York,  1799  ;  New-Jersey,  in  1804  ;  Vermont,  by  Con 
stitution,  in  1777  ;  Massachusetts,  in  1780  ;  and  New  Hampshire,  in 
1784. 

When  the  competency  of  thelaw-making  power  to  abolish  slavery, 
has  thus  been  recognised  every  where  and  for  ages,  when  it  has  been 
embodied  in  the  highest  precedents,  and  celebrated  in  the  thousand 
jubilees  of  regenerated  liberty,  is  it  forsooth  an  achievement  of  modern 
discovery,  that  such  a  power  is  a  nullity  ? — that  all  these  acts  of  abo 
lition  are  voioVand  that  the  millions  disenthralled  by  them,  are,  either 
themselves  or  their  posterity,  still  legally  in  bondage  ? 

4.  Legislative  power  has  abolished  slavery  in  its  parts.  The  law 
of  South  Carolina  prohibits  the  working  of  slaves  more  than  fifteen 
hours  in  the  twenty-four.  [See  Brevard's  Digest,  253.]  In  other 
words,  it  takes  from  the  slaveholder  his  power  over  nine  hours  of  the 
slave's  time  daily  ;  and  if  it  can  take  nine  hours  .it  may  take  twenty- 
four — if  two-fifths,  then  five-fifths.  The  laws  of  Georgia  prohibit 
the  working  of  slaves  on  the  first  day  of  the  week  ;  and  if  they  can 
do  it  for  the  first,  they  can  for  the  six  following.  Laws  embodying 
the  same  principle  have  existed  for  ages  in  nearly  all  governments 
that  have  tolerated  slavery. 

The  law  of  North  Carolina  prohibits  the  "  immoderate"  correction 
of  slaves.  If  it  has  power  to  prohibit  immoderate  correction,  it  can 
prohibit  moderate  correction — all  correction,  which  would  be  virtual 
emancipation  ;  for,  take  from  the  master  the  power  to  inflict  pain,  and 
he  is  master  no  lon'ger.  Cease  to  ply  the  slave  with  the  stimulus  of 
fear,  and  he  is  free.  Laws  similar  to  this  exist  in  slaveholding  govern 
ments  generally. 

The  Constitution  of  Mississippi  gives  the  General  Assembly  power 
to  make  laws  "  to  oblige  the  owners  cf  slaves  to  treat  them  with  hu 
manity."  The  Constitution  of  Missouri  has  the  same  clause,  and  an 
additional  one  making  it  the  DUTY  of  the  legislature  to  pass  such  laws 
as  may  be  necessary  to  secure  the  humane  treatment  of  the  slaves 
This  grant  of  power  to  those  legislatures  empowers  them  to  decide 


what  wand  what  is  not  "humane  treatment."  Otherwise  it  gives  no 
"  power  " — the  clause  is  mere  waste  paper,  and  flouts  in  the  face  of  a 
mocked  and  befooled  legislature.  A  clause  giving  power  to  require 
"  humane  treatment  "  covers  all  the  particulars  of  such  treatment — 
gives  power  to  exact  it  in  all  respects — requiring  certain  acts,  and 
prohibiting  others — maiming,  branding,  chaining  together,  allowing 
each  but  a  quart  of  corn  a  day,*  and  but  "one  shirt'  and  one  pair 
of  pantaloons"  in  six  months  f — separating  families,  destroying  mar. 
liage,  floggings  for  learning  the  alphabet  and  reading  the  Bible — 
robbing  them  of  their  oath,  of  jury  trial,  and  of  the  right  to  worship 
God  according  to  conscience — the  legislature  has  power  to  specify 
each  of  these  acts — declare  that  it  is  not  "humane  treatment,"  and 
PROHIBIT  it. — The  legislature  may  also  believe  that  driving  men  and 
women  into  the  field,  and  forcing  them  to  work  without  pay  as  long  as 
they  live,  is  not  "  humane  treatment,"  and  being  constitutionally 
bound  "to  oblige"  masters  to  practise  "  humane  treatment " — they 
have  the  power  to  prohibit  such  treatment,  and  are  bound  to  do  it. 

The  law  of  Louisiana  makes  slaves  real  estate,  prohibiting  the 
holder,  if  he  be  also  a  land  holder,  to  separate  them  from  the  soil.J 
If  it  has  power  to  prohibit  the  sale  without  the  soil,  it  can  prohibit  the 
sale  with  it ;  and  if  it  can  prohibit  the  sale  as  property,  it  can  prohibit 
the  holding  as  property.  Similar  laws  exist  in  the  French,  Spanish, 
and  Portuguese  colonies. 

The  law  of  Louisiana  requires  the  master  to  give  his  slaves  a  cer 
tain  amount  of  food  and  clothing,  (Martin's  Digest,  610.)  If  it  can 
oblige  the  master  to  give  the  slave  one  thing,  it  can  oblige  him  to  give 
him  another  :  if  food  and  clothing,  then  wages,  liberty,  his  own  body. 
Such  laws  exist  in  most  slaveholding  governments. 

By  the  slave  laws  of  Connecticut,  under  which  slaves  are  now  held, 
(for  even  Connecticut  is  still  a  slave  State,)  slaves  might  receive  and 
hold  property,  and  prosecute  suits  in  their  own  name  as  plaintiffs  : 
[This  last  was  also  the  law  of  Virginia  in  1795.  See  Tucker's 
"  Dissertation  on  Slavery,"  p.  73.]  There  were  also  laws  making 
marriage  contracts  legal,  in  certain  contingencies,  and  punishing  in 
fringements  of  them,  ["  Reeve's  Law  of  Baron  andFemme"  p.  340-1.] 
Each  of  the  laws  enumerated  above,  does,  in  principle,  abolish  slave 
ry  ;  and  all  of  them  together  abolish  it  in  fact.  True,  not  as  a  whole, 
and  at  a  stroke,  nor  all  in  one  place  ;  but  in  its  parts,  by  piecemeal,  at 
divers  times  and  places  ;  thus  showing  that  the  abolition  of  slavery  is 
within  the  boundary  of  legislation, 

*  Law  of  North  Carolina,  Haywood's  Manual,  524-5. 
t  Law  of  Louisiana,  Martin's  Digest,  610. 

t  Virginia  made  slaves  real  estate  by  a  law  passed  in  1705.  (Beverly's Hist. 
of  Va.,  p.  98.)  I  do  not  find  the  precise  time  when  this  law  was  repealed,  prob 
ably  v/hen Virginia  became  the  chief  slave  breeder  for  the  cotton-growing  and 
sugar-planting  country,  and  made  young  men  and  women  "  from  fifteen  to 
twenty-five  "  the  main  staple  production  of  the  State. 


5.  The  competency  of  the  law-making  power  to  abolish  slavery,  has 
been  recognized  by  all  the  slaveholding  States,  either  directly  or  by  im 
plication.  Some  States  recognize  it  in  their  Constitutions,  by  giving 
the  legislature  power  to  emancipate  such  slaves  as  may  «»  have  ren 
dered  the  state  some  distinguished  service,"  and  others  by  express 
prohibitory  restrictions.  The  Constitutions  of  Mississippi,  Arkansas, 
and  other  States,  restrict  the  power  of  the  legislature  in  this  respect. 
Why  this  express  prohibition,  if  the  law-making  power  cannot  abolish 
slavery  ?  A  stately  farce,  indeed,  formally  to  construct  a  special 
clause,  and  with  appropriate  rites  induct,  it  into  the  Constitution,  for 
the  express  purpose  of  restricting  a  nonentity  ! — to  take  from  the  law. 
making  power  what  it  never  had,  and  what  cannot  pertain  to  it !  The 
legislatures  of  those  States  have  no  power  to  abolish  slavery,  simply 
because  their  Constitutions  have  expressly  taken  away  that  power. 
The  people  of  Arkansas,  Mississippi,  &c.,  well  knew  the  competency 
of  the  law-making  power  to  abolish  slavery,  and  hence  their  zeal  to 
restrict  it.  The  fact  that  these  and  other  States  have  inhibited  their 
legislatures  from  the  exercise  of  this  power,  shows  that  the  abolition  of 
slavery  is  acknowledged  to  be  a  proper  subject  of  legislation,  when 
Constitutions  impose  no  restrictions. 

The  slaveholding  States  have  recognised  this  power  in  their 
laws.  The  Virginia  Legislature  passed  a  law  in  1786  to  prevent 
the  further  importation  of  Slaves,  of  which  the  following  is  an 
extract :  "  And  be  it  further  enacted  that  every  slave  imported  into 
this  commonwealth  contrary  to  the  true  intent  and  meaning  of  this 
act,  shall  upon  such  importation  become  free."  By  a  law  of  Virginia, 
passed  Dec.  17,  1792,  a  slave  brought  into  the  state  and  kept  there 
a  year,  \vasfree.  The  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals  at  the  December 
term  1813  (see  case  of  Stewart  vs.  Oakes,)  decided  that  a  slave  owned 
in  Maryland,  and  sent  by  his  master  into  Virginia  to  work  at  different 
periods,  making  one  year  in  the  whole,  became  free,  being  emancipa 
ted  by  the  law  of  Virginia  quoted  above.  North  Carolina  and  Geor 
gia  in  their  acts  of  cession,  transferring  to  the  United  States  the  terri 
tory  now  constituting  the  States  of  Tennessee,  Alabama  and  Mississippi, 
made  it  a  condition  of  the  grant,  that  the  provisions  of  the  ordinance 
.  of '87,  should  be  secured  to  the  inhabitants  with  the  exception  of  the  sixth 
article  which  prohibits  slavery ;  thus  conceding,  both  the  competency  of 
law  to  abolish  slavery,  and  the  power  of  Congress  to  do  it,  within  its 
jurisdiction.  Besides,  these  acts  show  the  prevalent  belief  at  that  time, 
in  the  slaveholding  States,  that  the  general  government  had  adopted 
a  line  of  policy  aiming  at  the  exclusion  of  slavery  from  the  entire  ter 
ritory  of  the  United  States,  not  included  within  the  original  States,  and 
that  this  policy  would  be  pursued  unless  prevented  by  specific  and  for 
mal  stipulation. 

Slaveholding  states  have  asserted  this  power  in  their  judicial  deci 
sions.  In  numerous  cases  their  highest  courts  have  decided  that  if  the 
legal  owner  of  slaves  takes  them  into  those  States  where  slavery  has 
been  abolished  either  by  law  or  by  the  constitution,  such  removal  eman- 


10 

cipates  them,  such  law  or  constitution  abolishing  their  slavery.  This 
principle  is  asserted  in  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Louisiana, 
in  the  case  of  Lunsford  vs.  Coquillon,  14  Martin's  La.  Reps.  401.  Also 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Virginia,  in  the  case  of  Hunter  vs.  Fulcher, 
1  Leigh's  Reps.  172.  The  same  doctrine  was  laid  down  by  Judge 
Washington,  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  in  the  case  of  But 
ler  vs.  Hopper,  Washington's  Circuit  Court  Reps.  508.  This  principle 
was  also  decided  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  in  Kentucky  ;  case  of  Ran- 
kin  vs.  Lydia,  2  Marshall's  Reps.  407  ;  see  also,  Wilson  vs.  Isbell,  5 
Call's  Reps.  425,  Spotts  vs.  Gillespie,  6  Randolph's  Reps.  566.  The 
State  vs.  Lasselle,  1  Blackford's  Reps.  60,  Marie  Louise  vs.  Mariot,  8 
La.  Reps.  475.  In  this  case,  which  was  tried  in  1836,  the  slave  had 
been  taken  by  her  master  to  France  and  brought  back  ;  Judge  Ma- 
thews,  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Louisiana,  decided  that  "residence 
for  one  moment"  under  the  laws  of  France  emancipated  her. 

6.  Eminent  statesmen,  themselves  slaveholders,  have  conceded  this 
power.  Washington,  in  a  letter  to  Robert  Morris,  dated  April  12, 
1786,  says :  "  There  is  not  a  man  living,  who  wishes  more  sincerely 
than  I  do,  to  see  a  plan  adopted  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  ;  but  there 
is  only  one  proper  and  effectual  mode  by  which  it  can  be  accom 
plished,  and  that  is  by  legislative  authority."  In  a  letter  to  Lafayette, 
dated  May  10,  1786,  he  says:  It  (the  abolition  of  (slavery)  certainly 
might,  and  assuredly  ought  to  be  effected,  and  that  too  by  legislative 
authority."  In  a  letter  to  John  Fenton  Mercer,  dated  Sept.  9,  1786, 
he  says  :  "  It  is  among  my  first  wishes  to  see  some  plan  adopted  by 
which  slavery  in  this  country  may  be  abolished  by  law."  In  a  letter 
to  Sir  John  Sinclair,  he  says  :  *'  There  are  in  Pennsylvania,  laws  for 
the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery,  which  neither  Maryland  nor  Virginia 
have  at  present,  but  which  nothing  is  more  certain  than  that  they  must 
have,  and  at  a  period  not  remote."  Speaking  of  movements  in  the 
Virginia  Legislature  in  1777,  for  the  passage  of  a  law  emancipating 
the  slaves,  Mr.  Jefferson  says  :  "  The  principles  of  the  amendment 
were  agreed  on,  that  is  to  say,  the  freedom  of  all  born  after  a  certain 
day  ;  but  it  was  found  that  the  public  mind  would  not  bear  the  propo- 
lition,  yet  the  day  is  not  far  distant,  when  it  must  l)ear  and  adopt  it." — 
Jefferson's  Memoirs,  v.  1,  p.  35.  It  is  well  known  that  Jefferson, 
Pendleton,  Mason,  Wythe  and  Lee,  while  acting  as  a  committee  of  the 
Virginia  House  of  Delegates  to  revise  the  State  Laws,  prepared  a  plan 
for  the  gradual  emancipation  of  the  slaves  by  law.  These  men  were 
the  great  lights  of  Virginia.  Mason,  the  author  of  the  Virginia  Con 
stitution  ;  Pendleton,  the  President  of  the  memorable  Virginia  Conven 
tion  in  1787,  and  President  of  the  Virginia  Court  of  Appeals  ;  Wythe 
was  the  Blackstone  of  the  Virginia  bench,  for  a  quarter  of  a  century 
Chancellor  of  the  State,  the  professor  of  law  in  the  University  of  Wil 
liam  and  Mary,  and  the  preceptor  of  Jefferson,  Madison,  and  Chief 
Justice  Marshall.  He  was  author  of  the  celebrated  remonstrance  to 
the  English  House  of  Commons  on  the  subject  of  the  stamp  act.  As 
to  Jefferson,  his  name  is  his  biography. 


11 

Every  slaveholding  member  of  Congress  from  the  States  of  Mary 
land,  Virginia,  North  and  South  Carolina,  and  Georgia,  voted  for  the 
celebrated  ordinance  of  1787,  which  abolishedi\\Q  slavery  then  existing 
in  the  Northwest  Territory.  Patrick  Henry,  in  his  well  known  letter 
to  Robert  Pleasants,  of  Virginia,  January  IS,  1773,  says  :  "I  believe 
a  time  will  come  when  an  opportunity  will  be  offered  to  abolish  this  la 
mentable  evil."  William  Pinkney,  of  Maryland,  advocated  the  aboli 
tion  of  slavery  by  law,  in  the  legislature  of  that  State,  in  1739.  Luther 
Martin  urged  the  same  measure  both  in  the  Federal  Convention,  and 
in  his  report  to  the  Legislature  of  Maryland.  In  1796,  St.  George 
Tucker,  professor  of  law  in  the  University  of  William  and  Mary,  and 
Judge  of  the  General  Court,  published  an  elaborate  dissertation  on  sla 
very,  addressed  to  the  General  Assembly  of  the  State,  and  urging  upon 
them  the  abolition  of  slavery  by  law. 

John  Jay,  while  New-York  was  yet  a  slave  State,  and  himself  in  law 
a  slaveholder,  said  in  a  letter  from  Spain,  in  1786,  "  An  excellent  law 
might  be  made  out  of  the  Pennsylvania  one,  for  the  gradual  abolition 
of  slavery.  Were  I  in  your  legislature,  I  would  present  a  bill  for  the 
purpose,  drawn  up  with  great  care,  and  I  would  never  cease  moving  it 
till  it  became  a  law,  or  I  ceased  to  be  a  member." 

Daniel  D.  Tompkins,  in  a  message  to  the  Legislature  of  New-York, 
January  8,  1812,  said  :  "  To  devise  the  means  for  the  gradual  and  ul 
timate  extermination  from  amongst  us  of  slavery,  is  a  work  worthy  the 
representatives  of  a  polished  and  enlightened  nation." 

The  Virginia  Legislature  asserted  this  power  in  1832.  At  the 
close  of  a  month's- debate,  the  following  proceedings  were  had.  I  ex 
tract  from  an  editorial  article  of  the  Richmond  Whig,  of  January  26, 
1832. 

"  The  report  of  the  Select  Committee,  adverse  to  legislation  on 
the  subject  of  Abolition,  was  in  these  words  :  Resolved,  as  the  opin 
ion  of  this  Committee,  that  it  is  INEXPEDIENT  FOR  THE  PRESETS,  to 
make  any  legislative  enactments  for  the  abolition  of  Slavery."  This 
Report  Mr.  Preston  moved  to  reverse,  and  thus  to  declare  that  it  was 
expedient,  now  to  make  Legislative  enactments  for  the  abolition  of 
slavery.  This  was  meeting  the  question  in  its  strongest  form.  It  de 
manded  action,  and  immediate  action.  On  this  proposition  the  vote 
was  58  to  73.  Many  of  the  most  decided  friends  of  abolition  voted 
against  the  amendment ;  because  they  thought  public  opinion  not  suffi 
ciently  prepared  for  it,  and  that  it  might  prejudice  the  cause  to  move 
too  rapidly.  The  vote  on  Mr.  Witcher's  motion  to  postpone  the  whole 
subject  indefinitely,  indicates  the  true  state  of  opinion  in  the  House. 
—That  was  the  test  question,  and  was  so  intended  and  proclaimed  by 
its  mover.  That  motion  was  negatived,  71  to  60  ;  showing  a  major 
ity  of  11,  who  by  that  vote,  declared  their  belief  that  at  the  proper 
time,  and  in  the  proper  mode,  Virginia  ought  to  commence  a  system 
of  gradual  abolition." 

8.  The  Congress  of  the  United  States  have  asserted  this  power. 
The  ordinance  of  '87,  declaring  that  there  should  be  "  neither  slavery 

2 


12 

nor  involuntary  servitude,"  in  the  North  Western  territory,  abolished 
the  slavery  then  existing  there.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Mississippi, 
in  its  decision  in  the  case  of  Harvey  vs.  Decker,  Walker's  Mi.  Reps. 
36,  declared  that  the  ordinance  emancipated  the  slaves  then  held 
there.  In  this  decision  the  question  is  argued  ably  and  at  great  length. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Louisiana  made  the  same  decision  in  the  case 
of  Forsyth  vs.  Nash,  4  Martin's  La.  Reps.  385,  The  same  doctrine 
was  laid  down  by  Judge  Porter,  (late  United  States  Senator  from 
Louisiana,)  in  his  decision  at  the  March  term  of  the  La.  Supreme 
Court,  1830,  in  the  case  of  Merry  vs.  Chexnaider,  20  Martin's 
Reps.  699. 

That  the  ordinance  abolished  the  slavery  then  existing,  is  also  shown 
by  the  fact,  that  persons  holding  slaves  in  the  territory  petitioned  for 
the  repeal  of  the  article  abolishing  slavery,  assigning  that  as  a  reason. 
"  The  petition  of  the  citizens  of  Randolph  and  St.  Clair  counties  in 
the  Illinois  country,  stating  that  they  were  in  possession  of  slaves, 
and  praying  the  repeal  of  that  act  (the  6th  article  of  the  ordinance  of 
'87)  and  the  passage  of  a  law  legalizing  slavery  there."  [Am.  State 
papers,  Public  Lands,  v.  1.  p.  69,]  Congress  passed  this  ordinance 
before  the  United  States  Constitution  was  adopted,  when  it  derived  all 
its  authority  from  the  articles  of  Confederation,  which  conferred  pow 
ers  of  legislation  far  more  restricted  than  those  conferred  on  Congress 
over  the  District  and  Territories  by  the  United  States  Constitution. 
Now,  we  ask,  how  does  the  Constitution  abridge  the  powers  which 
Congress  possessed  under  the  articles  of  confederation  ? 

The  abolition  of  the  slave  trade  by  Congress,  in  1808,  is  another 
illustration  of  the  competency  of  legislative  power  to  abolish  slavery. 
The  African  slave  trade  has  become  such  a  mere  technic,  in  common 
parlance,  that  the  fact  of  its  being  proper  slavery  is  overlooked.  The 
buying  and  selling,  the  transportation,  and  the  horrors  of  the  middle 
passage,  were  mere  incidents  of  the  slavery  in  which  the  victims  were 
held.  Let  things  be  called  by  their  own  names.  When  Congress 
abolished  the  African  slave  trade,  it  abolished  SLAVERY — supreme 
slavery — power  frantic  with  license,  trampling  a  whole  hemisphere 
scathed  with  its  fires,  and  running  down  with  blood.  True,  Congress 
did  not,  in  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade,  -abolish  all  the  slavery 
within  its  jurisdiction,  but  it  did  abolish  all  the  slavery  in  one  part 
of  its  jurisdiction.  What  has  rifled  it  of  power  to  abolish  slavery  in 
another  part  of  its  jurisdiction,  especially  in  that  part  where  it  has 
"  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever?" 

9.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  recognises  this  power  by 
tht  most  conclusive  implication.  In  Art.  1,  sec.  3,  clause  1,  it  prohibits 
the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade  previous  to  1808  :  thus  implying  the 
power  of  Congress  to  do  it  at  once,  but  for  the  restriction  ;  and  its  power 
to  do  it  unconditionally,  when  that  restriction  ceased.  Again :  In 
Art.  4,  sec.  2,  "  No  person  held  to  service  or  labor  in  one  state  under 
the  laws  thereof,  escaping  into  another,  shall  in  consequence  of  any 
law  or  regulation  therein,  be  discharged  from  said  service  or  labor." 


18 

This  clause  was  inserted,  as  all  admit,  to  prevent  the  runaway  slave 
from  being  emancipated  by  the  laws  of  the  free  states.  If  these  laws 
had  no  power  to  emancipate,  why  this  constitutional  guard  to  prevent  it  1 

The  insertion  of  the  clause,  was  the  testimony  of  the  eminent  jurists 
that  framed  the  Constitution,  to  the  existence  of  the  power,  and  their 
public  proclamation,  that  the  abolition  of  slavery  was  within  the  ap 
propriate  sphere  of  legislation.  The  right  of  the  owner  to  that  which 
is  rightfully  property,  is  founded  on  a  principle  of  universal  law,  and 
is  recognised  and  protected  by  all  civilized  nations ;  property  in  slaves 
is,  by  general  consent,  an  exception ;  hence  slaveholders  insisted  upon 
the  insertion  of  this  clause  in  the  United  States  Constitution,  that  they 
might  secure  by  an  express  provision,  that  from  which  protection  is 
withheld,  by  the  acknowledged  principles  of  universal  law.*  By  de 
manding  this  provision,  slaveholders  consented  that  their  slaves  should 
not  be  recognised  as  property  by  the  United  States  Constitution,  and 
hence  they  found  their  claim,  on  the  fact  of  their  being  "persons,  and 
held  to  service." 

But  waiving  all  concessions,  whether  of  constitutions,  laws,  judi 
cial  decisions,  or  common  consent!!  take  the  position  that  the  power 
of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  fee  District,  follows  from  the  fact, 
that  as  the  sole  legislature  there,  it  has  unquestionable  power  to  adopt 
the  Common  Law,  as  the  legal  system  within  its  exclusive  jurisdiction.* 
This  has  been  done,  with  certain  restrictions,  in  most  of  the  States, 
either  by  legislative  acts  or  by  constitutional  implication.  THE  COM 
MON  LAW  KNOWS  NO  SLAVES.  Its  principles  annihilate  slavery  wher 
ever  they  touch  it.  It  is  a  universal,  unconditional,  abolition  act. 
Wherever  slavery  is  a  legal  system,  it  is  so  only  by  statute  law, 
and  in  violation  of  common  law.  The  declaration  of  Lord  Chief 
Justice  Holt,  that  "  by  the  common  law,  no  man  can  have  pro 
perty  in  another,"  is  an  acknowledged  axiom,  and  based  upon  the 
well  known  common  law  definition  of  property.  "  The  subjects  of 
dominion  or  property  are  things ,  as  contra-distinguished  from  persons." 
Let  Congress  adopt  the  common  law  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  and 
slavery  there  is  at  once  abolished.  Congress  may  well  be  at  home 

*  The  fact,  that  under  the  articles  of  Confederation,  slaveholders,  whose 
slaves  had  escaped  into  free  states,  had  no  legal  power  to  force  them  back,— 
that  now  they  have  no  power  to  recover,  by  process  of  law,  their  slaves  who  es 
cape  to  Canada,  the  South  American  States,  or  to  Europe — the  case  already 
cited  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  of  Louisiana  decided,  that  residence  "for 
one  moment"  under  the  laws  of  France  emancipated  an  American  slave — the 
ease  of  Fulton,  vs.  Lewis,  3  Har.  and  John's  Reps.,  56,  where  the  slave  of  a  St. 
Domingo  slaveholder,  who  brought  him  to  Maryland  in  '93,  was  pronounced 
free  by  the  Maryland  Court  of  Appeals— these,  with  other  facts  and  cases 
"  too  numerous  to  mention,"  are  illustrations  of  the  acknowledged  truth  here 
asserted,  that  by  the  consent  of  the  civilized  world,  and  on  the  principles  of 
universal  law,  slaves  are  not  "  properly,"  but  self -proprietors,  and  that  when 
ever  held  as  property  under  law,  it  is  only  by  positive  legislative  acts,  forcibly 
setting  aside  the  law  of  nature,  the  common  law,  and  the  principles  of  universal 
justice  and  right  between  man  and  man,— principles  paramount  to  all  law,  and 
from  which  alone  law  derires  its  intrinsic  authoritative  sanction. 


14 

in  common  law  legislation,  for  the  common  law  is  the  grand  element 
of  the  United  States  Constitution.  All  its  fundamental  provisions  are 
instinct  with  its  spirit ;  and  its  existence,  principles  and  paramount  autho 
rity,  are  presupposed  and  assumed  throughout  the  whole.  The  pre 
amble  of  the  Constitution  plants  the  standard  of  the  Common  Law 
immovably  in  its  foreground.  "  We,  the  people  of  the  United  States, 
in  order  to  ESTABLISH  JUSTICE,  &c.,  do  ordain  and  establish  this  Con- 
stitution  ;"  thus  proclaiming  devotion  to  justice,  as  the  controlling  mo 
tive  in  the  organization  of  the  Government,  and  its  secure  establish 
ment  the  chief  object  of  its  aims.  By  this  most  solemn  recognition, 
the  common  law,  that  grand  legal  embodyment  of  "justice"  and  fun 
damental  right  was  made  the  groundwork  of  the  Constitution,  and 
intrenched  behind  its  strongest  munitions.  The  second  clause  of  Sec* 
9,  Art.  1 ;  Sec.  4,  Art.  2,  and  the  last  clause  of  Sec.  2,  Art.  3,  with 
Articles  7,  8,  9,  and  13  of  the  Amendments,  are  also  express  recogni 
tions  of  the  common  law  as  the  presiding  Genius  of  the  Constitution. 
By  adopting  the  common  law  within  its  exclusive  jurisdiction  Con 
gress  would  carry  out  the  principles  of  our  glorious  Declaration,  and 
follow  the  highest  precedents  in  our  national  history  and  jurispru 
dence.  It  is  a  political  maxim  as  old  as  civil  legislation,  that  laws  should 
be  strictly  homogeneous  with  the  principles  of  the  government  whose 
will  they  express,  embodying  and  carrying  them  out — being  indeed 
the  principles  themselves^  in  preceptive  form — representatives  alike  of 
the  nature  and  the  power  of  the  Government — standing  illustrations 
o£_its  genius  and  spirit,  while  they  proclaim  and  enforce  its  authority. 
s^Who  needs  be  told  that  slavery  is  in  antagonism  to  the  principles  of 
the  Declaration,  and  the  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  and  that  these  and 
the  principles  of  the  common  law  gravitate  toward  each  other  with 
irrepressible  affinities,  and  mingle  into  one  ?  The  common  law  came 
hither  with  our  pilgrim  fathers  ;  it  was  their  birthright,  their  panoply, 
their  glory,  and  their  song  of  rejoicing  in  the  house  of  their  pilgrim 
age.  It  covered  them  in  the  day  of  their  calamity,  and  their  trust 
was  under  the  shadow  of  its  wings.  From  the  first  settlement  of  the 
country,  the  genius  of  our  institutions  and  our  national  spirit  have 
claimed  it  as  a  common  possession,  and  exulted  in  it  with  a  common 
prider  i  A  century  ago,  Governor  Pownall,  one  of  the  most  eminent 
constitutional  jurists  of  colonial  times,  said  of  the  common  law,  "  In 
all  the  colonies  the  common  law,  is  received  as  the  foundation  and 
main  body  of  their  law."  In  the  Declaration  of  Rights,  made  by  the 
Continental  Congress  at  its  first  session  in  '74,  there  was  the  following 
resolution  :  "  Resolved,  That  the  respective  colonies  are  entitled  to  the 
common  law  of  England,  and  especially  to  the  great  and  inestimable 
privilege  of  being  tried  by  their  peers  of  the  vicinage  according  to  the 
course  of  that  law."  Soon  after  the  organization  of  the  general  go 
vernment,  Chief  Justice  Ellsworth,  in  one  of  his  decisions  on  the  bench 
of  the  United  States  Supreme  Cowrt,  said  :  *'  The  common  law  of  this 
country  remains  the  same  as  it  was  before  the  revolution."  Chief 
Justice  Marshall,  in  his  decision  in  the  case  of  Livingston  vs.  Jefferson, 


15 

said  :  '»  When  our  ancestors  migrated  to  America,  they  brought  with 
them  the  common  law  of  their  native  country,  so  far  as  it  was  appli 
cable  to  their  new  situation  and  I  do  not  conceive  that  the  revolution 
in  any  degree  changed  the  relations  of  man  to  man,  or  the  law  which 
regulates  them.  In  breaking  our  political  connection  with  the  parent 
state,  we  did  not  break  our  connection  with  each  other."  [See 
Hairs  Law  Journal,  new  series.'}  Mr.  Duponceau,  in  his  ''Disser 
tation  on  the  Jurisdiction  of  Courts  in  the  United  States,"  says,  "  I 
consider  the  common  law  of  England  the  jus  commune  of  the  United 
States.  I  think  I  can  lay  it  down  as  a  correct  principle,  that  the 
common  law  of  England,  as  it  was  at  the  time  of  the  declaration*  of 
Independence,  still  continues  to  be  the  national  law  of  this  country, 
so  far  as  it  is  applicable  to  our  present  state,  and  subject  to  the 
modifications  it  has  received  here  in  the  course  of  nearly  half  a 
century.  Chief  Justice  Taylor  of  North  Carolina,  in  his  decision  in 
the  case  of  the  State  vs.  Reed,  in  1823,  Hawkes5  N.  C.  Reps.  454, 
says,  "  a  law  of  paramount  obligation  to  the  statute  was  violated  by 
the  offence — COMMON  LAW,  founded  upon  the  law  of  nature,  and  con 
firmed  by  revelation."  The  legislation  of  the  United  States  abounds 
in  recognitions  of  the  principles  of  the  common  law,  asserting  their 
paramount  binding  power.  Sparing  details,  of  which  our  national 
state  papers  are  full,  we  illustrate  by  a  single  instance.  It  was  made 
a  condition  of  the  admission  of  Louisiana  into  the  Union,  that  the  right 
of  trial  by  jury  should  be  secured  to  all  her  citizens, — the  United 
States  government  thus  employing  its  power  to  enlarge  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  common  law  in  this  its  great  representative. 

Having  shown  that  the  abolition  of  slavery  is  within  the  compe 
tency  of  the  law-making  power,  when  unrestricted  by  constitutional 
provisions,  and  that  the  legislation  of  Congress  over  the  District  is 
thus  unrestricted,  its  power  to  abolish  slavery  there  is  established. 

Besides  this  general  ground,  the  power  of  Congress  to  abolish 
slavery  in  the  District  may  be  based  upon  another  equally  tenable. 
We  argue  it  from  the  fact,  that  slavery  exists  there  now  by  an  act  of 
Congress.  In  the  act  of  16th  July,  1790,  Congress  accepted  portions 
of  territory  offered  by  the  states  of  Maryland  and  Virginia,  and 
enacted  that  the  laws,  as  they  then  were,  should  continue  in  force, 
"  until  Congress  shall  otherwise  by  law  provide ;"  thus  making  the 
slave  codes  of  Maryland  and  Virginia  its  own.  Under  these  laws, 
adopted  by  Congress,  and  in  effect  re-enacted  and  made  laws  of  the 
District,  the  slaves  there  are  now  held. 

Is  Congress  so  impotent  in  its  own  "  exclusive  jurisdiction"  that 
it  cannot  "  otherwise  by  law  provide  ?"  If  it  can  say,  what  shall  be 
considered  property,  it  can  say  what  shall  not  be  considered  property. 
Suppose  a  legislature  enacts,  that  marriage  contracts  shall  be  mere 
bills  of  sale,  making  a  husband  the  proprietor  of  his  wife,  as  his  bona 
fide  property;  and  suppose  husbands  should  herd  their  wives  in  droves 
for  the  market  as  beasts  of  burden,  or  for  the  brothel  as  victims  of 
lust,  and  then  prate  about  their  inviolable  legal  property,  and  deny 


16 

the  power  of  the  legislature,  which  stamped  them  property,  to  undo 
its  own  wrong,  and  secure  to  wives  by  law  the  rights  of  human  beings. 
Would  such  cant  about  "  legal  rights"  be  heeded  where  reason  and 
justice  held  sway,  and  where  law,  based  upon  fundamental  morality, 
received  homage  ?  If  a  frantic  legislature  pronounces  woman  a 
chattel,  has  it  no  power,  with  returning  reason,  to  take  back  the  blas 
phemy  ?  Is  the  impious  edict  irrepealable  ?  Be  it,  that  with  legal 
forms  it  has  stamped  wives  "wares."  Can  no  legislation  blot  out  the 
brand  ?  Must  the  handwriting  of  Deity  on  human  nature  be  expunged 
for  ever  ?  Has  law  no  power  to  stay  the  erasing  pen,  and  tear  off 
the  scrawled  label  that  covers  up  the  IMAGE  OF  GOD  ?  We  now  pro 
ceed  to  show  that 

THE   POWER   OF   CONGRESS  TO  ABOLISH  SLAYERY   IN   THE   DISTRICT   HAS 
BEEN,   TILL    RECENTLY,   UNIVERSALLY    CONCEDED. 

1.  It  has  been  assumed  by  Congress  itself.    The  following  record 
stands  on  the  journals  of  the  House  of  Representatives  for  1804,  p. 
225  :  "  On  motion  made  and  seconded  that  the  House  do  come  to  the 
following  resolution  :  « Resolved,  That  from  and  after  the  4th  day  of 
July,  1805,  all  blacks  and  people  of  color  that  shall  be  born  within 
the  District  of  Columbia,  or  whose  mothers  shall  be  the  property  of 
any  person  residing  within  said  District,  shall  be  free,  the  males  at 
the  age  of  — ,  and  the  females  at  the  age  of  — .     The  main  question 
being  taken  that  the  House  do  agree  to  said  motion  as  originally  pro 
posed,  it  was  negatived  by  a  majority  of  46.' "     Though  the  motion 
was  lost,  it  was  on  the  ground  of  its  alleged  inexpediency  alone,  and 
not  because  Congress  lacked  the  constitutional  power.     In  the  debate 
which  preceded  the  vote,  the  power  of  Congress  was  conceded.     In 
March,  1816,  the  House  of  Representatives  passed  the  following  reso 
lution  : — "  Resolved,  That  a  committee  be  appointed  to  inquire  into 
the  existence  of  an  inhuman  and  illegal  traffic  in  slaves,  carried  on  in 
and  through  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  to  report  whether  any  and 
what  measures  are  necessary  for  putting  a  stop  to  the  same." 

On  the  9th  of  January,  1829,  the  House  of  Representatives  passed 
the  following  resolution  by  a  vote  of  114  to  66  :  "  Resolved,  That  the 
Committee  on  the  District  of  Columbia  be  instructed  to  inquire  into  the 
expediency  of  providing  by  law  for  the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery 
within  the  District,  in  such  manner  that  the  interests  of  no  individual 
shall  be  injured  thereby."  Among  those  who  voted  in  the  affirmative 
were  Messrs.  Barney  of  Md.,  Armstrong  of  Va.,  A.  H.  Shepperd  of 
N.  C.,  Blair  of  Tenn.,  Chilton  and  Lyon  of  Ky.,  Johns  of  Delaware, 
and  others  from  slave  states. 

2.  It  has  been  conceded  directly,  or  impliedly,  by  all  the  com 
mittees  on  the  District  of  Columbia  that  have  reported  on  the  subject. 
In  a  report  of  the  committee  on  the  District,  Jan.  11,  1837,  by  their 
chairman,  Mr.  Powell  of  Virginia,  there  is  the  following  declaration  : 
"  The  Congress  of  the  United  States,  has  by  the  constitution  exclusive 
jurisdiction  over  the  District,  and  has  power  upon  this  subject,  (slavery) 


17 

as  upon  all  other  subjects  of  legislation,  to  exercise  unlimited  discre 
tion."  Reps,  of  Comms.  2d  Session,  19th  Cong.  v.  I.  No.  43.  In 
February,  1829,  the  committee  on  the  District,  Mr.  Alexander  of 
Virginia,  Chairman,  in  their  report  pursuant  to  Mr.  Miner's  resolu 
tions,  recognize  a  contingent  abolition  proceeding  upon  the  consent  of 
the  people.  In  December,  1831,  the  committee  on  the  District,  Mr. 
Doddridge  of  Virginia,  Chairman,  reported,  "  That  until  the  adjoining 
states  act  on  the  subject  (slavery)  it  would  be  (not  unconstitutional 
but)  unwise  and  impolitic,  if  not  unjust,  for  Congress  to  interfere." 
In  April,  1836,  a  special  committee  on  abolition  memorials  reported 
the  following  resolutions  by  their  Chairman,  Mr.  Pinckney  of  South 
Carolina :  "  Resolved,  That  Congress  possesses  no  constitutional 
authority  to  interfere  in  any  way  with  the  institution  of  slavery  in  any 
of  the  states  of  this  confederacy." 

"  Resolved,  That  Congress  ought  not  to  interfere  in  any  way  with 
slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia."  "  Ought  not  to  interfere,"  care- 
fully  avoiding  the  phraseology  of  the  first  resolution,  and  thus  in  effect 
conceding  the  constitutional  power.  In  a  widely  circulated  "  Address 
to  the  electors  of  the  Charleston  District,"  Mr.  Pinckney  is  thus  de 
nounced  by  his  own  constituents :  "  He  has  proposed  a  resolution 
which  is  received  by  the  plain  common  sense  of  the  whole  country  as 
a  concession  that  Congress  has  authority  to  abolish  slavery  in  the 
District  of  Columbia." 

3.  It  has  been  conceded  by  the  citizens  of  the  District.    A  petition 
for  the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District,  signed  by  nearly 
eleven  hundred  of  its  citizens,  was  presented  to  Congress,  March  24, 
1837.    Among  the  signers  to  this  petition,  were  Chief  Justice  Cranch, 
Judge  Van  Ness,  Judge  Morsel,  Prof.  J.  M.  Staughton,  Rev.  Dr. 
Balch,  Rev.  Dr.  Keith,  John  M.  Munroe,  and  a  large  number  of  the 
most  influential  inhabitants  of  the  District.     Mr.  Dickson,  of  New 
York,  asserted  on  the  floor  of  Congress  in  1835,  that  the  signers  of 
this  petition  owned  more  than  half  of  the  property  in  the  District. 
The  accuracy  of  this  statement  has  never  been  questioned. 

This  power  has  been  conceded  by  grand  juries  of  the  District. 
The  grand  jury  of  the  county  of  Alexandria,  at  the  March  term  1802, 
presented  the  domestic  slave  trade  as  a  grievance,  and  said,  "  We 
consider  these  grievances  demanding  legislative  redress."  Jan.  19, 
1829,  Mr.  Alexander,  of  Virginia,  presented  a  representation  of  the 
grand  jury  in  the  city  of  Washington,  remonstrating  against  "  any 
measure  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  within  said  District,  unless  ac 
companied  by  measures  for  the  removal  of  the  emancipated  from  the 
same  ;"  thus,  not  only  conceding  the  power  to  emancipate  slaves,  but 
affirming  an  additional  power,  that  of  excluding  them  when  free.  See 
Journal  >I.  R.  1828-9,  p.  174. 

4.  This  power  has  been  conceded  by  State  Legislatures.    In  1828 
the  Legislature  of  Pennsylvania  instructed  their  Senators  in  Congress 
"  to  procure,  if  practicable,  the  passage  of  a  law  to  abolish  slavery 
in  the  District  of  Columbia."    Jan.  28,  1829,  the  House  of  Assembly 


18 

of  New  York  passed  a  resolution,  that  their  "  Senators  in  Congress 
be  instructed  to  make  every  possible  exertion  to  effect  the  passage  of 
a  law  for  the  abolition  of  Slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia."  In 
February,  1837,  the  Senate  of  Massachusetts  "  Resolved,  That  Con 
gress  having  exclusive  legislation  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  possess 
the  right  to  abolish  slavery  and  the  slave  trade  therein,  and  that  the 
early  exercise  of  such  right  is  demanded  by  the  enlightened  sentiment 
of  the  civilized  world,  by  the  principles  of  the  revolution,  and  by  hu 
manity."  The  House  of  Representatives  passed  the  following  reso 
lution  at  the  same  session  :  "  Resolved,  That  Congress  having  exclu 
sive  legislation  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  possess  the  right  to  abolish 
slavery  in  said  District,  and  that  its  exercise  should  only  be  restrained 
by  a  regard  to  the  public  good." 

November  1,  1837,  the  Legislature  of  Vermont,  Resolved,  that 
Congress  have  the  full  power  by  the  constitution  to  abolish  slavery 
and  the  slave  trade  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  in  the  territories." 
The  Legislature  of  Vermont  passed  in  substance  the  same  resolution, 
at  its  session  in  1836. 

May  30,  1836,  a  committee  of  the  Pennsylvania  Legislature  re 
ported  the  following  resolution  :  "  Resolved,  That  Congress  does  pos 
sess  the  constitutional  power,  and  it  is  expedient  to  abolish  slavery 
and  the  slave  trade  within  the  District  of  Columbia." 

In  January,  1836,  the  Legislature  of  South  Carolina  "  Resolved, 
That  we  should  consider  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Co 
lumbia  as  a  violation  of  the  rights  of  the  citizens  of  that  District  derived 
from  the  implied  conditions  on  which  that  territory  was  ceded  to  the 
General  Government."  Instead  of  denying  the  constitutional  power, 
they  virtually  admit  its  existence,  by  striving  to  smother  it  under  an 
implication.  In  February,  1836,  the  Legislature  of  North  Carolina 
"  Resolved,  That,  although  by  the  Constitution  all  legislative  power 
over  the  District  of  Columbia  is  vested  in  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  yet  we  would  deprecate  any  legislative  action  on  the  part  of 
that  body  towards  liberating  the  slaves  of  that  District,  as  a  breach  of 
faith  towards  those  States  by  whom  the  territory  was  originally  ceded, 
and  will  regard  such  interference  as  the  first  step  towards  a  general 
emancipation  of  the  slaves  of  the  South."  Here  is  a  full  concession 
of  the  power.  February  2,  1836,  the  Virginia  Legislature  passed 
unanimously  the  following  resolution  ;  "  Resolved,  by  the  General 
Assembly  of  Virginia,  that  the  following  article  be  proposed  to  the 
several  states  of  this  Union,  and  to  Congress,  as  an  amendment  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States:  'The  powers  of  Congress  shall  not 
be  so  construed  as  to  authorize  the  passage  of  any  law  for  the  eman 
cipation  of  slaves  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  without  the  consent  of 
the  individual  proprietors  thereof,  unless  by  the  sanction  of  the  Legis 
latures  of  Virginia  and  Maryland,  and  under  such  conditions  as  they 
shall  by  law  prescribe.'" 

Fifty  years  after  the  formation  of  the  United  States  constitution  the 
states  are  solemnly  called  upon  by  the  Virginia  Legislature,  to  amen* I 


19 

that  instrument  by  a  clause  asserting  that,  in  the  grant  to  Congress  of 
"  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever"  over  the  District,  the 
"  case"  of  slavery  is  not  included  ! !  What  could  have  dictated  such 
a  resolution  but  the  conviction  that  the  power  to  abolish  slavery  is  an 
irresistible  interference  from  the  constitution  as  it  is.  The  fact  that 
the  same  legislature  passed  afterward  a  resolution,  though  by  no 
means  unanimously?  that  Congress  does  not  possess  the  power,  abates 
not  a  tittle  of  the  testimony  in  the  first  resolution.  March  23d,  1824, 
"  Mr.  Brown  presented  the  resolutions  of  the  General  Assembly  of 
Ohio,  recommending  to  Congress  the  consideration  of  a  system  for 
the  gradual  emancipation  of  persons  of  color  held  in  servitude  in 
the  United  States."  On  the  same  day,  "  Mr.  Noble,  of  Indiana,  com 
municated  a  resolution  from  the  legislature  of  that  state,  respecting 
the  gradual  emancipation  of  slaves  within  the  United  States."  Jour 
nal  of  the  United  States  Senate,  for  1824-5,  p.  231. 

The  Ohio  and  Indiana  resolutions,  by  taking  for  granted  the  gene 
ral  power  of  Congress  over  the  subject  of  slavery,  do  virtually  assert 
its  special  power  within  its  exclusive  jurisdiction. 

5.  The  power  of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District,  has 
been  conceded  by  bodies  of  citizens  in  the  slave  states.     The  petition 
of  eleven  hundred  citizens  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  in  1827,  has 
been  already  mentioned.     "  March  5,  1880,  Mr.  Washington  present 
ed  a  memorial  of  inhabitants  of  the  county  of  Frederick,  in  the  state 
of  Maryland,  praying  that  provision  may  be  made  for  the  gradual  abo 
lition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia."      Journal  H.   R.  1829 
—30,  p.  358. 

March  30,  1828.  Mr.  A.  H.  Shepperd,  of  North  Carolina,  present, 
ed  a  memorial  of  citizens  of  that  state,  "  praying  Congress  to  take 
measures  for  the  entire  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Colum 
bia."  Journal  H.  R.  1829—30,  p.  379. 

January  14, 1822.  Mr.  Rhea,  of  Tennessee,  presented  a  memo- 
rial  of  citizens  of  that  state,  praying  "  that  provision  may  bo  made, 
whereby  all  slaves  which  may  hereafter  be  born  in  the  District  of  Co 
lumbia,  shall  be  free  at  a  certain  period  of  their  lives."  Journal  H. 
R.  1821 — 22,  p.  142. 

December  13,  1824.  Mr.  Saunders  of  North  Carolina,  presented 
a  memorial  of  citizens  of  that  state,  praying  "  that  measures  may 
be  taken  for  the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  United  States. 
Journal  H.  R.  1824—25,  p.  27. 

December  16,  ]  828.  "  Mr.  Barnard  presented  the  memorial  of  the 
American  Convention  for  promoting  the  abolition  of  slavery,  held  in 
Baltimore,  praying  that  slavery  may  be  abolished  in  the  District  of 
Columbia."  Journal  U.  S.  Senate,  1828—29,  p.  24. 

6.  Distinguished  statesmen  and  jurists  in  the  slaveholding   states, 
have  conceded  the  power  of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District. 
The  testimony  of  Messrs.  Doddridge,  Powell,  and  Alexander,  of  Vir 
ginia,  Chief  Justice  Cranch,  and  Judges  Morsell  and  Van  Ness,  of  the 
District,  has  already  been  given.     In  the  debate  in  Congress  on  the 

3 


20 

memorial  of  the  Society  of  Friends,  in  1790,  Mr.  Madison,  in  speak- 
ing  of  the  territories  of  the  United  States,  explicitly  declared,  from  his 
own  knowledge  of  the  views  of  the  members  of  the  convention  that 
framed  the  constitution,  as  well  as  from  the  obvious  import  of  its  terms, 
that  in  the  territories  **  Congress  have  certainly  the  power  to  regulate 
the  subject  of  slavery."  Congress  can  have  no  more  power  over  the 
territories  than  that  of  "  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever," 
consequently,  according  to  Mr.  Madison,  "  it  has  certainly  the  power 
to  regulate  the  subject  of  slavery  in  the"  District.  In  March,  1816, 
John  Randolph  introduced  a  resolution  for  putting  a  stop  to  the  do 
mestic  slave  trade  within  the  District.  December  12,  1827,  Mr.  Bar 
ney,  of  Maryland,  presented  a  memorial  for  abolition  in  the  District, 
and  moved  that  it  be  printed.  Mr.  McDuffie,  of  South  Carolina,  ob 
jected  to  the  printing,  but  "  expressly  admitted  the  right  of  Congress 
to  grant  to  the  people  of  the  District  any  measures  which  they  might 
deem  necessary  to  free  themselves  from  the  deplorable  evil." — (See 
letter  of  Mr.  Claiborne,  of  Mississippi,  to  his  constituents,  published  in 
the  Washington  Globe,  May  9,  1836.)  The  sentiments  of  Henry 
Clay  on  the  subject  are  well  known.  In  a  speech  before  the  U.  S. 
Senate,  in  1836,  he  declared  the  power  of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery 
in  the  District  "  unquestionable."  Messrs.  Blair,  of  Tennessee,  Chil- 
ton,  Lyon,  and  Richard  M.  Johnson,  of  Kentucky,  A.  H.  Shepperd, 
of  North  Carolina,  Messrs.  Armstrong  and  Smyth,  of  Virginia,  Messrs. 
Dorsey,  Archer,  and  Barney,  of  Maryland,  and  Johns,  of  Delaware, 
with  numerous  others  from  slave  states,  have  asserted  the  power  of 
Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District.  In  the  speech  of  Mr. 
Smyth,  of  Virginia,  on  the  Missouri  question,  January  28,  1820,  he 
says  on  this  point  :  "  If  the  future  freedom  of  the  blacks  is  your  real 
object,  and  not  a  mere  pretence,  why  do  you  not  begin  here  ?  Within 
the  ten  miles  square,  you  have  undoubted  power  to  exercise  exclusive 
legislation.  Produce  a  bill  to  emancipate  the  slaves  in  the  District  of 
Columbia,  or,  if  you  prefer  it,  to  emancipate  those  born  hereafter." 

To  this  may  be  added  the  testimony  of  the  present  Vice  President 
of  the  United  States,  Hon.  Richard  M.  Johnson,  of  Kentucky.  In  a 
speech  before  the  United  States'  Senate,  February  1,  1820,  (National 
Intelligencer,  April  29,  1820,)  he  says:  "  Congress  has  the  express 
power  stipulated  by  the  Constitution,  to  exercise  exclusive  legislation 
over  this  Distsict  of  ten  miles  square.  Here  slavery  is  sanctioned  by 
law.  In  the  District  of  Columbia,  containing  a  population  of  30,000 
souls,  and  probably  as  many  slaves  as  the  whole  territory  of  Missouri, 

THE    POWER     OF     PROVIDING    FOR    THEIR     EMANCIPATION     RESTS     WITH 

CONGRESS  ALONE.  Why,  then,  let  me  ask,  Mr.  President,  why  all  this 
sensibility — this  commiseration — this  heart-rending  sympathy  for  the 
slaves  of  Missouri,  and  this  cold  insensibility,  this  eternal  apathy, 
towards  the  slaves  in  the  District  of  Columbia  ?" 

It  is  quite  unnecessary  to  add,  that  the  most  distinguished  northern 
statesmen  of  both  political  parties,  have  always  affirmed  the  power  of 
Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District.  President  Van  Buren  in 
his  letter  of  March  6,  1836,  to  a  committee  of  gentlemen  in  North 


21 

Carolina,  says,  "  I  would  not,  from  the  light  now  before  me,  feel  my 
self  safe  in  pronouncing  that  Congress  does  not  possess  the  power  of 
abolishing  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia."  This  declaration 
of  the  President  is  consistent  with  his  avowed  sentiments  touching  the 
Missouri  question,  on  which  he  coincided  with  such  men  as  Daniel  D. 
Tompkins,  De  Witt  Clinton,  and  others,  whose  names  are  a  host.* 
It  is  consistent  also,  with  his  recommendation  in  his  late  message  on 
the  5lh  of  last  month,  in  which,  speaking  of  the  District,  he  strongly 
urges  upon  Congress  "  a  thorough  and  careful  revision  of  its  local 
government,"  speaks  of  the  "  entire  dependence"  of  the  people  of  the 
District  "  upon  Congress,"  recommends  that  a  "  uniform  system  of  lo 
cal  government"  be  adopted,  and  adds,  that  "  although  it  v/as  selected 
as  the  seat  of  the  General  Government,  the  site  of  its  public  edifices, 
the  depository  of  its  archives,  and  the  residence  of  officers  intrusted 
with  large  amounts  of  public  property,  and  the  management  of  public 
business,  yet  it  never  has  been  subjected  to,  or  received,  that  special 
and  comprehensive  legislation  which  these  circumstances  peculiarly 
demanded." 

The  tenor  of  Senator  Tallmadge's  speech  on  the  right  of  petition, 
in  the  last  Congress,  and  of  Mr.  Webster's  on  the  reception  of  aboli 
tion  memorials,  may  be  taken  as  universal  exponents  of  the  sentiments 
of  northern  statesmen  as  to  the  power  of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery 
in  the  District  of  Columbia, 

After  presenting  this  array  of  evidence,  direct  testimony  to  show 
that  the  power  of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District,  has  al 
ways  till  recently  been  universally  conceded,  is  perhaps  quite  super 
fluous.  We  subjoin,  however,  the  following  : 

The  Vice-President  of  the  United  States  in  his  speech  on  the  Mis 
souri  question,  quoted  above,  after  contending  that  the  restriction  of 
slavery  in  Missouri  would  be  unconstitutional,  adds,  "  But  I  am  at  a 
loss  to  conceive  why  gentlemen  should  arouse  all  their  sympathies 
upon  this  occasion,  when  they  permit  them  to  lie  dormant  upon  the 
same  subject,  in  relation  to  other  sections  of  country,  in  which  THEIR 
POWER  COULD  NOT  BE  QUESTIONED."  Then  follows  immediately  the 
assertion  of  congressional  power  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District,  as 


*  Mr.  Van  Buren,  when  a  member  of  the  Senate  of  New- York,  voted  for 
the  following  preamble  and  resolutions,  which  passed  unanimously : — Jan.  28th, 
1820.  "  Whereas,  the  inhibiting  the  further  extension  of  slavery  in  the  United 
States,  is  a  subject  of  deep  concern  to  the  people  of  this  state :  and  whereas,  we 
consider  slavery  as  an  evil  much  to  be  deplored,  and  that  every  constitutional 
barrier  should  be  interposed  to  prevent  Us  further  extension :  and  that  the  consti 
tution  of  the  United  States  clearly  gives  congress  tke  right  to  require  new  states, 
not  comprised  within  the  original  boundary  of  the  United  States,  to  make  the 
prohibition  of  slavery  a  condition  of  their  admission  into  the  Union  :  Therefore, 

Resolved,  That  our  Senators  be  instructed,  and  our  members  of  Congress 
be  requested,  to  oppose  the  admission  as  a  state  into  the  Union,  of  any  territory 
not  comprised  as  aforesaid,  without  making  ill",  prohibition  of  slavery  therein 
an  indispensable  condition  of  admission. 


22 

already  quoted.  In  the  speech  of  Mr.  Smyth,  of  Va.,  also  quoted 
above,  he  declares  the  power  of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  the 
District  to  be  "  UNDOUBTED." 

Mr.  Sutherland,  of  Pennsylvania,  in  a  speech  in  the' House  of  Re 
presentatives,  on  the  motion  to  print  Mr.  Pinckney's  Report,  is  thus 
reported  in  the  Washington  Globe,  of  May  9th,  '36.  "  He  replied  to 
the  remark  that  the  report  conceded  that  Oongress  had  a  right  to 
legislate  upon  the  subject  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  said  that 

SUCH    A    RIGHT    HAD    NEVER    BEEN,    TILL   RECENTLY,    DENIED." 

The  American  Quarterly  Review,  published  at  Philadelphia,  with 
a  large  circulation  and  list  of  contributors  in  the  slave  states,  holds 
the  following  language  in  the  September  No.  1833,  p.  55  :  "  Under 
this  '  exclusive  jurisdiction,'  granted  by  the  constitution.  Congress  has 
power  to  abolish  slavery  and  the  slave  trade  in  the  District  of  Colum 
bia.  It  would  hardly  be  necessary  to  state  this  as  a  distinct  proposi. 
tion,  had  it  not  been  occasionally  questioned.  The  truth  of  the  asser 
tion,  however,  is  too  obvious  to  admit  of  argument — and  we  believe 

HAS  NEVER  BEEN  DISPUTED  BY  PERSONS  WHO  ARE  FAMILIAR  WITH  THE 
CONSTITUTION." 

Finally — an  explicit,  and  unexpected  admission,  that  an  "over 
whelming  majority"  of  the  present  Congress  concede  the  power  to 
abolish  slavery  in  the  District,  has  just  been  made  by  a  member  of 
Congress  from  South  Carolina,  in  a  letter  published  in  the  Charleston 
Mercury  of  Dec.  27,  well  known  as  the  mouth-piece  of  Mr.  Calhoun. 
The  following  is  an  extract : 

"  The  time  has  arrived  when  we  must  have  new  guarantees  under 
the  constitution,  or  the  Union  must  be  dissolved.  Our  views  of  the 
constitution  are  not  those  of  the  majority.  An  overwhelming  majority 
think  that  by  the  constitution.  Congress  may  abolish  slavery  in  the  Dis 
trict  of  Columbia — may  abolish  the  slave  trade  between  the  States ;  that 
is,  it  may  prohibit  their  being  carried  out  of  the  State  in  which  they  are 
— and  prohibit  it  in  all  the  territories,  Florida  among  them.  They  think, 
NOT  WITHOUT  STRONG  REASONS,  that  the  power  of  Congress  extends  to 
all  of  these  subjects. " 

In  another  letter,  the  same  correspondent  says  : 

"  The  fact  is,  it  is  vain  to  attempt,  AS  THE  CONSTITUTION  is  NOW, 
to  keep  the  question  of  slavery  out  of  the  Halls  of  Congress, — until,  by 
some  decisive  action,  WE  COMPEL  SILENCE,  or  alter  the  constitution, 
agitation  and  insult  is  our  eternal  fate  in  the  confederacy." 

OBJECTIONS   TO   THE  FOREGOING  CONCLUSIONS  CONSIDERED. 

We  now  proceed  to  notice  briefly  the  main  arguments  that  ,iave 
been  employed  in  Congress  and  elsewhere  against  the  power  of  Con 
gress  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District.  One  of  the  most  plausible,  is 
that  "  the  conditions  on  which  Maryland  and  Virginia  ceded  the  District 
to  the  United  States,  would  be  violated,  if  Congress  should  abolish 
slavery  there."  The  reply  to  this  is,  that  Congress  had  no  power  to 


23 

accept  a  cession  coupled  with  conditions  restricting  the  power  given 
it  by  the  constitution.  Nothing  short  of  a  convention  of  the  states, 
and  an  alteration  of  the  constitution,  abridging  its  grant  of  power, 
could  have  empowered  Congress  to  accept  a  territory  on  any  other 
conditions  than  that  of  exercising  "  exclusive  legislation,  in  all  cases 
whatsoever,"  over  it. 

To  show  the  futility  of  the  objection,  bere  follow  the  acts  of  ces 
sion.  The  cession  of  Maryland  was  made  in  November,  1788,  and 
is  as  follows  :  "  An  act  to  cede  to  Congress  a  district  of  ten  miles 
square  in  this  state  for  the  seat  of  the  government  of  the  United  States." 
"  Be  it  enacted,  by  the  General  Assembly  of  Maryland,  that  the 
representatives  of  this  state  in  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States,  appointed  to  assemble  at  New- York, 
on  the  first  Wednesday  of  March  next,  be,  and  they  are  hereby 
authorized  and  required  on  the  behalf  of  this  state,  to  cede  to  the  Con 
gress  of  the  United  States,  any  district  in  this  state,  not  exceeding  ten 
miles  square,  which  the  Congress  may  fix  upon,  and  accept  for  the 
seat  of  government  of  the  United  States."  Laws  of  Maryland,  vol. 
2,  chap.  46. 

The  cession  from  Virginia  was  made  by  act  of  the  Legislature  of 
that  State  on  the  3d  of  December,  1788,  in  the  following  words  : 

"  Be  it  enacted  by  the  General  Assembly,  That  a  tract  of  country, 
not  exceeding  ten  miles  square,  or  any  lesser  quantity,  to  be  located 
within  the  limits  of  the  State,  and  in  any  part  thereof,  as  Congress 
may,  by  law,  direct,  shall  be,  and  the  same  is  hereby  for  ever  ceded 
and  relinquished  to  the  Congress  and  Government  of  the  United  States, 
in  full  and  absolute  right,  and  exclusive  jurisdiction,  as  well  of  soil, 
as  of  persons  residing  or  to  reside  thereon,  pursuant  to  the  tenor  and 
effect  of  the  eighth  section  of  the  first  article  of  the  government  of 
the  constitution  of  the  United  States." 

But  were  there  no  provisos  to  these  acts  ?  The  Maryland  act 
had  none.  That  part  of  the  District  therefore,  which  includes  the 
cities  of  Washington  and  Georgetown,  can  lay  claim  to  nothing  with 
which  to  ward  off  the  power  of  Congress.  The  Virginia  act  had  this 
proviso  :  "  Sect.  2.  Provided,  that  nothing  herein  contained,  shall  bo 
construed  to  vest  in  the  United  States  any  right  of  property  in  the  soil, 
or  to  affect  the  rights  of  individuals  therein,  otherwise  than  the  same 
shall  or  maybe  transferred  by  such  individuals  to  the  United  States." 
This  specification  touching  the  soil  was  merely  definitive  and  ex 
planatory  of  that  clause  in  the  act  of  cession,  "full  and  absolute  right" 
Instead  of  restraining  the  power  of  Congress  on  slavery  and  other 
subjects,  it  even  gives  it  wider  scope  ;  for  exceptions  to  parts  of  a 
rule,  give  double  confirmation  to  those  parts  not  embraced  in  the 
exceptions.  If  it  was  the  design  of  the  proviso  to  restrict  congres 
sional  action  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  why  is  the  soil  alone  specified  ? 
As  legal  instruments  are  not  paragons  of  economy  in  words,  might 
not  "John  Doe,"  out  of  his  abundance,  and  without  spoiling  his  style, 
afforded  an  additional  word — at  lenst  a  hint — that  slnverv  was 


meant,  though  nothing  was  said  about  it  ?  The  subject  must  have 
been  too  "  delicate,"  even  for  the  most  distant  allusion  !  The  mystery 
of  silence  is  solved  ! ! 

But  again,  Maryland  and  Virginia,  in  their  acts  of  cession,  declare 
them  to  be  "  in  pursuance  of"  that  clause  of  the  constitution  which 
gives  to  Congress  "  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever  over" 
the  ten  miles  square — thus,  instead  of  restricting  that  clause,  both 
States  gave  an  express-  and  decided  confirmation  of  it.  Now,  their 
acts  of  cession  either  accorded  with  that  clause  of  the  constitution, 
or  they  conflicted  with  it.  If  they  conflicted  with  it,  accepting  the 
cessions  was  a  violation  of  the  constitution.  If  they  accorded,  the 
objector  has  already  had  his  answer.  The  fact  that  Congress  ac 
cepted  the  cessions,  proves  that  in  its  view  their  terms  did  not  conflict 
with  the  constitutional  grant  of  "  power  to  exercise  exclusive  legisla 
tion  in  all  cases  whatsoever  over  such  District."  The  inquiry  whether 
these  acts  of  cession  were  consistent  or  inconsistent  with  the  United 
States  constitution,  is  totally  irrelevant  to  the  question  at  issue.  What 
saith  the  CONSTITUTION  ?  That  is  the  question.  Not,  what  saith  Vir 
ginia,  or  Maryland,  or — equally  to  the  point — John  Bull  !  If  Mary 
land  and  Virginia  had  been  the  authorized  interpreters  of  the  consti 
tution  for  the  Union,  these  acts  of  cession  could  hardly  have  been 
magnified  more  than  they  were  by  Messrs.  Garland  and  Wise  in  the 
last  Congress.  A  true  understanding  of  the  constitution  can  be  had, 
forsooth,  only  by  holding  it  up  in  the  light  of  Maryland  and  Virginia 
legislation ! 

We  are  told,  again,  that  those  States  would  riot  have  ceded  the 
District  if  they  had  supposed  the  constitution  gave  Congress  power 
to  abolish  slavery  in  it. 

This  comes  with  an  ill  grace  from  Maryland  and  Virginia.  They 
knew  the  constitution.  They  were  parties  to  it.  They  had  sifted  it, 
clause  by  clause,  in  their  State  conventions.  They  had  weighed  its 
words  in  the  balance — they  had  tested  them  as  by  fire  ;  and  finally, 
after  long  pondering,  they  adopted  the  constitution.  And  afterward, 
self-moved,  they  ceded  the  ten  miles  square,  and  declared  the  cession 
made  "in  pursuance  of"  that  oft-cited  clause,  "Congress  shall  have 
power  to  exercise  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever  over 
such  District,"  &c.  And  now  verily  "  they  would  not  have  ceded  if 
they  had  supposed!"  &c.  Cede  it  they  did,  and  "  in  full  and  abso 
lute  right  both  of  soil  and  persons."  Congress  accepted  the  cession — 
state  power  over  the  District  ceased,  and  congressional  power  over  it 
commenced — and  now,  the  sole  question  to  be  settled  is,  the  amount  of 
poicer  oner  the  District,  lodged  in  Congress  by  the  constitution.  The 
constitution — the  CONSTITUTION — that  is  the  point.  Maryland  and 
Virginia  "suppositions"  must  be  potent  suppositions,  to  abrogate  a  clause 
in  the  United  States  Constitution !  That  clause  either  gives  Congress 
power  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District,  or  it  does  not — and  that  point 
is  to  be  settled,  not  by  state  "  suppositions,"  nor  state  usages,  nor 
state  legislation,  but  by  the  terms  of  the  clause  themselves. 


Southern  members  of  Congress,  in  the  recent  discussions,  have  con 
ceded  the  power  of  a  contingent  abolition  in  the  District,  by  suspend 
ing  it  upon  the  consent  of  the  people.  Such  a  doctrine  from  declaim- 
ers  like  Messrs.  Alford,  of  Georgia,  and  Walker,  of  Mississippi,  would 
excite  no  surprise  ;  but  that  it  should  be  honored  with  the  endorse 
ment  of  such  men  as  Mr.  Rives  and  Mr.  Calhoun,  is  quite  unaccount 
able.  Are  attributes  of  sovereignty  mere  creatures  of  contingency  ? 
Is  delegated  authority  mere  conditional  permission  1  Is  a  constitu 
tional  power  to  be  exercised  by  those  who  hold  it,  only  by  popular  suf 
ferance  ?  Must  it  lie  helpless  at  the  pool  of  public  sentiment,  waiting 
the  gracious  troubling  of  its  waters?  Is  it  a  lifeless  corpse,  save  only 
when  popular  "  consent"  deigns  to  puff  breath  into  its  nostrils  ?  Besides, 
if  the  consent  of  the  people  of  the  District  be  necessary,  the  consent 
of  the  whole  people  must  be  had — not  that  of  a  majority,  however 
large.  Majorities,  to  be  authoritative,  must  be  legal — and  a  legal  ma 
jority  without  legislative  power,  right  of  representation,  or  even  the 
electoral  franchise,  would  be  an  anomaly.  In  the  District  of  Colum 
bia,  such  a  thing  as  a  majority  in  a  legal  sense  is  unknown  to  law. 
To  talk  of  the  power  of  a  majority,  or  the  will  of  a  majority  there,  is 
mere  mouthing.  A  majority?  Then  it  has  an  authoritative  will 
— and  an  organ  to  make  it  known — and  an  executive  to  carry  it 
into  effect — Where  are  they?  We  repeat  it — if  the  consent  of  the 
people  of  the  District  be  necessary,  the  consent  of  every  one  is  neces 
sary — and  universal  consent  will  come  only  with  the  Greek  Kalends 
and  a  "  perpetual  motion."  A  single  individual  might  thus  perpetuate 
slavery  in  defiance  of  the  expressed  will  of  a  whole  people.  The 
most  common  form  of  this  fallacy  is  given  by  Mr.  Wise,  of  Virginia, 
in  his  speech,  February  16,  1835,  in  which  he  denied  the  power  of 
Congress  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District,  unless  the  inhabitants 
owning  slaves  petitioned  for  it !  !  Southern  members  of  Congress  at 
the  present  session  ring  changes  almost  daily  upon  the  same  fallacy. 
What !  pray  Congress  to  use  a  power  which  it  has  not  ?  "  It  is  re 
quired  of  a  man  according  to  what  he  hath"  saith  the  Scripture.  I 
commend  Mr.  Wise  to  Paul  for  his  ethics.  Would  that  he  had  got 
his  logic  of  him  !  If  Congress  does  not  possess  the  power,  why  taunt 
it  with  its  weakness,  by  asking  its  exercise  ?  Why  mock  it  by  de 
manding  impossibilities  ?  Petitioning,  according  to  Mr.  Wise,  is,  in 
matters  of  legislation,  omnipotence  itself;  the  very  source  of  all  consti 
tutional  power  ;  for,  asking  Congress  to  do  what  it  cannot  do,  gives  it 
the  power — to  pray  the  exercise  of  a  power  that  is  not,  creates  it.  A 
beautiful  theory  !  Let  us  work  it  both  ways.  If  to  petition  for  the 
exercise  of  a  power  that  is  not,  creates  it — to  petition  against  the  exer 
cise  of  a  power  that  is,  annihilates  it.  As  southern  gentlemen  are 
partial  to  summary  processes,  pray,  sirs,  try  the  virtue  of  your  own 
recipe  on  "  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever  ;"  a  better  sub 
ject  for  experiment  and  test  of  the  prescription  could  not  be  had.  But 
if  the  petitions  of  the  citizens  of  the  District  give  Congress  the  right  to 
abolish  slavery,  they  impose  the  duty  ;  if  they  confer  constitutional 


26 

authority,  they  create  constitutional  obligation.  If  Congress  may 
abolish  because  of  an  expression  of  their  will,  it  must  abolish  at  the 
bidding  of  that  will.  If  the  people  of  the  District  are  a  source  of  pow 
er  to  Congress,  their  expressed  will  has  the  force  of  a  constitutional 
provision,  and  has  the  same  binding  power  upon  the  National  Legisla 
ture.  To  make  Congress  dependent  on  the  District  for  authority,  is 
to  make  it  a  subject  of  its  authority,  restraining  the  exercise  of  its  own 
discretion,  and  sinking  it  into  a  mere  organ  of  the  District's  will.  We 
proceed  to  another  objection. 

"  The  southern  states  would  not  have  ratified  the  constitution,  if 
they  had  supposed  that  it  gave  this  power."  It  is  a  sufficient  answer 
to  this  objection,  that  the  northern  states  would  not  have  ratified  it,  if 
they  had  supposed  that  it  withheld  the  power.  If  "  suppositions"  are 
to  take  the  place  of  the  constitution — coming  from  both  sides,  they 
neutralize  each  other.  To  argue  a  constitutional  question  by  guessing 
at  the  "suppositions"  that  might  have  been  made  by  the  parties  to  it, 
would  find  small  favor  in  a  court  of  'aw.  But  even  a  desperate  shift 
is  some  easement  when  sorely  pushed.  If  this  question  is  to  be  settled 
by  "suppositions,"  suppositions  shall  be  forthcoming,  and  that  without 
stint. 

First,  then,  I  affirm  that  the  North  ratified  the  constitution,  "  sup« 
posing"  that  slavery  had  begun  to  wax  old,  and  would  speedily  vanish 
away,  and  especially  that  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade,  which  by  the 
constitution  was  to  be  surrendered  to  Congress  after  twenty  years, 
would  cast  it  headlong. 

Would  the  North  have  adopted  the  constitution,  giving  three-fifths 
of  the  "slave  property"  a  representation,  if  it  had  "  supposed"  that 
the  slaves  would  have  increased  from  half  a  million  to  two  millions  and 
a  half  by  1838 — and  that  the  census  of  1840  would  give  to  the  slave 
states,  oO  representatives  of  *•  slave  property  '?" 

If  they  had  "supposed"  that  this  representation  would  have  con 
trolled  the  legislation  of  the  government,  and  carried  against  the 
North  every  question  vital  to  its  interests,  would  Alexander  Hamil 
ton,  Benjamin  Franklin,  Roger  Sherman,  Elbridge  Gerry,  William 
Livingston,  John  Langdon,  and  Rufus  King  have  been  such  mad 
men,  as  to  sign  the  constitution,  and  the  Northern  States  such  sui 
cides  as  to  ratify  it  1  Every  self-preserving  instinct  would  have  shriek 
ed  at  such  an  infatuate  immolation.  At  the  adoption  of  the  United 
States  constitution,  slavery  was  regarded  as  a  fast  waning  system. 
This  conviction  was  universal.  Washington,  Jefferson,  Patrick 
Henry,  Grayson,  St.  George  Tuckei,  Madison,  Wythe,  (Pendleton, 
Lee,  Blair,  Mason,  Page,  Parker,  Edmund  Randolph,  Iredell,  Spaight, 
Ramsey,  William  Pinckney,  Luther  Martin,  James  McHenry,  Sam 
uel  Chase,  and  nearly  all  the  illustrious  names  south  of  the  Potomac, 
proclaimed  it  before  the  sun,  that  the  days  of  slavery  were  beginning 
to  be  numbered.  A  reason  urged  in  the j, convention  that  formed  the 
United  States  constitution,  why  the  word  slave  should  not  be  used  in 


27 

it,  was,  that  when  slavery  should  cease  there  might  remain  upon  the 
National  Charter  no  record  that  it  had  ever  been.  (See  speech  of 
Mr.  Burrill,  of  R.  I.,  on  the  Missouri  question.) 

I  now  proceed  to  show  by  testimony,  that  at  the  date  of  the  Uni 
ted  States  constitution,  and  for  several  years  before  and  after  that 
period,  slavery  was  rapidly  on  the  wane;  that  the  American  Rev 
olution  with  the  great  events  preceding  accompanying,  and  follow 
ing  it,  had  wrought  an  immense  and  almost  universal  change  in  the  pub- 
lie  sentiment  of  the  nation  on  the  subject,  powerfully  impelling  it  toward 
the  entire  abolition  of  the  system— and  that  it  was  the  general  belief 
that  measures  for  its  abolition  throughout  the  Union,  would  be  com 
menced  by  the  individual  States  generally  before  the  lapse  of  many 
years.  A  great  mass  of  testimony  establishing  this  position  is  at 
hand  and  might  be  presented,  but  narrow  space,  little  time,  the  pa 
tience  of  readers,  and  the  importance  of  speedy  publication,  counsel 
brevity.  Let  the  following  proofs  suffice.  First,  a  few  dates  as  points 
of  observation. 

The  first  general  Congress  met  in  1774.  The  revolutionary  war 
commenced  in  '75.  Independence  was  declared  in  '76.  The  articles 
of  confederacy  were  adopted  by  the  thirteen  states  in  '79,  Inde 
pendence  acknowledged  in  '83.  The  convention  for  forming  the  U. 
S.  constitution  was  held  in  '87,  the  state  conventions  for  considering 
it  in  '87,  and  '88.  The  first  Congress  under  the  constitution  in  '89. 

Dr.  Rush,  of  Pennsylvania,  one  of  the  signers  of  the  Declaration 
of  Independence,  in  a  letter  to  the  celebrated  Granville  Sharpe,  May 
1,  1773,  says  :  "  A  spirit  of  humanity  and  religion  begins  to  awaken 
in  several  of  the  colonies  in  favor  of  the  poor  negroes.  The  clergy 
begin  to  bear  a  public  testimony  against  this  violation  of  the  laws  of 
nature  and  Christianity.  Great  events  have  been  brought  about  by 
small  beginnings.  Anthony  Benezet  stood  alone  a  few  years  ago  in 
opposing  negro  slavery  in  Philadelphia,  and  NOW  THREE-FOURTHS  OF 

THE  PROVINCE  AS  WELL  AS  OF  THE  CITY  CRY  OUT  AGAINST  IT." (StU- 

art's  Life  of  Sharpe,  p.  21.) 

In  the  preamble  to  the  act  prohibiting  the  importation  of  slaves  in 
to  Rhode  Island,  June,  1774,  is  the  following  :  "  Whereas,  the  inhab 
itants  of  America  are  generally  engaged  in  the  preservation  of  their  own 
rights  and  liberties,  among  which  that  of  personal  freedom  must  be 
considered  the  greatest,  and  as  those  who  are  desirous  of  enjoying  all 
the  advantages  of  liberty  themselves,  should  be  willing  to  extend  per 
sonal  liberty  to  others,  therefore,"  &.c. 

October  20,  1774,  the  Continental  Congress  passed  the  following  : 
"  We,  for  ourselves  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  several  colonies  whom 
we  rep  resent,  firmly  agree  and  associate  under  the  sacred  ties  of  vir 
tue,  honor,  and  love  of  our  country,  as  follows  : 

"  2d  Article.  We  will  neither  import  nor  purchase  any  slaves  im 
ported  after  the  first  day  of  December  next,  after  which  time  we  will 
wholly  discontinue  the  slave  trade,  and  we  will  neither  be  concerned 

4 


28 

in  it  ourselves,  nor  will  we  hire  our  vessels,  nor  sell  our  commodities 
or  manufactures  to  those  who  are  concerned  in  it." 

The  Continental  Congress,  in  1775,  setting  forth  the  causes  and 
the  necessity  for  taking  up  arms,  say  :  *«  If  it  were  possible  for  men 
who  exercise  their  reason  to  believe  that  the  Divine  Author  of  our 
existence  intended  a  part  of  the  human  race  to  hold  an  absolute  prop 
erty  in,  and  unbounded  power  over  others,  marked  out  by  infinite  good 
ness  and  wisdom  as  the  objects  of  a  legal  domination,  never  rightfully 
resistible,  however  severe  and  oppressive,  the  inhabitants  of  these  col 
onies  might  at  least  require  from  the  Parliamentof  Great  Britain  some 
evidence  that  this  dreadful  authority  over  them  has  been  granted  to 
that  body." 

In  1776,  the  celebrated  Dr.  Hopkins,  then  at  the  head  of  New- 
England  divines,  published  a  pamphlet  entitled,  "  An  Address  to  the 
owners  of  negro  slaves  in  the  American  colonies,"  from  which  the  fol 
lowing  is  an  extract  :  "  The  conviction  of  the  unjustifiableness  of  this 
practice  (slavery)  has  been  increasing,  and  greatly  spreading  of  late, 
and  many  who  have  had  slaves,  have  found  themselves  so  unable  to 
justify  their  own  conduct  in  holding  them  in  bondage,  as  to  be  in 
duced  to  set  them  at  liberty.  May  this  conviction  soon  reach  every 
owner  of  slaves  in  North  America  !  *******  Slavery 
is,  in  every  instance,  wrong,  unrighteous,  and  oppressive — a  very  great 
and  crying  sin — there  being  nothing  of  the  kind  equal  to  it  on  the  face 
of  the  cart/i" 

The  same  year  the  American  Congress  issued  a  solemn  MANIFESTO 
to  the  world.  These  were  its  first  words  :  "  We  hold  these  truths  to 
be  self-evident,  that  all  men  are  created  equal,  that  they  are  endowed 
by  their  Creator  wit!)  certain  inalienable  rights ;  that  among  these 
arc  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness."  Once,  these  were 
words  of  power  ;  now, ';  a  rhetorical  flourish." 

The  celebrated  Patrick  Henry  of  Virginia,  in  a  letter,  of  Jan.  18, 
1773,  to  Robert  Pleasatits,  afterwards  president  of  the  Virginia  Aboli 
tion  Society,  says  :  '*  Believe  me,  I  shall  honor  the  Quakers  for  their 
noble  efforts  to  abolish  slavery.  It  is  a  debt  we  owe  to  the  purity  of 
our  religion  to  show  that  it  is  at  variance  with  that  law  that  warrants 
slavery.  I  exhort  you  to  persevere  in  so  worthy  a  resolution." 

In  1779,  the  Continental  Congress  ordered  a  pamphlet  to  be  pub 
lished,  entitled,  "  Observations  on  the  American  Revolution,"  from 
which  the  following  is  an  extract:  "  The  great  principle  (of  govern 
ment)  is  and  ever  will  remain  in  force,  that  men  are  by  nature  free ; 
as  accountable  to  him  that  made  them,  they  must  be  so  ;  and  so  long 
as  we  have  any  idea  of  divine  justice,  we  must  associate  that  of  7m- 
man  freedom.  Whether  men  can  part  with  their  liberty,  is  among 
the  questions  which  have  exercised  the  ablest  writers  ;  but  it  is  conce 
ded  on  all  hands,  that,  the  right  to  be  free  CAN  NKVEH  BE  ALIENATED — 
still  leys  is  it  practicable  for  one  generation  to  mortgage  the  privileges 
of  another." 


29 

Extract  from  the  Pennsylvania  act  for  the  Abolition  of  Slavery, 
passed  March  1,  1780:  *  :  "  We  conceive  that  it  is  our  duty, 

and  we  rejoice  that  it  is  in  our  power,  to  extend  a  portion  of  that  free 
dom  to  others  which  has  been  extended  to  us.  Weaned  by  a  long 
course  of  experience  from  those  narrow  prejudices  and  partialities  we 
had  imbibed,  we  find  our  hearts  enlarged  with  kindness  and  benevo 
lence  towards  men  of  all  conditions  and  nations  :  *  *  *  Therefore 
be  it  enacted,  that  no  child  born  hereafter  be  a  slave,"  &c. 

Jefferson,  in  his  Notes  on  Virginia,  written  just  before  the  close  of 
the  Revolutionary  War,  says  :  "  I  think  a  change  already  perceptible 
since  the  origin  of  the  present  revolution.  The  spirit  of  the  master  is 
abating,  that  of  the  slave  is  rising  from  the  dust,  his  condition  mollify 
ing,  the  way  I  hope  preparing  under  the  auspices  of  heaven,  FOR  A  TO 
TAL  EMANCIPATION,  and  that  this  is  disposed,  in  the  order  of  events,  to 
be  with  the  consent  of  the  masters,  rather  than  by  their  extirpation." 

In  a  letter  to  Dr.  Price,  of  London,  who  had  just  published  a 
pamphlet  in  favor  of  the  abolition  of  slavery,  Mr.  Jefferson,  then  Min 
ister  at  Paris,  (August  7,  1785,)  says  :  "  From  the  mouth  to  the  head 
of  the  Chesapeake,  the  bulk  of  the  people  will  approve  of  your  pamphlet 
in  theory,  and  it  will  find  a  respectable  minority  ready  to  adopt  it  in 
practice — a  minority  which,  for  weight  and  worth  of  character,  pre 
ponderates  against  the  greater  number."  Speaking  of  Virginia,  he 
says  :  "  This  is  the  next  state  to  which  we  may  turn  our  eyes  for  the 
interesting  spectacle  of  justice  in  conflict  with  avarice  and  oppression, 
— a  conflict  in  which  THE  SACRED  SIDE  is  GAINING  DAILY  RECRUITS. 
Be  not,  therefore  discouraged — what  you  have  written  will  do  a  great 
deal  of  good;  and  could  you  still  trouble  yourself  with  our  welfare,  no 
man  is  more  able  to  give  aid  to  the  laboring  side.  The  College  of 
William  and  Mary,  in  Williamsburg,  since  the  remodelling  of  its  plan, 
is  the  place  where  are  collected  together  all  the  young  men  of  Virgi 
nia,  under  preparation  for  public  life.  They  are  there  under  the  direc 
tion  (most  of  them)  of  a  Mr.  Wythe,  one  of  the  most  virtuous  of  char 
acters,  and  whose  sentiments  on  the  subject  of  slavery  are  unequivocal. 
I  am  satisfied,  if  you  could  resolve  to  address  an  exhortation  to  those 
young  men  with  all  that  eloquence  of  which  you  are  master,  that  its 
influence  on  the  future  decision  of  this  important  question  would  be  great, 
perhaps  decisive.  Thus,  you  see,  that  so  far  from  thinking  you  have 
cause  to  repent  of  what  you  have  done,  I  wish  you  to  do  more,  and  wish 
it  on  an  assurance  of  its  effect." — Jefferson's  Posthumous  Works,  vol. 
1,  p  268. 

In  1786,  John  Jay,  afterward  Chief  Justice  of  the  United  States, 
drafted  and  signed  a  petition  to  the  Legislature  of  New  York,  on  the 
subject  of  slavery,  beginning  with  these  words  : 

"  Your  memorialists  being  deeply  affected  by  the  situation  of  those, 
who,  although  FREE  BY  THE  LAWS  OF  GOD,  are  held  in  slavery  by  the 
laws  of  the  State,"  &c. 

This  memorial  bore  also  the  signatures  of  the  celebrated  Alex 
ander  Hamilton ;  Robert  R.  Livingston,  afterward  Secretary  of  Fo- 


30 

reign  Affairs  of  the  United  States,  and  Chancellor  of  the  State  of 
New  York  ;  James  Duane,  Mayor  of  the  City  of  New  York,  and 
many  others  of  the  most  eminent  individuals  in  the  Stale. 

In  the  preamble  of  an  instrument,  by  which  Mr.  Jay  emancipated 
a  slave  in  1784,  is  the  following  passage  : 

"  Whereas,  the  children  of  men  are  by  nature  equally  free,  and 
cannot,  without  injustice,  be  either  reduced  to  or  HELD  in  slavery." 

In  his  letter  while  Minister  at  Spain,  in  1786,  he  says,  speaking 
of  the  abolition  of  slavery  :  "Till  America  comes  into  this  measure, 
her  prayers  to  heaven  will  be  IMPIOUS.  This  is  a  strong  expression, 
but  it  is  just.  I  believe  God  governs  the  world  ;  and  I  believe  it  to 
be  a  maxim  in  his,  as  in  our  court,  that  those  who  ask  for  equity 
ought  to  do  it." 

In  1785,  the  New  York  Manumission  Society  was  formed. 
John  Jay  was  chosen  its  first  President,  and  held  the  office  five 
years.  Alexander  Hamilton  was  its  second  President,  and  after 
holding  the  office  one  year,  resigned  upon  his  removal  to  Philadelphia 
as  Secretary  of  the  United  States'  Treasury.  In  1787,  the  Pennsyl 
vania  Abolition  Society  was  formed.  Benjamin  Franklin,  warm  from 
the  discussions  of  the  convention  that  formed  the  United  States  con 
stitution,  was  chosen  President,  and  Benjamin  Rush,  Secretary — both 
signers  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  In  1789,  the  Maryland 
Abolition  Society  was  formed.  Among  its  officers  were  Samuel 
Chace,  Judge  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  and  Luther  Martin, 
a  member  of  the  convention  that  formed  the  United  States  constitu 
tion.  In  1790,  the  Connecticut  Abolition  Society  was  formed.  The 
first  President  was  Rev.  Dr.  Stiles,  President  of  Yale  College,  and 
the  Secretary,  Simeon  Baldwin,  (the  late  Judge  Baldwin  of  New 
Haven.)  In  1791,  this  Society  sent  a  memorial  to  Congress,  from 
which  the  following  is  an  extract : 

"From  a  sober  conviction  of  the  unrighteousness  of  slavery,  your 
petitioners  have  long  beheld,  with  grief,  our  fellow  men  doomed  to 
perpetual  bondage,  in  a  country  which  boasts  of  her  freedom.  Your 
petitioners  are  fully  of  opinion,  that  calm  reflection  will  at  last  con 
vince  the  world,  that  the  whole  system  of  African  slavery  is  unjust 
in  its  nature — impolitic  in  its  principles — and,  in  its  consequences, 
ruinous  to  the  industry  and  enterprise  of  the  citizens  of  these  States. 
From  a  conviction  of  these  truths,  your  petitioners  were  led,  by 
motives,  we  conceive,  of  general  philanthropy,  to  associate  ourselves 
for  the  protection  and  assistance  of  this  unfortunate  part  of  our  fellow 
men  ;  and,  though  this  Society  has  been  lately  established,  it  has  now 
become  generally  extensive  through  this  state,  and,  we  fully  believe, 
embraces,  on  this  subject,  the  sentiments  of  a  large  majority  of  its 
citizens." 

The  same  year  the  Virginia  Abolition  Society  was  formed.  This 
Society,  and  the  Maryland  Society,  had  auxiliaries  in  different  parts 
of  those  States.  Both  societies  sent  up  memorials  to  Congress.  The 
memorial  of  the  Virginia  Society  is  headed — "  The  memorial  of  the 


31 

Virginia  Society,  for  promoting  the  Abolition  of  Slavery,  &c."     The 
following  is  an  extract : 

"  Your  memorialists,  fully  believing  that  '  righteousness  exalteth 
a  nation,'  and  that  slavery  is  not  only  an  odious  degradation,  but  an 
outrageous  violation  of  one  of  the  most  essential  rights  of  human  nature, 
and  utterly  repugnant  to  the  precepts  of  the  gospel,  which  breathes 
'  peace  on  earth,  good  will  to  men  ;'  lament  that  a  practice,  so  incon 
sistent  with  true  policy  and  the  inalienable  rights  of  men,  should 
subsist  in  so  enlightened  an  age,  and  among  a  people  professing,  that 
all  mankind  are,  by  nature,  equally  entitled  to  freedom." 

About  the  same  time  a  Society  was  formed  in  New-Jersey.  It 
had  an  acting  committee  of  five  members  in  each  county  in  the  State. 
The  following  is  an  extract  from  the  preamble  to  its  constitution  : 

"  It  is  our  boast,  that  we  live  under  a  government  founded  on 
principles  of  justice  and  reason,  wherein  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit 
of  happiness,  are  recognised  as  the  universal  rights  of  men  ;  and 
whilst  we  are  anxious  to  preserve  these  rights  to  ourselves,  and  trans 
mit  them  inviolate,  to  our  posterity,  we  abhor  that  inconsistent,  illiberal, 
and  interested  policy,  which  withholds  those  rights  from  an  unfortu 
nate  and  degraded  class  of  our  fellow  creatures." 

Among  other  distinguished  individuals  who  were  efficient  officers 
of  these  Abolition  Societies,  and  delegates  from  their  respective  state 
societies,  at  the  annual  meetings  of  the  American  convention  for  pro 
moting  the  abolition  of  slavery,  were  Hon.  Uriah  Tracy,  United 
States'  Senator,  from  Connecticut ;  Hon.  Zephaniah  Swift,  Chief  Jus 
tice  of  the  same  State  ;  Hon.  Cesar  A.  Rodney,  Attorney  General  of 
the  United  States  ;  Hon.  James  A.  Bayard,  United  States  Senator,  from 
Delaware  ;  Governor  Bloomfield,  of  New  Jersey  ;  Hon.  Wm.  Rawle, 
the  late  venerable  head  of  the  Philadelphia  bar  ;  Dr.  Casper  Wistar, 
of  Philadelphia ;  Messrs.  Foster  and  Tillinghast,  of  Rhode  Island  ; 
Messrs.  Ridgeley,  Buchanan,  and  Wilkinson,  of  Maryland ;  and 
Messrs.  Pleasants,  McLean,  and  Anthony,  of  Virginia. 

In  July,  1787,  the  old  Congress  passed  the  celebrated  ordinance, 
abolishing  slavery  in  the  northwestern  territory,  and  declaring  that 
it  should  never  thereafter  exist  there.  This  ordinance  was  passed 
while  the  convention  that  formed  the  United  States  constitution  was 
in  session.  At  the  first  session  of  Congress  under  the  constitution, 
this  ordinance  was  ratified  by  a  special  act.  Washington,  fresh  from 
the  discussions  of  the  convention,  in  which  more  than  forty  days  had 
been  spent  in  adjusting  the  question  of  slavery,  gave  it  his  approval. 
The  act  passed  with  only  one  dissenting  voice,  (that  of  Mr.  Yates,  of 
New- York,)  the  South  equally  with  the  North  avoiding  the  jitness  and 
expediency  of  the  measure  on  general  considerations,  and  indicating 
thus  early  the  line  of  national  policy,  to  be  pursued  by  the  United 
States  Government  on  the  subject  of  slavery. 

In  the  debates  in  the  North  Carolina  Convention,  Mr.  Iredell, 
afterward  a  Judge  of  the  United  States'  Supreme  Court,  said,  "When 
the  entire  abolition  of  slavery  takes  place,  it  will  be  an  event 


32 

which  must  be  pleasing  to  every  generous  mind  and  every  friend 
of  human  nature."  Mr.  Galloway  said,  "  I  wish  to  see  this  abomi 
nable  trade  put  an  end  to.  I  apprehend  the  clause  (touching 
the  slave  trade)  means  to  bring  forward  manumission"  Luther 
Martin,  of  Md.,  a  member  of  the  convention  that  formed  the  United 
States  constitution,  said,  "  We  ought  to  authorize  the  General  Govern 
ment  to  make  such  regulations  as  shall  be  thought  most  advantageous 
for  the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery,  and  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves 
which  are  already  in  the  States."  Judge  Wilson,  of  Pennsylvania, 
one  of  the  framors  of  the  constitution,  said,  in  the  Pennsylvania  con 
vention  of  '87,  Deb.  Pa.  Con.  p.  303,  156  :  "  I  consider  this  (the  clause 
relative  to  the  slave  trade)  as  laying  the  foundation  for  banishing  slavery 
out  of  this  country.  It  will  produce  the  same  kind  of  gradual  change 
which  was  produced  in  Pennsylvania  ;  the  new  states  which  are  to  be 
formed  will  be  under  the  control  of  Congress  in  this  particular,  and 
slaves  will  never  be  introduced  among  them.  It  presents  us  with  the 
pleasing  prospect  that  the  rights  of  mankind  will  be  acknowledged  and 
established  throughout  the  Union.  Yet  the  lapse  of  a  few  years,  and 
Congress  will  have  power  to  exterminate  slavery  within  our  borders." 
In  the  Virginia  convention  of  '87,  Mr.  Mason,  author  of  the  Virginia 
constitution,  said,  "  The  augmentation  of  slaves  weakens  the  States, 
and  such  a  trade  is  diabolical  in  itself,  and  disgraceful  to  mankind. 
As  much  as  I  value  a  union  of  all  the  states,  I  would  not  admit  the 
southern  stated,  (i.  e.,  South  Carolina  and  Georgia,)  into  the  union, 
unless  they  agree  to  a  discontinuance  of  this  disgraceful  trade" 
Mr.  Tyler  opposed  with  great  power  the  clause  prohibiting  the  aboli 
tion  of  the  slave  trade  till  1808,  and  said,  '*  My  earnest  desire  is,  that 
it  shall  be  handed  down  to  posterity  that  I  oppose  this  wicked  clause." 
Mr.  Johnson  said,  <•  The  principle  of  emancipation  has  begun  since 
the  revolution.  Let  us  do  what  we  will,  it  will  come  round" — 
[Deb.  Va.  Con.  p.  463.]  Patrick  Henry,  arguing  the  power  of 
Congress  under  the  United  States  constitution  to  abolish  slavery  in 
the  States,  said,  in  the  same  convention,  "  Another  thing  will  contri 
bute  to  bring  this  event  (the  abolition  of  slavery)  about.  Slavery  is 
detested.  We  feel  its  fatal  effects  :  we  deplore  it  with  all  the  pity  of 
humanity."—  [Deb.  Va.  Con.  p.  431.]  In  the  Mass.  Con.  of  '88, 
Judge  Dawes  said,  "  Although  slavery  is  not  smitten  by  an  apoplexy, 
yet  it  has  received  a  mortal  wound,  and  will  die  of  consumption." — 
[Deb.  Mass.  Con.  p.  60.]  General  Heath  said  that,  "  Slavery  was 
confined  to  the  States  now  existing,  it  could  not  be  extended.  By  their 
ordinance,  Congress  had  declared  that  the  new  States  should  be  re 
publican  States,  and  have  no  slavery." — p.  147. 

In  the  debate  in  the  first  Congress,  February  llth  and  12th,  1789, 
on  the  petitions  of  the  Society  of  Friends,  and  the  Pennsylvania  Aboli 
tion  Society,  Mr.  Parker,  of  Virginia,  said,  "  I  hope,  Mr.  Speaker,  the 
petition  of  these  respectable  people  will  be  attended  to  with  all  the 
readiness  the  importance  of  its  object  demands ;  and  I  cannot  help  ex 
pressing  the  pleasure  I  feel  in  finding  so  considerable  a  part  of  the 


33 

community  attending  to  matters  of  such  a  momentous  concern  to  the 
future  prosperity  and  happiness  of  the  people  of  America.  I  think  it 
my  duty,  as  a  citizen  of  the  Union,  to  espouse  their  cause" 

Mr.  Page,  of  Virginia,  (afterward  Governor) — "  Was  in  favor  of 
the  commitment ;  he  hoped  that  the  designs  of  the  respectable  memo- 
riaiists  would  not  be  stopped  at  the  threshold,  in  order  to  preclude  a 
fair  discussion  of  the  prayer  of  the  memprial.  With  respect  to  the 
alarm  that  was  apprehended,  he  conjectured  there  was  none  ;  but  there 
might  be  just  cause,  if  the  memorial  was  not  taken  into  consideration. 
He  placecl  himself  in  the  case  of  a  slave,  and  said,  that  on  hearing 
that  Congress  had  refused  to  listen  to  the  decent  suggestions  of  a  respect 
able  part  of  the  community,  he  should  infer,  that  the  general  govern 
ment,  from  which  was  expected  great  good  would  result  to  EVERY  CLASS  of 
citizens,  had  shut  their  ears  against  the  voice  of  humanity,  and  he 
should  despair  of  any  alleviation  of  the  miseries  he  and  his  posterity 
had  in  prospect ;  if  any  thing  could  induce  him  to  rebel,  it  must  be  a 
stroke  like  this,  impressing  on  his  mind  all  the  horrors  of  despair. 
But 'if  he  was  told,  that  application  was  made  in  his  behalf,  and  that 
Congress  were  willing  to  hear  what  could  be  urged  in  favor  of  dis 
couraging  the  practice  of  importing  his  fellow-wretches,  he  would 
trust  in  their  justice  and  humanity,  and  wait  the  decision  patienily" 

Mr.  Scott,  of  Pennsylvania  :  **  I  cannot,  for  my  part,  conceive  how 
any  person  can  he  said  to  acquire  a  property  in  another ;  but  enough 
of  those  who  reduce  men  to  the  state  of  transferable  goods,  or  use 
them  like  beasts  of  burden,  who  deliver  them  up  as  the  property  or 
patrimony  of  another  man.  Let  us  argue  on  principles  countenanced 
by  reason,  and  becoming  humanity.  1  do  not  know  how  far  I  might 
go,  if  1  was  one  of  the  judges  of  the  United  States,  and  those  people 
were  to  come  before  me  and  claim  their  emancipation,  but  I  am  sure 
I  would  go  as  far  as  I  could" 

Mr.  Burke,  of  South  Carolina,  said,  "  He  saw  the  disposition  of  the 
House,  and  he  feared  it  would  be  referred  to  a  committee,  maugre  all 
their  opposition." 

Mr.  Smith,  of  South  Carolina,  said,  "  That  on  entering  into  this  go 
vernment,  they  (South  Carolina  and  Georgia)  apprehended  that  the  other 
states,  not  knowing  the  necessity  the  citizens  of  the  Southern  states 
were  under  to  hold  this  species  of  property,  would,  from  motives  of 
humanity  and  benevolence,  be  led  to  vote  for  a  general  emancipation ; 
and  had  they  not  seen,  that  the  constitution  provided  against  the  effect 
of  such  a  disposition,  I  may  be  bold  to  say,  they  never  would  have 
adopted  it.3' 

In  the  debate,  at  the  same  session,  May  13th,  1789,  on  the  peti 
tion  of  the  Society  of  Friends  respecting  the  slave  trade,  Mr.  Parker, 
of  Virginia,  said,  "  He  hoped  Congress  would  do  all  that  lay  in  their 
power  to  restore  to  human  nature  its  inherent  privileges,  and  if  possi 
ble,  wipe  off  the  stigma,  which  America  labored  under.  The  incon 
sistency  in  our  principles,  with  which  we  are  justly  charged  should  be 
done  away,  that  we  may  show  by  our  actions  the  pure  beneficence  of 


34 

the  doctrine  we  held  out  to  the  world  in  our  Declaration  of  Indcpen. 
dence." 

Mr.  Jackson,  of  Georgia,  said,  "  IT  WAS  THE  FASHION  OF  THE  DAY 

TO    FAVOR    THE    LIBERTY    OF   THE    SLAVES.        *****        What  JS 

to  be  done  for  compensation  ?  Will  Virginia  set  all  her  negroes  free  ? 
Will  they  give  up  the  money  they  have  cost  them  ;  and  to  whom  ? 
When  this  practice  comes  to.be  tried,  then  the  sound  of  liberty  will 
lose  those  charms  which  make  it  grateful  to  the  ravished  ear." 

Mr.  Madison,  of  Virginia, — "  The  dictates  of  humanity,  the  princi 
ples  of  the  people,  the  national  safety  and  happiness,  and  prudent  poli 
cy,  require  it  of  us.  The  constitution  has  particularly  called  our  at 
tention  to  it.  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  1  conceive  the  constitution 
in  this  particular  was  formed  in  order  that  the  Government,  whilst  it 
was  restrained  from  laying  a  total  prohibition,  might  be  able  to  give 
some  testimony  of  the  sense  of  America,  with  respect  to  the  African 
trade.  *  *  *  •*  It  is  to  be  hoped,  that  by  expressing  a 

national  disapprobation  of  this  trade,  we  may  destroy  it,  and  save  our. 
selves  from  reproaches,  AND  OUR  POSTERITY  THE  IMBECILITY  EVER 

ATTENDANT    ON    A    COUNTRY    FILLED    WITH    SLAVES.       I    do    not  wish    to 

say  any  thing  harsh  to  the  hearing  of  gentlemen  who  entertain  differ 
ent  sentiments  from  me,  or  different  sentiments  from  those  I  represent. 
But  if  there  is  any  one  point  in  which  it  is  clearly  the  policy  of  this 
nation,  so  far  as  we  constitutionally  can,  to  vary  the  practice  obtain, 
ing  under  some  of  the  state  governments,  it  is  this.  But  it  is  certain 
a  majority  of  the  states  are  opposed  to  this  practice." — [Cong.  Reg. 
v.  1,  p.  308-12. 

A  writer  in  the  "  Gazette  of  the  United  States,"  Feb.  20th,  1790, 
(then  the  government  paper,)  who  opposes  the  abolition  of  slavery, 
and  avows  himself  a  slaveholder,  says,  "  I  have  seen  in  the  papers  ac 
counts  of  large  associations,  and  applications  to  Government  for  the 
abolition  of  slavery.  Religion,  humanity,  and  the  generosity  natural 
to  a  free  people,  are  the  noble  principles  which  dictate  those  measures. 

SUCH  MOTIVES  COMMAND  RESPECT,  AND  ARE  ABOVE  ANY  EULOGIUM 
WORDS  CAN  BESTOW."  '  ""' 

It  is  well  known,  that  in  the  convention  that  formed  the  constitu 
tion  of  Kentucky  in  1780,  the  effort  to  prohibit  slavery  was  nearly 
successful.  The  writer  has  frequently  heard  it  asserted  in  Kentucky, 
and  has  had  it  from  some  who  were  members  of  that  convention,  that 
a  decided  majority  of  that  body  would  have  voted  for  its  exclusion, 
but  for  the  great  efforts  and  influence  of  two  large  slaveholders — men 
of  commanding  talents  and  sway — Messrs.  Breckenridge  and  Nicho. 
las.  The  following  extract  from  a  speech  made  in  that  convention 
by  a  member  of  it,  Mr.  Rice,  a  native  Virginian,  is  a  specimen  of 
the  free  discussion  that  prevailed  on  that  "  delicate  subject."  Said 
Mr.  Rice  :  "I  do  a  man  greater  injury,  when  I  deprive  him  of  his 
liberty,  than  when  I  deprive  him  of  his  property.  It  is  vain  for  me 
to  plead  that  I  have  the  sanction  of  law  ;  for  this  makes  the  injury 
the  greater — it  arms  the  community  against  him,  and  makes  his  case 


35 

desperate.  The  owners  of  such  slaves  then  are  licensed  robbers,  and 
not  the  just  proprietors  of  what  they  claim.  Freeing  them  is  not 
depriving  them  of  property,  but  restoring  it  to  the  right  owner.  In 
America,  a  slave  is  a  standing  monument  of  the  tyranny  and  incon 
sistency  of  human  governments.  The  master  is  the  enemy  of  the 
slave ;  he  has  made  open  war  upon  him,  AND  is  DAILY  CARRYING  IT 
ON  in  unremitted  efforts.  Can  any  one  imagine,  then,  that  the  slave 
is  indebted  to  his  master,  and  bound  to  serve  him  ?  Whence  can  the 
obligation  arise  ?  What  is  it  founded  upon  ?  What  is  my  duty  to  an 
enemy  that  is  carrying  on  war  against  me  ?  I  do  not  deny,  but  in 
some  circumstances,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  slave  to  serve  ;  but  it  is  a 
duty  he  owes  himself,  and  not  his  master." 

President  Edwards,  the  younger,  said,  in  a  sermon  preached  before 
the  Connecticut  Abolition  Society,  Sept.  15,  1791  :  "  Thirty  years 
ago,  scarcely  a  man  in  this  country  thought  either  the  slave  trade  or 
the  slavery  of  negroes  to  be  wrong ;  but  now  how  many  and  able 
advocates  in  private  life,  in  our  legislatures,  in  Congress,  have 
appeared,  and  have  openly  and  irrefragably  pleaded  the  rights  of 
humanity  in  this  as  well  as  other  instances  ?  And  if  we  judge  of  the 
future  by  the  past,  within  fifty  years  from  this  time,  it  will  be  as 
shameful  for  a  man  to  hold  a  negre  slave,  as  to  be  guilty  of  common 
robbery  or  theft" 

In  1794,  the  General  Assembly  of  the  Presbyterian  church  adopted 
its  "  Scripture  proofs,"  notes,  comments,  &c.  Among  these  was  the 
following  : 

"  1  Tim.  i.  10.  The  law  is  made  for  manstealers.  This  crime 
among  the  Jews  exposed  the  perpetrators  of  it  to  capital  punishment. 
Exodus  xxi.  16.  And  the  apostle  here  classes  them  with  sinners  of 
thejirst  rank.  The  word  he  uses,  in  its  original  import  comprehends 
all  who  are  concerned  in  bringing  any  of  the  human  race  into  slavery, 
or  in  retaining  them  in  it.  Stealers  of  men  are  all  those  who  bring 
off  slaves  or  freemen,  and  keep,  sell,  or  buy  them." 

In  1794,  Dr.  Rush  declared :  "  Domestic  slavery  is  repugnant  to 
the  principles  of  Christianity.  It  prostrates  every  benevolent  and  just 
principle  of  action  in  the  human  heart.  It  is  rebellion  against  the 
authority  of  a  common  Father.  It  is  a  practical  denial  of  the  extent 
and  efficacy  of  the  death  of  a  common  Savior.  It  is  an  usurpation  of 
the  prerogative  of  the  great  Sovereign  of  the  universe,  who  has 
solemnly  claimed  an  exclusive  property  in  the  souls  of  men." 

In  1795,  Mr.  Fiske,  then  an  officer  of  Dartmouth  College,  after 
ward  a  Judge  in  Tennessee,  said,  in  an  oration  published  that  year, 
speaking  of  slaves  :  "  I  steadfastly  maintain,  that  we  must  bring  them 
to  an  equal  standing,  in  point  of  privileges,  with  the  whites  !  They 
must  enjoy  all  the  rights  belonging  to  human  nature." 

When  the  petition  on  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade  was  under  dis 
cussion  in  the  Congress  of '89,  Mr.  Brown,  of  North  Carolina,  said, 
"  The  emancipation  of  the  slaves  will  be  effected  in  time  ;  it  ought  to 
be  a  gradual  business,  but  he  hoped  that  Congress  would  not  precipi- 

5 


36 

tate  it  to  the  great  injury  of  the  southern  States."  Mr.  Hartley,  of 
Pennsylvania,  said,  in  the  same  debate,  "  He  was  not  a  little  surprised 
to  hear  the  cause  of  slavery  advocated  in  that  house."  WASHINGTON, 
in  a  letter  to  Sir  John  Sinclair,  says,  "  There  are,  in  Pennsylvania, 
laws  for  the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery  which  neither  Maryland  nor 
Virginia  have  at  present,  but  which  nothing  is  more  certain  than  that 
they  must  have,  and  at  a  period  NOT  REMOTE."  In  1782,  Virginia 
passed  her  celebrated  manumission  act.  Within  nine  years  from  that 
time  nearly  eleven  thousand  slaves  were  voluntarily  emancipated  by 
their  masters.  Judge  Tucker's  "  Dissertation  on  Slavery,"  p.  72.  In 
1787,  Maryland  passed  an  act  legalizing  manumission.  Mr.  Dorsey, 
of  Maryland,  in  a  speech  in  Congress,  December  27th,  1826,  speak 
ing  of  manumissions  under  that  act,  said,  that  "  The  progress  of  eman 
cipation  was  astonishing,  the  State  became  crowded  with  a  free  black 
population." 

The  celebrated  William  Pinkney,  in  a  speech  before  the  Mary 
land  House  of  Delegates,  in  1789,  on  the  emancipation  of  slaves,  said, 
'*  Sir,  by  the  eternal  principles  of  natural  justice,  no  master  in  the 
state  has  a  right  to  hold  his  slave  in  bondage  for  a  single  hour.  .  . 
I  would  as  soon  believe  the  incoherent  tale  of  a  schoolboy,  who  should 
tell  me  he  had  been  frightened  by  a  ghost,  as  that  the  grant  of  this 
permission  (to  emancipate)  ought  in  any  degree  to  alarm  us.  Are 
we  apprehensive  that  these  men  will  become  more  dangerous  by  be 
coming  freemen  1  Are  we  alarmed,  lest  by  being  admitted  into  the 
enjoyment  of  civil  rights,  they  will  be  inspired  with  a  deadly  enmity 
against  the  rights  of  others  ?  Strange,  unaccountable  paradox  !  How 
much  more  rational  would  it  be,  to  argue  that  the  natural  enemy  of 
the  privileges  of  a  freeman,  is  he  who  is  robbed  of  them  himself!  Dis 
honorable  to  the  species  is  the  idea  that  they  would  ever  prove  injuri 
ous  to  our  interests — released  from  the  shackles  of  slavery,  by  the 
justice  of  government  and  the  bounty  of  individuals — the  want  of  fide 
lity  and  attachment  would  be  next  to  impossible." 

Hon.  James  Campbell,  in  an  address  before  the  Pennsylvania  So 
ciety  of  the  Cincinnati,  July  4,  1787,  said,  "Our  separation  from 
Great  Britain  has  extended  the  empire  of  humanity.  The  time  is  not 
far  distant  when  our  sister  states,  in  imitation  of  our  example,  shall 
turn  their  vassals  into  freemen."  The  Convention  that  formed  the 
United  States'  constitution  being  then  in  session,  attended  at  the  de 
livery  of  this  oration  with  General  Washington  at  their  head. 

A  Baltimore  paper  of  September  8th,  1780,  contains  the  follow 
ing  notice  of  Major  General  Gates:  "A  few  clays  ago  passed  through 
this  town  the  Hon.  General  Gates  and  lady.  The  General,  previous 
to  leaving  Virginia,  summoned  his  numerous  family  of  slaves  about 
him,  and  amidst  their  tears  of  affection  and  gratitude,  gave  them  their 

FREEDOM." 

In  1791  the  university  of  William  and  Mary,  in  Virginia,  conferred 
upon  Granville  Sharpe  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Laws.  Sharpe  was 
at  that  time  the  acknowledged  head  of  British  abolitionists.  His  in- 


37 

defatigable  exertions,  prosecuted  for  years  in  the  case  of  Somerset,  pro 
cured  that  memorable  decision  in  the  Court  of  King's  Bench,  which 
settled  the  principle  that  no  slave  could  be  held  in  England.  He  was 
most  uncompromising  in  his  opposition  to  slavery,  and  for  twenty 
years  previous  he  had  spoken,  written,  and  accomplished  more  against 
it  than  any  man  living. 

In  the  "  Memoirs  of  the  Revolutionary  War  in  the  Southern  De 
partment,"  by  Gen.  Lee,  of  Va.,  Commandant  of  the  Partizan  Legion, 
is  the  following  :  "  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  adopted 
lately  with  so  much  difficulty,  has  effectually  provided  against  this 
evil,  (by  importation)  after  a  few  years.  It  is  much  to  be  lamented 
that  having  done  so  mnch  in  this  way,  a  provision  had  not  been  made 
for  the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery ." — p.  233,  4. 

Mr.  Tucker,  of  Virginia,  Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  state, 
and  professor  of  law  in  the  University  of  William  and  Mary,  address 
ed  a  letter  to  the  General  Assembly  of  that  state,  in  1796,  urging 
the  abolition  of  slavery  ;  from  which  the  following  is  an  extract. 
Speaking  of  the  slaves  in  Virginia,  he  says  :  "  Should  we  not,  at  the 
time  of  the  revolution,  have  loosed  their  chains  and  broken  their  fet 
ters  ;  or  if  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  such  an  experiment  prohib 
ited  the  attempt,  during  the  convulsions  of  a  revolution,  is  it  not 
our  duty,  to  embrace  the  first  moment  of  constitutional  health  and 
vigor  to  effectuate  so  desirable  an  object,  and  to  remove  from  us  a 
stigma  with  which  our  enemies  will  never  fail  to  upbraid  us,  nor 
consciences  to  reproach  us?" 

Mr.  Faulkner,  in  a  speech  before  the  Virginia  Legislature,  Jan. 
20,  1832,  said — "  The  idea  of  a  gradual  emancipation  and  removal  of 
the  slaves  from  this  commonwealth,  is  coeval  with  the  declaration  of 
our  independence  from  the  British  yoke.  It  sprung  into  existence  du 
ring  the  first  session  of  the  General  Assembly,  subsequent  to  the  for 
mation  of  your  republican  government.  When  Virginia  stood  sus 
tained  in  her  legislation  by  the  pure  and  philosophic  intellect  of  Pen- 
dleton — by  the  patriotism  of  Mason  and  Lee — by  the  searching  vigor 
and  sagacity  of  Wythe,  and  by  the  all-embracing,  all-comprehensive 
genius  of  Thomas  Jefferson  !  Sir,  it  was  a  committee  composed  of 
those  five  illustrious  men,  who,  in  1777,  submitted  to  the  general  as 
sembly  of  this  state,  then  in  session,  a  plan  for  the  gradual,  emancipa 
tion  of  the  slaves  of  this  commonwealth" 

Hon.  Benjamin  Watkins  Leigh,  late  United  States'  senator  from 
Virginia,  in  his  letters  to  the  people  of  Virginia,  in  1832,  signed  Ap- 
pomattox.  p.  43,  says  :  "  I  thought,  till  very  lately,  that  it  was  known 
to  every  body  that  during  the  Revolution,  and  for  many  years  after, 
the  abolition  of  slavery  was  a  favorite  topic  with  many  of  our  ablest 
statesmen,  who  entertained,  with  respect,  all  the  schemes  which  wis 
dom  or  ingenuity  could  suggest  for  accomplishing  the  object. 
Mr.  Wythe,  to  the  day  of  his  death,  was  for  a  simple  abolition,  consid 
ering  the  objection  to  color  as  founded  in  prejudice.  By  degrees,  all 


38 

projects  of  the  kind   were  abandoned.     Mr.   Jefferson   retained   his 
opinion,  and  now  we  have  these  projects  revived." 

Governor  Barbour,  of  Virginia,  in  his  speech  in  the  U.  S.  Senate, 
on  the  Missouri  question,  Jan.  1820,  said  : — "We  are  asked  why  has 
Virginia  changed  her  policy  in  reference  to  slavery  ?  That  the  senti 
ments  of  our  most  distinguished  men,  for  thirty  years  entirely  cor 
responded  with  the  course  which  the  friends  of  the  restriction  (of  sla 
very  in  Missouri)  now  advocated  ;  and  that  the  Virginia  delegation, 
one  of  whom  was  the  late  President  of  the  United  States,  voted  for 
the  restriction,  (of  slavery)  in  the  northwestern  territory,  and  that 
Mr.  Jefferson  has  delineated  a  gloomy  picture  of  the  baneful  effects 
of  slavery.  When  it  is  recollected  that  the  Notes  of  Mr.  Jefferson 
were  written  during  the  progress  of  the  revolution,  it  is  no  matter  of 
surprise  that  the  writer  should  have  imbibed  a  large  portion  of  that 
enthusiasm  which  such  an  occasion  was  so  well  calculated  to  produce. 
As  to  the  consent  of  the  Virginia  delegation  to  the  restriction  in 
question,  whether  the  result  of  a  disposition  to  restrain  the  slave  trade 
indirectly,  or  the  influence  of  that  enthusiasm  to  which  I  have  just  al 
luded,  *  *  *  it  is  not  now  important  to  decide.  We  have 
witnessed  its  effects.  The  liberality  of  Virginia,  or,  as  the  result  may 
prove,  her  folly,  which  submitted  to,  or,  if  you  will,  PROPOSED  this 
measure,  (abolition  of  slavery  in  the  N.  W.  territory)  has  eventuated 
in  effects  which  speak  a  monitory  lesson.  How  is  the  representation 
from  this  quarter  on  the  present  question  ?" 

Mr.  Imlay,  in  his  early  history  of  Kentucky,  p.  185,  says  :  '«  We 
have  disgraced  the  fair  face  of  humanity,  and  trampled  upon  the  sa 
cred  privileges  of  man,  at  the  very  moment  that  we  were  exclaiming 
against  the  tyranny  of  your  (the  English)  ministry.  But  in  contend 
ing  for  the  birthright  of  freedom,  we  have  learned  to  fcelfor  the  bon 
dage  of  others,  and  in  the  libations  we  offer  to  the  goddess  of  liberty, 
we  contemplate  an  emancipation  of  the  slaves  of  this  country,  as  hon 
orable  to  themselves  as  it  will  be  glorious  to  us." 

In  the  debate  in  Congress,  Jan.  20,  1806,  on  Mr.  Sloan's  motion  to 
lay  a  tax  on  the  importation  of  slaves,  Mr.  Clark  of  Va.  said  :  "  He 
was  no  advocate  for  a  system  of  slavery."  Mr.  Marion,  of  S.  Caroli 
na,  said  :  4<  He  never  had  purchased,  nor  should  he  ever  purchase  a 
slave."  Mr.  Southard  said :  "  Not  revenue,  but  an  expression  of 
the  national  sentiment  is  the  principal  object."  Mr.  Smilie — "  I  re 
joice  that  the  word  (slave)  is  not  in  the  constitution  ;  its  not  being 
there  does  honor  to  the  worthies  who  would  not  suffer  it  to  become  a 
part  of  it."  Mr.  Alston,  of  N.  Corolina — "  In  two  years  we  shall 
have  the  power  to  prohibit  the  trade  altogether.  Then  this  House 
will  be  UNANIMOUS.  No  one  will  object  to  our  exercising  our  full  con. 
stitutional  powers."  National  Intelligencer,  Jany.  24,  1806. 

These  witnesses  need  no  vouchers  to  entitle  them  to  credit — nor  their 
testimony  comments  to  make  it  intelligible — their  names  are  their  endor 
sers  and  their  strong  words  their  own  interpreters.  We  wave  all  com- 


39 

ments.  Our  readers  are  of  age.  Whosoever  hath  ears  to  hear,  let 
him  HEAR.  And  whosoever  will  not  hear  the  fathers  of  the  revolu 
tion,  the  founders  of  the  government,  its  chief  magistrates,  judges,  le 
gislators  and  sages,  who  dared  and  periled  all  under  the  burdens,  and 
in  the  heat  of  the  day  that  tried  men's  souls-  then  "  neither  will  he 
be  persuaded  though  THEY  rose  from  the  dead." 

Sowie-of lhfi..paints,  established  by  the  testimony  are — The  univer 
sal  expectation  that  the  moral,  influence  of  Congress,  of  state  legisla- 
tureSi _of  seminaries  of  learning,  of  churches,  of  the  ministers  of  reli 
gion,  and  of  public  sentiment  widely  embodied  in  abolition  societies, 
woHJdJ>e  exerted  against  slavery,  calling  forth  by  argument  and  ap 
peal  the  moral  sense  of  the  nation,  and  creating  a  power  of  opinion 
that  would  abolish  the  system  throughout  the  union.  In  a  word,  that] 
free  speech  and  a  free  press  would  be  wielded  against  slavery  without  \ 
ceasing  and  without  restriction.  Fuji  well  did  the  south  know,  not ' 
only  that  the  national  government  would  probably  legislate  against 
slavery  wherever  the  constitution  placed  it  within  its  reach,  but  she 
knew  also  that  Congress  had  already  marked  out  the  line  of  national 
policy  to  be  pursued  on  the  subject — had  committed  itself  before  the 
world  to  a  course  of  action  against  slavery,  wherever  she  could  move 
upon  it  without  encountering  a  conflicting  jurisdiction — that  the  na 
tion  had  established  by  solemn  ordinance  a  memorable  precedent  for 
subsequent  action,  by  abolishing  slavery  in  the  northwest  territory, 
and  by  declaring  that  it  should  never  thenceforward  exist  there ;  and  this 
too,  as  soon  as  by  cession  of  Virginia  and  other  states,  the  territory  came 
under  Congressional  control.  The  south  knew  also  that  the  sixth  article 
in  the  ordinance  prohibiting  slavery  was  first  proposed  by  the  largest 
slaveholding  state  in  the  confederacy — that  the  chairman  of  the  com 
mittee  that  reported  the  ordinance  was  a  slaveholder — that  the  ordi 
nance  was  enacted  by  Congress  during  the  session  of  the  convention 
that  formed  the  United  States  Constitution — that  the  provisions  of  the 
ordinance  were,  both  while  in  prospect,  and  when  under  discussion, 
matters  of  universal  notoriety  and  approval  with  all  parties,  and  when 
finally  passed,  received  the  vote  of  every  member  of  Congress  from  each 
of  the  slaveholding  states.  The  south  also  had  every  reason  for  believ 
ing  that  the  first  Congress  under  the  constitution  would  ratify  that  or 
dinance — as  it  did  unanimously. 

A  crowd  of  reflections,  suggested  by  the  preceding  testimony, 
press  for  utterance.  The  right  of  petition  ravished  and  trampled  by 
its  constitutional  guardians,  and  insult  and  defiance  hurled  in  the  faces  of 
the  SOVEREIGN  PEOPLE  while  calmly  remonstrating  with  their  SERVANTS 
for  violence  committed  on  the  nation's  charter  and  their  own  dearest 
rights  !  Added  to  this  "the  right  of  peaceably  assembling"  violently 
wrested — the  rights  of  minorities,  rights  no  longer — free  speech  struck 
dumb — free  men  outlawed  and  murdered — free  presses  cast  into  the 
streets  and  their  fragments  strewed  with  shoutings,  or  flourished  in 
triumph  before  the  gazo  of  approving  crowds  as  proud  mementos  of 
prostrate  law  ! 


The  spirit  and  power  of  our  fathers,  where  are  they  ?     Their  deep 

homage  always  and  every  where  rendered  to  FREE  THOUGHT^  with  its 
inseparable  signs — -free  speech  and  a  free  press-}-  their  reverence  for 
justice,  liberty,  rights  and  all-pervading  law,  where  are  theyT\ 

But  we  turn  from  these  considerations — though  the  times  on  which 
we  have  fallen,  and  those  towards  which  we  are  borne  with  headlong 
haste,  call  for  their  discussion  as  with  the  voices  of  departing  life — and 
proceed  to  topics  relevant  to  the  argument  before  us. 

The  seventh  article  of  the  amendments  to  the  constitution  is 
alleged  to  withhold  from  Congress  the  power  to  abolish  slavery  in  the 
District.  "  No  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property, 
without  due  process  of  law."  All  the  slaves  in  the  District  have  been 
"  deprived  of  liberty"  by  legislative  acts.  Now,  these  legislative  acts 
"  depriving"  them  "  of  liberty,"  were  either  "  due  process  of  law," 
or  they  were  not.  If  they  were,  then  a  legislative  act,  taking  from 
the  master  that  "  property"  which  is  the  identical  "  liberty"  previously 
taken  from  the  slave,  would  be  "  due  process  of  law"  also,  and  of 
course  a  constitutional  act ;  but  if  the  legislative  acts  "  depriving" 
them  of  "  liberty"  were  not  "  due  process  of  law,"  then  the  slaves 
were  deprived  of  liberty  unconstitutionally ,  and  these  acts  are  void. 
In  that  case  the  constitution  emancipates  them. 

If  the  objector  reply,  by  saying  that  the  import  of  the  phrase 
"  due  process  of  law,"  is  judicial  process  solely,  it  is  granted,  and 
that  fact  is  our  rejoinder ;  for  no  slave  in  the  District  lias  been  de 
prived  of  his  liberty  by  "  a  judicial  process,"  or,  in  other  words,  by 
"  due  process  of  law;"  consequently,  upon  the  objector's  own  admission, 
every  slave  in  the  District  has  been  deprived  of  liberty  unconstitu 
tionally,  and  is  therefore  free  by  the  constitution.  This  is  asserted 
only  of  the  slaves  under  the  "  exclusive  legislation"  of  Congress. 

The  last  clause  of  the  article  under  consideration  is  quoted  for  the 
same  purpose  :  "  Nor  shall  private  property  be  taken  for  public  use 
without  just  compensation."  Each  of  the  state  constitutions  has  a 
clause  of  similar^purport.  The  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  by 
Congress,  would  not,  as  we  shall  presently  show,  violate  this  clause 
either  directly  or  by  implication.  Granting  for  argument's  sake,  that 
slaves  are  "  private  property,"  and  that  to  emancipate  them,  would 
be  to  "  take  private  property"  for  "  public  use,"  the  objector  admits 
the  power  of  Congress  to  do  this,  provided  it  will  do  something  else, 
that  is,  pay  for  them.  Thus,  instead  of  denying  the  power,  the  objector 
not  only  admits,  but  affirms  it,  as  the  ground  of  the  inference  that 
compensation  must  accompany  it.  So  far  from  disproving  the  exist 
ence  of  one  power,  the  objector  asserts  the  existence  of  two — one,  the 
power  to  take  the  slaves  from  their  masters,  the  other,  the  power  to 
take  the  property  of  the  United  States  to  pay  for  them. 

If  Congress  cannot  constitutionally  impair  the  right  of  private 
property,  or  take  it  without  compensation,  it  cannot  constitutionally, 
legalize  the  perpetration  of  such  acts,  by  others,  nor  protect  those  who 
commit  them.  Does  the  power  to  rob  a  man  of  his  earnings,  rob  the 


41 

earner  of  his  right  to  them?  Who  has  a  better  right  to  the  product 
than  the  producer  ? — to  the  interest,  than  the  owner  of  the  principal  ? 
— to  the  hands  and  arms,  than  he  from  whose  shoulders  they  swing? 
— to  the  body  and  soul,  than  he  whose  they  are  1  Congress  not  only 
impairs  but  annihilates  the  right  of  private  property,  while  it  withholds 
from  the  slaves  of  the  District  their  title  to  themselves.  What!  Con- 
gress  powerless  to  protect  a  man's  right  to  himself,  when  it  can  make 
inviolable  the  right  to  a  dog  !  But,  waving  this,  I  deny  that  the  abo 
lition  of  slavery  in  the  District  would  violate  this  clause.  What  does 
the  clause  prohibit  ?  The  "  taking"  of  "  private  property"  for  "  public 
use."  Suppose  Congress  should  emancipate  the  slaves  in  the  District, 
what  would  it  "  take  ?"  Nothing.  What  would  it  hold  ?  Nothing. 
What  would  it  put  to  "  public  use  ?"  Nothing.  Instead  of  taking" 
"  private  property,"  Congress,  by  abolishing  slavery,  would  say 
"private  property  shall  not  be  taken  ;  and  those  who  have  been 
robbed  of  it  already,  shall  be  kept  out  of  it  no  longer ;  and  since 
every  man's  right  to  his  own  body  is  paramount,  he  shall  be  protected 
in  it."  True,  Congress  may  not  arbitrarily  take  property,  as  pro 
perty,  from  one  man  and  give  it  to  another — and  in  the  abolition  of 
slavery  no  such  thing  is  done.  A  legislative  act  changes  the  condi 
tion  of  the  slave — makes  him  his  own  proprietor  instead  of  the  pro. 
perty  of  another.  It  determines  a  question  of  original  right  between 
two  classes  of  persons — doing  an  act  of  justice  to  one,  and  restraining 
the  other  from  acts  of  injustice  ;  or,  in  other  words,  preventing  one 
from  robbing  the  other,  by  granting  to  the  injured  party  the  protection 
of  just  and  equitable  laws. 

Congress,  by  an  act  of  abolition,  would  change  the  condition  of 
seven  thousand  "  persons"  in  the  District,  but  would  "  take"  nothing. 
To  construe  this  provision  so  as  to  enable  the  citizens  of  the  District 
to  hold  as  property,  and  in  perpetuity,  whatever  they  please,  or  to 
hold  it  as  property  in  all  circumstances — all  necessity,  public  welfare, 
and  the  will  and  power  of  the  government  to  the  contrary  notwith 
standing — is  a  total  perversion  of  its  whole  intent.  The  design  of 
the  provision,  was  to  throw  up  a  barrier  against  Governmental  ag 
grandizement.  The  right  to  "  take  property"  for  State  uses  is  one 
thing; — the  right  so  to  adjust  the  tenures  by  which  property  is  held, 
that  each  may  have  his  own  secured  to  him,  is  another  thing,  and 
clearly  within  the  scope  of  legislation.  Besides,  if  Congress  were  to 
"  take"  the  slaves  in  the  District,  it  would  be  adopting,  not  abolishing 
slavery — becoming  a  slaveholder  itself,  instead  of  requiring  others  to 
be  such  no  longer.  The  clause  in  question,  prohibits  the  "  taking" 
of  individual  property  for  public  uses,  to  be  employed  or  disposed  of 
as  property  for  governmental  purposes.  Congress,  by  abolishing 
slavery  in  the  District,  would  do  no  such  thing.  It  would  merely 
change  the  condition  of  that  which  has  been  recognised  as  a  qualified 
property  by  congressional  acts,  though  previously  declared  "  persons" 
by  the  constitution.  More  than  this  is  done  continually  by  Congress 
and  every  other  Legislature.  .  Property  the  most  absolute  and  unqualt. 


42 

fied,  is  annihilated  by  legislative  acts.  The  embargo  and  non-inter 
course  act,  prostrated  at  a  stroke,  a  forest  of  shipping,  and  sunk  mil- 
lions  of  capital.  To  say  nothing  of  the  power  of  Congress  to  take 
hundreds  of  millions  from  the  people  by  direct  taxation,  who  doubts 
its  power  to  abolish  at  once  the  whole  tariff  system,  change  the  seat 
of  Government,  arrest  the  progress  of  national  works,  prohibit  any 
branch  of  commerce  with  the  Indian  tribes  or  with  foreign  nations, 
change  the  locality  of  forts,  arsenals,  magazines,  dock  yards,  &c.,  to 
abolish  the  Post  Office  system,  the  privilege  of  patents  and  copyrights, 
&c.  By  such  acts  Congress  might,  in  the  exercise  of  its  acknow 
ledged  powers,  annihilate  property  to  an  incalculable  amount,  and 
that  without  becoming  liable  to  claims  for  compensation. 

Finally,  this  clause  prohibits  the  taking  for  public  use  of  "pro 
perty"  The  constitution  of  the  United  States  does  not  recognise 
slaves  as  "  PROPERTY"  any  where,  and  it  does  not  recognise  them  in 
any  sense  in  the  District  of  Columbia.  All  allusions  to  them  in  the 
constitution  recognise  them  as  "  persons."  Every  reference  to  them 
points  solely  to  the  element  of  personality  ;  and  thus,  by  the  strongest 
implication,  declares  that  the  constitution  knows  tnern  only  as  "  per 
sons,"  and  will  not  recognise  them  in  any  other  light.^If  they  escape  into 
free  States,  the  constitution  authorizes  their  being  taken  back.  But 
how?  Not  as  the  property  of  an  "  owner,"  but  as  "  persons  ;"  and 
the  peculiarity  of  the  expression  is  a  marked  recognition  of  their  per 
sonality — a  refusal  to  recognise  them  as  chattels — "  persons  held  to 
service."  Are  oxen  "  held  to  service  1"  That  can  be  affirmed  only 
of  persons.  Again,  slaves  give  political  power  as  "  persons."  The 
constitution,  in  settling  the  principle  of  representation,  requires  their 
enumeration  in  the  census.  How  ?  As  property  ?  Then  why  not 
include  race  horses  and  game  cocks  ?  Slaves,  like  other  inhabitants, 
are  enumerated  as  "  persons."  So  b}'  the  constitution,  the  government 
was  pledged  to  non-interference  with  "  the  migration  or  importation 
of  such  persons"  as  the  States  might  think  proper  to  admit  until  1808, 
and  authorized  the  laying  of  a  tax  on  each  "  person"  so  admitted. 
Further,  slaves  are  recognised  as  per  sons  by  the  exaction  of  their  alle 
giance  to  the  government.  For  offences  against  the  government 
slaves  are  tried  as  persons  ;  as  persons  they  are  entitled  to  counsel  for 
their  defence,  to  the  rules  of  evidence,  and  to  "  due  process  of  law," 
and  as  persons  they  are  punished.  True,  they  are  loaded  with  cruel 
disabilities  in  courts  of  law,  such  as  greatly  obstruct  and  often  inevi 
tably  defeat  the  ends  of  justice,  yet  they  are  still  recognised  as  per 
sons.  Even  in  the  legislation  of  Congress,  and  in  the  diplomacy  of 
the  general  government,  notwithstanding  the  frequent  and  wide  depar 
tures  from  the  integrity  of  the  constitution  on  this  subject,  slaves  are 
not  recognised  as  property  without  qualification.  Congress  has  al 
ways  refused  to  grant  compensation  for  slaves  killed  or  taken  by  the 
enemy,  even  when  these  slaves  had  been  impressed  into  the  United 
States'  service.  In  half  a  score  of  cases  since  the  last  war,  Congress 
has  rejected  such  applications  for  compensation.  Besides,  both  in 


43 

Congressional  acts,  and  in  our  national  diplomacy,  slaves  and  property 
are  not  used  as  convertible  terms.  When  mentioned  in  treaties  and 
stuto  papers  it  is  in  such  a  way  as  to  distinguish  them  from  mere  pro 
perty,  and  generally  by  a  recognition  of  their  personality.  In  the  in 
variable  recognition  of  slaves  as  persons,  the  United  States'  constitu 
tion  caught  the  mantle  of  the  glorious  Declaration,  and  most  worthily 
wears  it. — It  recognizes  all  human  beings  as  "  men,"  "  persons,"  and 
thus  as  "  equals."  In  the  original  draft  of  the  Declaration,  as  it 
came  from  the  hand  of  Jefferson,  it  is  alleged  that  Great  Britain  had 
"  waged  a  cruel  war  against  human  nature  itself,  violating  its  most  sa 
cred  rights  of  life  and  liberty  in  the  persons  of  a  distant  people,  carry 
ing  them  into  slavery,  *  *  determined  to  keep  up  a  market  where 
MEN  should  be  bought  and  sold," — thus  disdaining  to  make  the  charter 
of  freedom  a  warrant  for  the  arrest  of  men,  that  they  might  be  shorn 
both  of  liberty  and  humanity. 

The  celebrated  Roger  Sherman,  one  of  the  committee  of  five  ap 
pointed  draft  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and  also  a  member  of  the 
convention  that  formed  the  United  States'  constitution,  said,  in  the  first 
Congress  after  its  adoption  :  "  The  constitution  does  not  consider  these 
persons,  (slaves,)  as  a  species  of  property." — [Lloyd's  Cong.  Reg. 
v.  1,  p.  313.]  That  the  United  States'  Constitution  does  not  make 
slaves  "  property,"  is  shown  in  the  fact,  that  no  person,  either  as  a  citi 
zen  of  the  United  States,  or  by  having  his  domicile  within  the  United 
States'  government,  can  hold  slaves.  He  can  hold  them  only  by  deri 
ving  his  power  from  state  laws,  or  from  the  laws  of  Congress,  if  he 
hold  slaves  within  the  District.  But  no  person  resident  within  the 
United  States'  jurisdiction,  and  not  within  the  District,  nor  within  a 
state  whose  laws  support  slavery,  nor  "  held  to  service  "  under  the 
laws  of  such  state  or  district,  having  escaped  therefrom,  can  be  held  as 
a  slave. 

Men  can  hold  property  under  the  United  States'  government  though 
residing  beyond  the  bounds  of  any  state,  district,  or  territory.  An  in 
habitant  of  the  Wisconsin  Territory  can  hold  property  there  under  the 
laws  of  the  United  States,  but  he  cannot  hold  slaves  there  under  the 
United  States'  laws,  nor  by  virtue  of  the  United  States'  Constitution, 
nor  upon  the  ground  of  his  United  States  citizenship,  nor  by  having 
his  domicile  within  the  United  States  jurisdiction.  The  constitution 
no  where  recognizes  the  right  to  "  slave  property,"  but  merely  the  fact 
that  the  states  have  jurisdiction  each  in  its  own  limits,  and  that  there 
are  certain  "persons"  within  their  jurisdictions  "held  to  service  "  ly 
their  own  laws. 

Finally,  in  the  clause  under  consideration,  "private  property" 
is  not  to  be  taken  "  without  just  compensation."  "  JUST  !"  If 
justice  is  to  be  appealed  to  in  determining  the  amount  of  compensa 
tion,  let  her  determine  the  grounds  also.  If  it  be  her  province  to  say 
how  much  compensation  is  "just,"  it  is  hers  to  say  whether  any  is 
"just," — whether  the  slave  is  "just"  property  at  all,  rather  than  a 
"person"  Then,  if  justice  adjudges  the  slave  to  be  "private  prop- 

6 


44 

erty,"  it  adjudges  him  to  be  his  own  property,  since  the  right  to  one's- 
self  is  the  first  right — the  source  of  all  others — the  original  stock  by 
which  they  are  accumulated — the  principal,  of  which  they  are  the  in 
terest.  And  since  the  slave's  "private  property  "  has  been  "  taken," 
and  since  "  compensation"  is  impossible — there  being  no  equivalent  for 
one's  self— the  least  that  can  be  done  is  to  restore  lo  him  his  original 
private  property. 

Having  shown  that  in  abolishing  slavery,  "  property  "  would  not 
be  "  taken  for  public  use,"  it  may  be  added  that,  in  those  states  where 
slavery  has  been  abolished  by  law,  no  claim  for  compensation  has 
been  allowed.  Indeed  the  manifest  absurdity  of  demanding  it,  seems 
to  have  quite  forestalled  the  setting  up  of  such  a  claim. 

The  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District,  instead  of  being  a  legisla 
tive  anomaly,  would  proceed  upon  the  principles  of  every  day  legisla 
tion.  It  has  been  shown  already,  that  the  United  States'  Constitution 
does  not  recognize  slaves  as  "  property."  Yet  ordinary  legislation  is 
full  of  precedents,  showing  that  even  absolute  property  is  in  many  re 
spects  wholly  subject  to  legislation.  The  repeal  of  the  law  of  entail- 
ments — all  those  acts  that  control  the  alienation  of  property,  its  dispo 
sal  by  will,  its  passing  to  heirs  by  descent,  with  the  question,  who  shall 
be  heirs,  and  what  shall  be  the  rule  of  distribution  among  them,  or 
whether  property  shall  be  transmitted  at  all  by  descent,  rather  than 
escheat  to  the  state — these,  with  statutes  of  limitation,  and  various  oth 
er  classes  of  legislative  acts,  serve  to  illustrate  the  acknowledged 
scope  of  the  law-making  power,  even  where  property  is  in  every  sense 
absolute.  Persons  whose  property  is  thus  affected  by  public  laws, 
receive  from  the  government  no  compensation  for  their  losses,  unless 
the  state  has  been  put  into  possession  of  the  property  taken  from 
them. 

The  preamble  of  the  United  States'  Constitution  declares  it  to  be 
a  fundamental  object  of  the  organization  of  the  government  "  to  ES 
TABLISH  JUSTICE."  Has  Congress  no  power  to  do  that  for  which 
it  was  made  the  depository  of  power  ?  CANNOT  the  United  States 
Government  fulfil  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  brought  into  being  ? 

To  abolish  slavery,  is  to  take  from  no  rightful  owner  his  property  ; 
but  to  "establish justice"  between  two  parties.  To  emancipate  the 
slave,  is  to  "  establish  justice"  between  him  and  his  master — to  throw 
around  the  person,  character,  conscience,  liberty,  and  domestic 
relations  of  the  one,  the  same  law  that  secures  arid  blesses  the  other. 
In  other  words,  to  prevent  by  legal  restraints  one  class  of  men  from  seiz 
ing  upon  another  class,  and  robbing  them  at  pleasure  of  their  earnings, 
their  time,  their  liberty,  their  kindred,  and  the  very  use  and  owner 
ship  of  their  own  persons.  Finally,  to  abolish  slavery  is  to  proclaim 
and  enact  that  innocence  and  helplessness — now  free  plunder — are 
entitled  to  legal  protection ;  and  that  power,  avarice,  and  lust,  shall  no 
longer  gorge  upon  their  spoils  under  the  license,  and  by  the  ministra 
tions  of  law!  Congress,  by  possessing  "exclusive  legislation  in  all 
cases  whatsoever,"  has  a  general  protective  power  for  ALL  the  inhabi- 


45 

tants  of  the  District.  If  it  has  no  power  to  protect  one  man,  it  has  none 
to  protect  another — none  to  protect  any — and  if  it  can  protect  one  man 
and  is  bound  to  protect  him,  it  can  protect  every  man — all  men — and  is 
bound  to  do  it.  All  admit  the  power  of  Congress  to  protect  the  masters 
in  the  District  against  their  slaves.  What  part  of  the  constitution 
gives  the  power  ?  The  clause  so  often  quoted, — "  power  of  legislation 
in  all  cases  whatsoever,"  equally  in  the  "  case"  of  defending  the 
blacks  against  the  whites,  as  in  that  of  defending  the  whites  against 
the  blacks.  The  power  is  given  also  by  Art.  1,  Sec.  8,  clause  15 — 
"  Congress  shall  have  power  to  suppress  insurrections" — a  power  to 
protect,  as  well  blacks  against  whites,  as  whites  against  blacks.  If 
the  constitution  gives  power  to  protect  one  class  against  the  other, 
it  chives  power  to  protect  either  against  the  other.  Suppose  the  blacks 
in  the  District  should  seize  the  whites,  drive  them  into  the  fields  and 
kitchens,  force  them  to  work  without  pay,  flog  them,  imprison  them, 
and  sell  them  at  their  pleasure,  where  would  Congress  find  power  to 
restrain  such  acts  ?  Answer  ;  a  general  power  in  the  clause  so  often 
cited,  and  an  express  one  in  that  cited  above — "  Congress  shall  have 
power,  to  suppress  insurrections."  So  much  for  a  supposed  case. 
Here  follows  a  real  one.  The  whites  in  the  District  are  perpetrating 
these  identical  acts  upon  seven  thousand  blacks  daily.  That  Congress 
has  power  to  restrain  these  acts  in  one  case,  all  assert,  and  in  so  doing 
they  assert  the  power  "  in  all  cases  whatsoever."  For  the  grant 
of  power  to  suppress  insurrections,  is  an  unconditional  grant, 
not  hampered  by  provisos  as  to  the  color,  shape,  size,  sex,  lan 
guage,  creed,  or  condition  of  the  insurgents.  Congress  derives  its 
power  to  suppress  this  actual  insurrection,  from  the  same  source 
whence  it  derived  its  power  to  suppress  the  same  acts  in  the  case  sup 
posed.  If  one  case  is  an  insurrection,  the  other  is.  The  acts  in  both 
are  the  same ;  the  actors  only  are  different.  In  the  one  case,  igno 
rant  and  degraded — goaded  by  the  memory  of  the  past,  stung  by  the 
present,  and  driven  to  desperation  by  the  fearful  looking  for  of  wrongs 
for  ever  to  come.  In  the  other,  enlightened  into  the  nature  of  rights, 
the  principles  of  justice,  and  the  dictates  of  the  law  of  love,  unprovok 
ed  by  wrongs,  with  cool  deliberation,  and  by  system,  they  perpetrate 
these  acts  upon  those  to  whom  they  owe  unnumbered  obligations  for 
whole  lives  of  unrequited  service.  On  which  side  may  palliation  be 
pleaded,  and  which  party  may  most  reasonably  claim  an  abatement  of 
the  rigors  of  law  ?  If  Congress  has  power  to  suppress  such  acts  at  all, 
it  has  power  to  suppress  them  in  all. 

It  has  been  shown  already  that  allegiance  is  exacted  of  the  slave/ 
Is  the  government  of  the  United  States  unable  to  grant  protection 
where  it  exacts  allegiance  ?  It  is  an  axiom  of  the  civilized  world, 
and  a  maxim  even  with  savages,  that  allegiance  and  protection  are 
reciprocal  and  correlative.  Are  principles  powerless  with  us  which 
exact  homage  of  barbarians  ?  Protection  is  the  CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHT 
of  every  human  being  under  the  exclusive  legislation  of  Congress  who 
has  not  forfeited  it  by  crime. 


46 

In  conclusion,  I  argue  the  power  of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery 
in  the  District,  from  Art.  1,  sec.  8,  clause  1,  of  the  constitution  : 
"  Congress  shall  have  power  to  provide  for  the  common  defence  and 
the  general  welfare  of  the  United  States."  Has  the  government  of 
the  United  States  no  power  under  this  grant,  to  legislate  within  its 
own  exclusive  jurisdiction  on  subjects  that  vitally  affect  its  interests? 
Suppose  the  slaves  in  the  District  should  rise  upon  their  masters,  and 
the  United  States'  government,  in  quelling  the  insurrection,  should 
kill  any  number  of  them.  Could  their  masters  claim  compensation  of 
the  government  ?  Manifestly  not ;  even  though  no  proof  existed  that 
the  particular  slaves  killed  were  insurgents.  This  was  precisely  the 
point  at  issue  between  those  masters,  whose  slaves  were  killed  by  the 
State  troops  at  the  time  of  the  Southampton  insurrection,  and  the  Vir 
ginia  Legislature ;  no  evidence  was  brought  to  show  that  the  slaves 
killed  by  the  troops  were  insurgents ;  yet  the  Virginia  Legislature 
decided  that  their  masters  were  not  entitled  to  compensation.  They 
proceeded  on  the  sound  principle,  that  a  government  may  in  self- 
protection  destroy  the  claim  of  its  subjects  even  to  that  which  has 
been  recognised  as  property  by  its  own  acts.  If  in  providing  for  the 
common  defence,  the  United  States'  government,  in  the  case  supposed, 
would  have  power  to  destroy  slaves  both  as  property  and  persons,  it 
surely  might  stop  half-way,  destroy  them  as  property  while  it  legalized 
their  existence  as  persons,  and  thus  provided  for  the  common  defence 
by  giving  them  a  personal  and  powerful  interest  in  the  government, 
and  secuiing  their  strength  for  its  defence. 

Like  other  Legislatures,  Congress  has  power  to  abate  nuisances — 
to  remove  or  tear  down  unsafe  buildings — -to  destroy  infected  cargoes 
— to  lay  injunctions  upon  manufactories  injurious  to  the  public  health 
— and  thus  to  "  provide  for  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare" 
by  destroying  individual  property,  when  it  puts  in  jeopardy  the  public 
weal. 

Granting,  for  argument's  sake,  that  slaves  are  "  property"  in  the 
District  of  Columbia — if  Congress  has  a  right  to  annihilate  property 
in  the  District  when  the  public  safety  requires  it,  it  may  surely  anni 
hilate  its  existence  as  property  when  the  public  safety  requires  it, 
especially  if  it  transform  into  &  protection  and  defence  that  which  as 
property  periled  the  public  interests.  In  the  District  of  Columbia 
there  are,  besides  the  United  States'  Capitol,  the  President's  house,  the 
national  offices,  &c.  of  the  Departments  of  State,  Treasury,  War,  and 
Navy,  the  General  Post-office,  and  Patent  Office.  It  is  also  the  resi 
dence  of  the  President,  all  the  highest  officers  of  the  government, 
both  houses  of  Congress,  and  all  the  foreign  ambassadors.  In  this 
same  District  there  are  also  seven  thousand  slaves.  Jefferson,  in  his 
Notes  on  Va.  p.  241,  says  of  slavery,  that  "  the  State  permitting  one 
half  of  its  citizens  to  trample  on  the  rights  of  the  other,  transforms 
them  into  enemies ;"  and  Richard  Henry  Lee,  in  the  Va.  House  of 
Burgesses  in  1758,  declared  that  to  those  who  held  them,  "  slaves 
must  be  natural  enemies"  Is  Congress  so  impotent  that  it  cannot 


47 

exercise  that  right  pronounced  both  by  municipal  and  national  law, 
the  most  sacred  and  universal — the  right  of  self-preservation  and  de 
fence?  Is  it  shut  up  to  the  necessiiy  of  keeping  seven  thousand 
"  enemies"  in  the  heart  of  the  nation's  citadel  ?  Does  the  iron  fiat  of 
the  constitution  doom  it  to  such  imbecility  that  it  cannot  arrest  the 
process  that  made  them  "  enemies,"  and  still  goads  to  deadlier  hate  by 
fiery  trials,  and  day  by  day  adds  others  to  their  number  ?  Is  this 
providing  for  the  common  defence  and  general  welfare  ?  If  to  rob 
men  of  rights  excites  their  hute,  freely  to  restore  them  and  make 
amends,  will  win  their  love. 

By  emancipating  the  slaves  in  the  District,  the  government  of  the 
United  States  would  disband  an  army  of  "  enemies,"  and  enlist  "  for 
the  common  defence  and  general  welfare,"  a  body  guard  of  friends 
seven  thousand  strong.  In  the  last  war,  a  handful  ot  British  soldiers 
sacked  Washington  city,  burned  the  capitol,  the  President's  house, 
and  the  national  offices  and  archives ;  and  no  marvel,  for  thousands 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  District  had  been  "TRANSFORMED  INTO  ENE 
MIES."  Would  they  beat  back  invasion?  If  the  national  government 
had  exercised  its  constitutional  "  power  to  provide  for  the  common 
defence  and  to  promote  the  general  welfare,  "  by  turning  those  "ene 
mies"  into  friends,  then,  instead  of  a  hostile  ambush  lurking  in  every 
thicket  inviting  assault,  and  secret  foes  in  every  house  paralyzing 
defence,  an  army  of  allies  would  have  rallied  in  the  hour  of  her  ca 
lamity,  and  shouted  defiance  from  their  munitions  of  rocks  ;  whilst  the 
banner  of  the  republic,  then  trampled  in  dust,  would  have  floated  se 
curely  over  FREEMEN  exulting  amidst  bulwarks  of  strength. 

To  show  that  Congress  can  abolish  slavery  in  the  District,  under 
the  grant  of  power  *'  to  provide  for  the  common  defence  and  to  pro 
mote  the  general  welfare,"  I  quote  an  extract  from  a  speech  of  Mr. 
Madison,  of  Va.,  in  the  first  Congress  under  the  constitution,  May  13, 
1789.  Speaking  of  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade,  Mr.  Madison 
aays  :  "  I  should  venture  to  say  it  is  as  much  for  the  interests  of 
Georgia  and  South  Carolina,  as  of  any  state  in  the  union.  Every 
addition  they  receive  to  their  number  of  slaves  tends  to  weaken  them, 
and  renders  them  less  capable  of  self-defence.  In  case  of  hostilities 
with  foreign  nations,  they  will  be  the  means  of  inviting  attack  instead 
of  repelling  invasion.  It  is  a  necessary  duty  of  the  general  govern 
ment  to  protect  every  part  of  the  empire  against  danger,  as  well  in 
ternal  as  external.  Every  thing,  therefore,  which  tends  to  increase, 
this  danger,  though  it  may  be  a  local  affair,  yet  if  it  involves  nation 
al  expense  or  safety,  it  becomes  of  concern  to  every  part  of  the  union, 
and  is  a  proper  subject  for  the  consideration  of  those  charged  with 
the  general  administration  of  the  government.  See  Cong.  Keg.  vol. 
l,p.  310-11. 

WYTHE. 


POSTSCRIPT. 


MY  apology  for  adding-  a  postscript,  to  a  discussion  already  perhaps  too 
protracted,  is  the  fact  that  the  preceding  sheets  were  in  the  hands  of  the  prin 
ter,  and  all  but  the  concluding  pages  had  gone  through  the  press,  before  the 
passage  of  Mr.  Calhoun's  late  resolutions  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States. 
A  proceeding  so  extraordinary, — if  indeed  the  time  has  not  passed  when  any 
acts  of  Congress  in  derogation  of  freedom  and  in  deference  to  slavery,  can 
be  deemed  extraordinary, — should  not  be  suffered  to  pass  in  silence  at  such 
a  crisis  as  the  present;  especially  as  the  passage  of  one  of  the  resolutions 
by  a  vote  of  36  to  8,  exhibits  a  shift  of  position  on  the  part  of  the  South, 
as  sudden  as  it  is  unaccountable,  being  nothing  less  than  the  surrender  of 
a  fortress  which  until  then  they  had  defended  with  the  pertinacity  of  a 
blind  and  almost  infuriated  fatuity.  Upon  the  discussions  during  the  pend 
ency  of  the  resolutions,  and  upon  the  vote,  by  which  they  were  carried,  I 
make  no  comment,  save  only  to  record  my  exultation  in  the  fact  there 
exhibited,  that  great  emergencies  are  true  touchstones,  and  that  hencefor 
ward,  until  this  question  is  settled,  whoever  holds  a  seat  in  Congress  will 
find  upon,  and  all  around  him,  a  pressure  strong  enough  to  TEST  him — a 
focal  blaze  that  will  find  its  way  through  the  carefully  adjusted  cloak  of  fair 
pretension,  and  the  sevenfold  brass  of  two-faced  political  intrigue,  and  no- 
faced  non-committalism,  piercing  to  the  dividing  asunder  of  joints  and  mar 
row.  Be  it  known  to  every  northern  man  who  aspires  to  a  seat  in  Congress, 
that  hereafter  it  is  the  destiny  of  congressional  action  on  this  subject,  to  be  a 
MIGHTY  RJEVELATOR — making  secret  thoughts  public  property,  and  pro 
claiming  on  the  house-tops  what  is  whispered  in  the  ear — smiting  otF  masks, 
and  bursting  open  sepulchres  beautiful  outwardly,  and  heaving-  up  to  the  sun 
their  dead  men's  bones.  To  such  we  say, — Remember  the  Missouri  Ques 
tion,  and  the  fate  of  those  who  then  sold  the  North,  and  their  ou-n  birthright ! 

Passing  by  the  resolutions  generally  without  remark — the  attention 
of  the  reader"  is  specially  solicited  to  Mr.  Clay's  substitute  for  Mr.  Cal 
houn's  fifth  resolution. 

"Resolved,  That  when  the  District  of  Columbia  was  ceded  by  the  states 
of  Virginia  and  Maryland  to  the  United  States,  domestic  slavery  existed  in 
both  of  these  states,  including  the  ceded  territory,  and  that,  as  it  still  con 
tinues  in  both  of  them,  it  could  not  be  abolished  within  the  District  without 
a  violation  of  that  good  faith,  which  was  implied  in  the  cession  and  in  the 
acceptance  of  the  territory  ;  nor,  unless  compensation  were  made  to  the  pro 
prietors  of  slaves,  without  a  manifest  infringement  of  an  amendment  to  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States ;  nor  without  exciting  a  degree  of  just 
alarm  and  apprehension  in  the  states  recognising  slavery,  far  transcending 
in  mischievous  tendency,  any  possible  benefit  which  could  be  accomplished 
by  the  abolition." 

By  voting  for  this  resolution,  the  south  by  a  simultaneous  movement, 
shifted  its  mode  of  defence,  not  so  much  by  taking  a  position  entirely  new, 
as  by  attempting  to  refortify  an  old  one — never  much  trusted  in,  and  aban 
doned  mainly  long  ago,  as  being  unable  to  hold  out  against  assault  however 


40 

unskilfully  directed.  In  the  debate  on  this  resolution,  though  the  southern 
members  of  Congress  did  not  professedly  retreat  from  the  ground  hitherto 
maintained  by  tliem — that  Congress  has  no  power  by  the  constitution  to  abo 
lish  slavery  in  the  District — yet  in  the  main  they  silently  drew  off  from  it. 

The  passage  of  this  resolution — with  the  vote  ot*  every  southern  senator, 
forms  a  new  era  in  the  discussion  of  this  question. 

We  cannot  join  in  the  lamentations  of  those  who  bewail  it.  We  hail  it, 
and  rejoice  in  it.  It  was  as  we  would  have  had  it — oifered  by  a  southern  se 
nator,  advocated  by  southern  senators,  and  on  the  ground  that  it  "  was  no 
compromise  " — that  it  embodied  the  true  southern  principle — that  "  this 
resolution  stood  on  as  high  ground  as  Mr.  Calhoun's." — (Mr.  Preston) — 
"that  Mr.  Clay's  resolution  was  as  strong  as  Mr.  Calhonn's" — (Mr.  Rives) 
— that  "the  resolution  he  (Mr.  Calhoun)  now  refused  to  support,  was 
as  strong  as  his  own,  and  that  in  supporting  it,  there  was  no  abandonment 
of  principle  by  the  south." — (Mr.  Walker,  of  Mi.) — further,  that  it  wag  ad 
vocated  by  the  southern  senators  generally  as  an  expression  of  their  views, 
and  as  setting  the  question  of  slavery  in  the  District  on  its  true  ground — that 
finally  "when  the  question  was  taken,  every  slaveholding  senator,  including 
Mr.  Calhoun  himself,  voted  for  the  resolution. 

By  passing  this  resolution,  and  with  such  avowals,  the  south  has  sur 
rendered  irrevocably  the  whole  question  at  issue  between  them  and  the 
petitioners  for  abolition  in  the  District.  It  has,  unwittingly  but  explicitly, 
conceded  the  main  question  argued  in  the  preceding  pages. 

The  only  ground  taken  against  the  right  of  Congress  to  abolish  slavery 
in  the  District  is,  that  slavery  existed  in  Maryland  and  Virginia  when  the 
cession  was  made,  and  "  as  it  still  continues  in  both  of  them,  it  could  not  be 
abolished  without  a  violation  of  that  good  faith  which  was  implied  in  the 
cession,"  &c.  The  sole  argument  is  not  that  exclusive  sovereignty  has  no 
power  to  abolish  slavery  within  its  jurisdiction,  nor  that  the  powers  of  even 
ordinary  legislation  cannot  do  it, — nor  that  the  clause  granting  Congress 
"exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever  over  such  District,"  gives  no 
power  to  do  it ;  but  that  the  unexpressed  expectation  of  one  of  the  parties 
that  the  other  would  not  "in  all  cases"  use  the  power  which  said  party  had 
consented  might  be  used  "  in  all  cases,"  prohibits  the  use  of  it.  The  only 
cardinal  point  in  the  discussion,  is  here  not  only  yielded,  but  formally  laid 
down  by  the  South  as  the  leading  article  in  their  creed  on  the  question  of 
Congressional  jurisdiction  over  slavery  in  the  District.  The  sole  reason 
given  why  Congress  should  not  abolish,  and  the  sole  evidence  that  if  it  did, 
such  abolition  would  be  a  violation  of  "  good  faith,"  is  that  "  slavery  still 
continues  in  those  states" — thus  explicitly  admitting,  that  if  slavery  did  not 
"  still  continue"  in  those  States,  Congress  could  abolish  it  in  the  District. 
The  same  admission  is  made  also  in  the  premises,  which  state  that  slavery 
existed  in  those  states  at  the  time  of  the  cession,  &c.  Admitting  that  if  it 
had  not  existed  there  then,  but  had  grown  up  in  the  District  under  United 
States'  lams,  Congress  might  constitutionally  abolish  it.  Or  that  if  the  ceded 
parts  of  those  states  had  been  the  only  parts  in  which  slaves  were  held  under 
their  laws,  Congress  might  have  abolished  in  such  a  contingency  also.  The 
cession  in  that  case  leaving  no  slaves  in  those  states, — no  "good  faith," 
would  be  "  implied"  in  it,  nor  any  "  violated,"  by  an  act  of  abolition.  The 
principle  of  the  resolution  makes  this  further  admission,  that  if  Maryland 
and  Virginia  should  at  once  abolish  their  slavery,  Congress  might  at  once 
abolish  it  in  the  District.  The  principle  goes  even  further  than  this,  and 
requires  Congress  in  such  case  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District  "  by  the 
good  faith  implied  in  the  cession  and  acceptance  of  the  territory."  Since, 


50 

according  to  the  spirit  and  scope  of  the  resolution,  this  "implied  good  faith" 
of  Maryland  and  Virginia  in  making  the  cession,  was  that  Congress  would 
do  nothing  within  the  District  which  should  go  to  counteract  the  policy,  or 
bring  into  disrepute  the  "  institutions,"  or  call  in  question  the  usages,  or  even 
in  any  way  ruffle  the  prejudices  of  those  states,  or  do  what  they  might  think 
would  unfavorably  bear  upon  their  interests  ;  themselves  of  course  being  the 
judges. 

But  let  us  dissect  another  limb  of  the  resolution.  What  is  to  be  understood 
by  "that  good  faith  which  was  IMPLIED]"  It  is  of  course  an  admission  that 
such  a  condition  was  not  expressed  in  the  acts  of  cession — that  in  their  terms 
there  is  nothing  restricting  the  power  of  Congress  on  the  subject  of  slavery  in 
the  District — not  a  word  alluding  to  it,  nor  one  inserted  with  such  an  intent. 
This  "  implied  faith,"  then,  rests  on  no  clause  or  word  in  the  United  States' 
Constitution,  or  in  the  acts  of  cession,  or  in  the  acts  of  Congress  accepting 
the  cession,  nor  does  it  rest  on  any  declarations  of  the  legislatures  of  Maryland 
and  Virginia  made  at  the  time,  or  in  tliat  generation,  nor  on  any  act  of  theirs, 
nor  on  any  declaration  of  the  people  of  those  states,  nor  on  the  testimony  of 
the  Washingstons,  Jeffersons,  Madisons,  Chaces,  Martins,  arid  Jennifers,  of 
those  states  and  times.  The  assertion  rests  on  itself  alone  !  Mr.  Clay  and 
the  other  senators  who  voted  for  the  resolution,  guess  that  Maryland  and 
Virginia  supposed  that  Congress  would  by  no  means  use  the  power  given 
them  by  the  constitution,  except  in  such  ways  as  would  be  well  pleasing  in 
the  eyes  of  those  states  ;  especially  as  one  of  them  was  the  "Ancient  Do 
minion  !"  And  now  after  the  lapse  of  half  a  century,  this  assumed  expecta 
tion  of  Maryland  and  Virginia,  the  existence  of  which  is  mere  matter  of  con 
jecture  with  tho  36  senators,  is  conjured  up  and  duly  installed  upon  the 
judgment-seat  of  final  appeal,  before  whose  nod  constitutions  are  to  floe 
away,  and  with  whom,  solemn  grants  of  power  and  explicit  guaranties  are 
when  weighed  in  the  balance,  altogether  lighter  than  vanity  ! 

But  let  us  survey  it  in  another  light.  Why  did  Maryland  and  Vir 
ginia  leave  so  much  to  be  "implied!"  Why  did  they  not  in  some  way  ex 
press  what  lay  so  near  their  hearts  ?  Had  their  vocabulary  run  so  low 
that  a  single  word  could  not  not  be  eked  out  for  the  occasion  1  Or  were 
those  states  so  bashful  of  a  sudden  that  they  dare  not  speak  out  and 
tell  what  they  wanted  1  Or  did  they  take  it  for  granted  that  Congress 
would  always  act  in  the  premises  according  to  their  wishes,  and  that  too, 
without  their  making  knoicntheir  wishes  ?  If,  as  honorable  senators  tell  us, 
Maryland  and  Virginia  did  verily  travail  with  such  abounding  faith,  why 
brought  they  forth  no  works? 

It  is  as  true  in  legislation  as  in  religion,  that  the  only  evidence  of 
"  faith "  is  works,  and  that  •*  faith "  without  works  is  dead,  i.  e.  has  no 
power.  But  here,  forsooth,  a  blind  implication  with  nothing  expressed,  an 
"  implied  "  fiith  without  works,  is  omnipotent.  Mr.  Clay  is  lawyer  enough  to 
know  that  even  a  senatorial  hypothesis  as  to  what  must  have  been  the  under- 
standing  of  Maryland  and  Virginia  about  congressional  exercise  of  constitu 
tional  power,  abrogates  no  grant,  and  that  to  plead  it  in  a  court  of  law,  would 
be  of  small  service  except  to  jostle  "  their  Honors' "  gravity  !  He  need 
not  be  told  that  the  constitution  gives  Congress  "  power  to  exercise  exclu 
sive  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever  over  such  District."  Nor  that  the  le 
gislatures  of  Maryland  and  Virginia  constructed  their  acts  of  cession  with 
this  clause  before  their  eyes,  and  that  both  of  them  declared  those  acts  made 
"  in  pursuance  "  of  said  clause.  Those  states  were  aware  that  the  United 
States  in  their  constitution  had  left  nothing  to  be  "  implied  "  as  to  the  pow 
er  of  Congress  over  the  District ; — an  admonition  quite  sufficient  one  would 


51 

think  to  put  them  on  their  guard,  and  induce  them  to  eschew  vague  impli 
cations  and  resort  to  stipulations.  Full  well  did  they  know  also  that  those 
were  times  when,  in  matters  of  high  import,  nothing  was  left  to  be  "  im 
plied."  The  colonies  were  then  panting  from  a  twenty  years'  conflict  with 
the  mother  country,  about  bills  of  rights,  charters,  treaties,  constitutions, 
grants,  limitations,  and  acts  of  cession.  The  severities  of  a  long  and  terrible 
discipline  had  taught  them  to  guard  at  all  points  legislative  grants,  that  their 
exact  import  and  limit  might  be  self-evident — leaving  no  scope  for  a  blind 
*'  faith,"  that  somehow  in  the  lottery  of  chances  there  would  be  no  blanks, 
but  making  all  sure  by  the  use  of  explicit  terms,  and  wisely  chosen  words, 
and  just  enough  of  them.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  with  its 
amendments,  those  of  the  individual  states,  the  national  treaties,  the  public 
documents  of  the  general  and  state  governments  at  that  period,  show  the 
universal  conviction  of  legislative  bodies,  that  when  great  public  interests 
were  at  stake,  nothing  should  be  left  to  be  "  implied." 

Further  :  suppose  Maryland  and  Virginia  had  expressed  their  <{  implied 
faith"  in  words,  and  embodied  it  in  their  acts  of  cession  as  a  proviso,  declar 
ing  that  Congress  should  not "  exercise  exclusive  legislation  in  all  cases  what 
soever  over  the  District,"  but  that  the  "  case"  of  slavery  should  be  an  excep 
tion  :  who  does  not  know  that  Congress,  if  it  had  accepted  the  cession  on  those 
terms,  would  have  violated  the  Constitution  ;  and  who  that  has  ever  studied 
the  free  mood  of  those  times  in  its  bearings  on  slavery — proofs  of  which  are 
given  in  scores  on  the  preceding  pages — can  for  an  instant  believe  that  the 
people  of  the  United  States  would  have  altered  their  Constitution  for  the 
purpose  of  providing  for  slavery  an  inviolable  sanctuary  ;  that  when  driven 
in  from  its  outposts,  and  everywhere  retreating  discomfited  before  the 
march  of  freedom,  it  might  be  received  into  everlasting  habitations  on  the 
common  homestead  and  hearth-stone  of  this  free  republic  ?  Besides,  who  can 
believe  that  Virginia  made  such  a  condition,  or  cherished  such  a  purpose, 
when  at  that  very  moment,  Washington,  Jefferson,  Wythe,  Patrick  Henry 
St.  George  Tucker,  and  almost  all  her  illustrious  men,  were  advocating  the 
abolition  of  slavery  by  law.  When  Washington  had  said,  two  years  before, 
Maryland  and  Virginia  "must  have  laws  for  the  gradual  abolition  of  slavery 
and  at  a  period  not  remote ;"  and  when  Jefferson  in  his  letter  to  Price, 
three  years  before  the  cession,  had  said,  speaking  of  Virginia,  "  This  is  the 
next  state  to  which  we  may  turn  our  eyes  for  the  interesting  spectacle  of 
justice  in  conflict  with  avarice  and  oppression — a  conflict  in  which  THE 
SACRED  SIDE  is  GAINING  DAILY  RECRUITS  ;"  when  voluntary  emancipations 
on  the  soil  were  then  progressing  at  the  rate  of  between  one  and  two  thou 
sand  annually,  (See  Judge  Tucker's  "  Dissertation  on  Slavery,"  p.  73 ;) 
when  the  public  sentiment  of  Virginia  had  undergone,  and  was  undergoing  so 
mighty  a  revolution  that  the  idea  of  the  continuance  of  slavery  as  a  permanent 
system  could  not  be  tolerated,  though  she  then  contained  about  half  the  slaves 
in  the  Union.  Was  this  the  time  to  stipulate  for  the  perpetuity  of  slavery  under 
the  exclusive  legislation  of  Congress  ?  and  that  too  at  the  same  session  of  Con 
gress  when  every  one  of  her  delegation  voted  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in 
the  North  West  Territory  ;  a  territory  which  she  had  herself  ceded  to  Con 
gress,  and  along  with  it  had  surrendered  her  jurisdiction  over  many  of  her 
citizens,  inhabitants  of  that  territory,  who  held  slaves  there — and  whose 
slaves  wore  emancipated  by  that  act  of  Congress,  in  which  all  her  delegation 
with  one  accord  participated  ? 

Now  in  view  of  the  universal  belief  then  prevalent,  that  slavery  in  this 
country  was  doomed  to  short  life,  and  especially  that  in  Maryland  and  Vir 
ginia  it  would  be  speedily  abolished — are  we  to  be  told  that  those  states  de. 


52 

signed  to  bind  Congress  never  to  terminate  it  1  Are  we  to  adopt  the  mon 
strous  conclusion  that  this  was  the  intent  of  the  Ancient  Dominion — thus  to 
bind  the  United  States  by  an  "  implied  faith,"  and  that  when  the  United 
States  accepted  the  cession,  she  did  solemnly  thus  plight  her  troth,  and 
that  Virginia  did  then  so  'Understand  it  1  Verily  one  would  think  that  hon 
orable  senators  supposed  themselves  deputed  to  do  our  thinking  as  well  as 
our  legislation,  or  rather,  that  they  themselves  were  absolved  from  such 
drudgery  by  virtue  of  their  office  ! 

Another  absurdity  of  this  dogma  about  "  implied  faith"  is,  that  where 
there  was  no  power  to  exact  an  express  pledge,  there  was  none  to  demand 
an  implied  one,  and  where  there  was  no  power  to  give  the  one,  there  was 
none  to  give  the  other.  We  have  shown  already  that  Congress  could  not 
have  accepted  the  cession  with  such  a  condition.  To  have  signed  away  a 
part  of  its  constitutional  grant  of  power  would  have  been  a  breach  of  the 
Constitution.  Further,  the  Congress  which  accepted  the  cession  was  com 
petent  to  pass  a  resolution  pledging  itself  not  to  use  all  the  power  over  the 
District  committed  to  it  by  the  Constitution.  But  here  its  power  ended. 
Its  resolution  would  only  bind  itself.  Could  it  bind  the  next  Congress  by 
its  authority  1  Could  the  members  of  one  Congress  say  to  the  members  of 
another,  because  we  do  not  choose  to  exercise  all  the  authority  vested  in  us  by 
the  Constitution,  therefore  you  shall  not  ?  This  would  have  been  a  prohibition 
to  do  what  the  Constitution  gives  power  to  do.  Each  successive  Congress 
would  still  have  gone  to  the  Constitution  for  its  power,  brushing  away  in  its 
course  the  cobwebs  stretched  across  its  path  by  the  officiousnes  of  an  im 
pertinent  predecessor.  Again,  the  legislatures  of  Virginia  and  Maryland, 
had  no  power  to  bind  Congress,  either  by  an  express  or  an  implied  pledge, 
never  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District.  Those  legislatures  had  no  power 
to  bind  themselves  never  to  abolish  slavery  within  their  own  territories — the 
ceded  parts  included.  Where  then  would  they  get  power  to  bind  another 
not  to  do  what  they  had  no  power  to  bind  themselves  not  to  do  1  If  a 
legislature  could  not  in  this  respect  control  the  successive  legislatures  of 
its  own  State,  could  it  control  the  successive  Congresses  of  the  United 
States  1 

But  perhaps  we  shall  be  told,  that  the  "  implied  faith"  in  the  acts  of  ces 
sion  of  Maryland  and  Virginia  was  not  that  Congress  should  never  abolish 
slavery  in  the  District,  but  that  it  should  not  do  it  until  they  had  done  it 
within  their  bounds  !  Verily  this  *'  faith"  comes  little  short  of  the  faith  of 
miracles  !  "  A  good  rule  that  works  both  ways."  First,  Maryland  and  Vir 
ginia  have  "good  faith"  that  Congress  will  not  abolish  until  they  do  ;  and 
then  just  as  ••  good  faith"  that  Congress  will  abolish  when  they  do  !  Excel- 
Jently  accommodated  !  Did  those  States  suppose  that  Congress  would  le 
gislate  over  the  national  domain,  the  common  jurisdiction  of  all,  for  Mary 
land  and  Virginia  alone  1  And  who,  did  they  suppose,  would  be  judges  in 
the  matter  7 — themselves  merely  1  or  the  whole  Union  ] 

This  "  good  faith  implied  in  the  cession"  is  no  longer  of  doubtful  interpre 
tation.  The  principle  at  the  bottom  of  it,  when  fairly  stated,  is  this  : — That 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  are  bound  in  "good  faith"  to  do  in  the 
District  of  Columbia,  without  demurring,  just  what  and  when,  Maryland  and 
Virginia  do  in  their  own  States.  In  short,  that  the  general  government  is  eased 
of  all  the  burdens  of  legislation  within  its  exclusive  jurisdiction,  save  that 
of  hiring  a  scrivener  to  copy  off  the  acts  of  the  Maryland  and  Virginia  legisla 
tures  as  fast  as  they  are  passed,  and  engross  them,  under  the  title  of  "  Laws 
of  the  United  States,  for  the  District  of  Columbia  !"  A  slight  additional  ex 
pense  would  also  be  incurred  in  keeping  up  an  express  between  the  capitols 


53 

of  those  States  and  Washington  city,  bringing  Congress  from  time  to  time 
its  "  instructions"  from  head  quarters-^instructions  not  to  be  disregarded 
without  a  violation  of  that  ''good  faith  implied  in  the  cession,"  &c. 

This  sets  in  strong  light  the  advantages  of  "  our  glorious  Union,"  if  the 
doctrine  of  Mr.  Clay  and  the  thirty-six  Senators  be  orthodox.  The  people 
of  the  United  States  have  been  permitted  to  set  up  at  their  own  expense, 
and  on  their  own  territory,  two  great  sounding  boards  called  "  Senate 
Chamber"  and  "  Representatives'  Hall,"  for  the  purpose  of  sending  abroad 
"  by  authority"  national  echoes  of  state  legislation  ! — permitted  also  to  keep  in 
their  pay  a  corps  of  pliant  national  musicians,  with  peremptory  instructions  to 
sound  on  any  line  of  the  staff  according  as  Virginia  and  Maryland  may  give 
the  sovereign  key  note  ! 

Though  this  may  have  the  seeming  of  mere  raillery,  yet  an  analysis  of 
the  resolution  and  of  the  discussions  upon  it,  will  convince  every  fair  mind 
that  it  is  but  the  legitimate  carrying  out  of  the  principle  pervading  both. 
They  proceed  virtually  upon  the  hypothesis  that  the  will  and  pleasure  of 
Virginia  and  Maryland  are  paramount  to  those  of  the  Union.  If  the  main 
design  of  setting  apart  a  federal  district  had  been  originally  the  accommo 
dation  of  Maryland,  Virginia,  and  the  south,  with  the  United  States  as  an 
agent  to  consummate  the  object,  there  could  hardly  have  been  higher  as 
sumption  or  louder  vaunting.  The  sole  object  of  having  such  a  District  was 
in  effect  totally  perverted  in  the  resolution  of  Mr.  Clay,  and  in  the  discussions 
of  the  entire  southern  delegation,  upon  its  passage.  Instead  of  taking  the 
ground,  that  the  benefit  of  the  whole  Union  was  the  sole  object  of  a  federal 
district,  that  it  was  designed  to  guard  and  promote  the  interests  of  all  the 
states,  and  that  it  was  to  be  legislated  over  for  this  end — the  resolution 
proceeds  upon  an  hypothesis  totally  the  reverse.  It  takes  a  single  point  of 
state  policy,  and  exalts  it  above  NATIONAL  interests,  utterly  overshadowing 
them  ;  abrogating  national  rights ;  making  void  a  clause  of  the  Constitution  ; 
humbling  the  general  government  into  a  subject — crouching  for  favors  to  a 
superior,  and  that  too  on  its  own  exclusive  jurisdiction.  All  the  attributes  of 
sovereignty  vested  in  Congress  by  the  Constitution  it  impales  upon  the 
point  of  an  alleged  implication.  And  this  is  Mr.  Clay's  peace-offering,  to 
appease  the  lust  of  power  and  the  ravenings  of  state  encroachment !  A 
"  compromise,"  forsooth  !  that  sinks  the  general  government  on  its  own  ter 
ritory  into  a  mere  colony,  with  Virginia  and  Maryland  for  its  "  mother 
country  !"  It  is  refreshing  to  turn  from  these  shallow,  distorted  construc 
tions  and  servile  cringings,  to  the  high  bearing  of  other  southern  men  in 
other  times ;  men,  who  in  their  character  of  legislators  and  lawyers,  dis 
dained  to  accommodate  their  interpretations  of  constitutions  and  charters  to 
geographical  lines,  or  to  bend  them  to  the  purposes  of  a  political  canvass. 
In  the  celebrated  case  of  Cohens  vs.  the  State  of  Virginia,  Hon.  William 
Pinkney,  late  of  Baltimore,  and  Hon.  Waiter  Jones,  of  Washington  city, 
with  other  eminent  constitutional  lawyers,  prepared  an  elaborate  written 
opinion,  from  which  the  following  is  an  extract :  "  Nor  is  there  any  danger 
to  be  apprehended  from  allowing  to  Congressional  legislation  with  regard  to 
the  District  of  Columbia,  its  FULLEST  EFFECT.  Congress  is  responsible  to 
the  States,  and  to  the  people  for  that  legislation.  It  is  in  truth  the  legisla 
tion  of  the  states  over  a  district  placed  under  their  control  for  their  own  be 
nefit,  not  for  that  of  the  District,  except  as  the  prosperity  of  the  District  is 
involved,  and  necessarv  to  the  general  advantage." — [Life  of  Pinkney,  p. 
612.] 

The  profound  legal  opinion,  from  which  this  is  an  extract,  was  elabo 
rated  at  great  length  many  years  since,  by  a  number  of  the  most  distin- 


54 

guished  lawyers  in  the  United  States,  whose  signatures  are  appended  to  it. 
It  is  specific  and  to  the  point.  It  asserts,  1st,  that  Congressional  legisla 
tion  over  the  District,  is  "  the  legislation  of  the  States  and  the  people," 
(not  of  two  states,  and  a  mere  fraction  of  the  people  ;)  2d.  "  Over  a  District 
placed  under  their  control,"  i.  e.  under  the  control  of  the  whole  of  the  States, 
not  under  the  control  of  two  twenty-sixths  of  them.  3d.  That  it  was  thus 
put  under  their  control  "/or  THEIR  OWN  benefit,"  the  benefit  of  all  the  States 
equally;  not  to  secure  special  benefits  to  Maryland  and  Virginia,  (or  what  it 
might  be  conjectured  they  would  regard  as  benefits.)  4th.  It  concludes  by 
asserting  that  the  design  of  this  exclusive  control  of  Congress  over  the 
District  was  "  not  for  the  benefit  of  the  District"  except  as  that  is  con 
nected  with,  and  a  me  ins  of  promoting  the  general  advantage.  If  this  is  the 
case  with  the  District,  which  is  directly  concerned,  it  is  pre-eminently  so 
with  Maryland  and  Virginia,  who  are  but  indirectly  interested,  and  would  be 
but  remotely  affected  by  it.  The  argument  of  Mr.  Madison  in  the  Congress 
of  '89,  an  extract  from  which  has  been  given  on  a  preceding  page,  lays 
down  the  same  principle  ;  that  though  any  matter  "may  be  a  local  affair^ 
yet  if  it  involves  national  EXPENSE  or  SAFETY,  it  becomes  of  concern  to  every 
part  of  the  union,  and  is  a  proper  subject  for  the  consideration  of  those  charged 
with  the  general  administration  of  the  government"  Cong.  Reg.  vol.  1.  p. 
310,  11. 

But  these  are  only  the  initiatory  absurdities  of  this  "good  faith  implied" 
The  thirty-six  senators  aptly  illustrate  the  principle,  that  error  not  only 
conflicts  with  truth,  but  is  generally  at  issue  with  itself.  For  if  it  would  be 
a  violation  of  "  good  faith"  to  Maryland  and  Virginia,  for  Congress  to  abo 
lish  slavery  in  the  District,  it  would  be  equally  a  violation  for  Congress  to 
do  it  with  the  consent,  or  even  at  the  earnest  and  unanimous  petition  of  the 
people  of  the  District :  yet  for  years  it  has  been  the  southern  doctrine,  that 
if  the  people  of  the  District  demand  of  Congress  relief  in  this  respect,  it  has 
power,  as  their  local  legislature,  to  grant  it,  and  by  abolishing  slavery  there, 
carry  out  the  will  of  the  citizens.  But  now  new  Tight  has  broken  in  !  The 
optics  of  the  thirty-six  have  pierced  the  millstone  with  a  deeper  insight,  and 
discoveries  thicken  faster  than  they  can  be  telegraphed  !  Congress  has  no 
power,  O  no,  not  a  modicum,  to  help  the  slaveholders  of  the  District,  how 
ever  loudly  they  may  clamor  for  it.  The  southern  doctrine,  that  Congress  is 
to  the  District  a  mere  local  Legislature  to  do  its  pleasure,  is  tumbled  from 
the  genitive  into  the  vocative  !  Hard  fate — and  that  too  at  the  hands  of  those 
who  begat  it !  The  reasonings  of  Messrs.  Pinckney,  Wise,  and  Leigh,  are 
now  found  to  be  wholly  at  fault,  and  the  chanticleer  rhetoric  of  Messrs. 
Glascock  and  Garland  stalks  featherless  and  crest-fallen.  For,  Mr.  Clay's 
resolution  sweeps  by  the  board  all  those  stereotyped  common- places,  as 
"  Congress  a  local  Legislature,"  "  consent  of  the  District,"  "bound  to  con 
sult  the  wishes  of  the  District,"  &c.  &c.,  which  for  the  last  two  sessions  of 
Congress  have  served  to  eke  out  scanty  supplies.  It  declares,  that  as 
slavery  existed  in  Maryland  and  Virginia  at  the  time  of  the  cession,  and  as 
it  still  continues  in  both  those  states,  it  could  not  be  abolished  in  the  District 
without  a  violation  of 'that  good  faith,'  &c. 

But  Jet  us  see  where  this  principle  of  the  thirty-six  will  lead  us.  If 
"  implied  faith"  to  Maryland  and  Virginia  restrains  Congress  from  the 
abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District,  it  requires  Congress  to  do  in  the  Dis 
trict  what  those  states  have  done  within  their  bounds,  i.  e.,  jestrain  others 
from  abolishing  it.  Upon  the  same  principle  Congress  is  bound,  by  the 
doctrine  of  Mr.  Clay's  resolution,  to  prohibit  emancipation  within  the  Dis 
trict.  There  is  no  stopping  place  for  this  plighted  "  faith."  Congress  must 


55 

not  only  refrain  from  laying  violent  hands  on  slavery,  itself,  and  see  to  it 
that  the  slaveholders  themselves  do  not,  but  it  ia  bound  to  keep  the  system 
up  to  the  Maryland  and  Virginia  standard  of  vigor  ! 

Again,  if  the  good  faith  of  Congress  to  Virginia  and  Maryland  requires 
that  slavery  should  exist  in  the  District,  while  it  exists  in  those  states,  it 
requires  that  it  should  exist  there  as  it  exists  in  those  states.  If  to  abolish 
every  form  of  slavery  in  the  District  would  violate  good  faith,  to  abolish  the 
form  existing  in  those  states,  and  to  substitute  a  totally  different  one,  would 
also  violate  it.  The  Congressional  "  good  faith"  is  to  be  kept  not  only  with 
slavery,  but  with  the  Maryland  and  Virginia  systems  of  slavery.  The  faith  of 
those  states  not  being  in  the  preservation  of  a  system,  but  of  their  system  ; 
otherwise  Congress,  instead  of  sustaining,  would  counteract  their  policy — 
principles  would  be  brought  into  action  there  conflicting  with  their  system, 
and  thus  the  true  spirit  of  the  "  implied"  pledge  would  be  violated.  On 
this  principle,  so  long  as  slaves  are  "  chattels  personal"  in  Virginia  and 
Maryland,  Congress  could  not  make  them  real  estate,  inseperable  from  the 
soil,  as  in  Louisiana ;  nor  could  it  permit  slaves  to  read,  nor  to  worship 
God  according  to  conscience  ;  nor  could  it  grant  them  trial  by  jury,  nor 
legalize  marriage  ;  nor  require  the  master  to  give  sufficient  food  and  cloth 
ing  ;  nor  prohibit  the  violent  sundering  of  families — because  such  provisions 
would  conflict  with  the  existing  slave  laws  of  Virginia  and  Maryland,  and 
thus  violate  the  "  good  faith  implied,"  &c.  So  the  principle  of  the  resolu 
tion  binds  Congress  in  all  these  particulars  :  1st.  Not  to  abolish  slavery  in 
the  District  until  Virginia  and  Maryland  abolish.  2d.  Not  to  abolish  any 
part  of  it  that  exists  in  those  states.  3d.  Not  to  abolish  any/orm  or  append 
age  of  it  still  existing  in  those  states.  4th.  To  abolish  when  they  do.  5th. 
To  increase  or  abate  its  rigors  when,  how,  and  as  the  same  are  modified 
by  those  states.  In  a  word,  Congressional  action  in  the  District  is  to  float 
passively  in  the  wake  of  legislative  action  on  the  subject  in  those  states. 

But  here  comes  a  dilemma.  Suppose  the  legislation  of  those  states 
should  steer  diiferent  courses — then  there  would  be  two  wakes !  Can  Congress 
float  in  both  1  Yea,  verily  !  Nothing  is  too  hard  for  it !  Its  obsequious 
ness  equals  its  "  power  of  legislation  in  all  cases  whatsoever."  It  can  float 
up  on  the  Virginia  tide,  and  ebb  down  on  the  Maryland  at  the  same  time. 
What  Maryland  does,  Congress  will  do  in  the  Maryland  part.  What  Vir 
ginia  does,  Congress  will  do  in  the  Virginia  part.  Though  Congress  might 
not  always  be  able  to  run  at  the  bidding-  of  both  at  once,  especially  in  .dif 
ferent  directions,  yet  if  it  obeyed  orders  cheerfully,  and  "  kept  in  its  place," 
according  to  its  "good  faith  implied,"  impossibilities  might  not  be  rigidly 
exacted.  True,  we  have  the  highest  sanction  for  the  maxim  that  no  man 
can  serve  two  masters — but  if  "  corporations  have  no  souls,"  analogy  would 
absolve  Congress  on  that  score,  or  at  most  give  it  only  a  very  small  soul — 
not  large  enough  to  be  at  all  in  the  way,  as  an  exception  to  the  universal 
rule  laid  down  in  the  maxim  ! 

In  following  out  the  absurdities  of  this  "implied  good  faith,"  it  will  be 
seen  at  once  that  the  doctrine  of  Mr.  Clay's  Resolution,  extends  to  all  the 
subjects  of  legislation  existing  in  Maryland  and  Virginia,  which  exist  also 
within  the  District.  Every  system,  "  institution,"  law,  and  established 
usage  there,  is  placed  beyond  Congressional  control  equally  with  slavery, 
and  by  the  same  "  implied  faith."  The  abolition  of  the  lottery  system  in 
the  District  as  an  immorality,  was  a  flagrant  breach  of  this  "  good  faith"  to 
Maryland  and  Virginia,  as  the  system  "  still  continued  in  those  states."  So 
to  abolish  imprisonment  for  debt,  and  capital  punishment,  to  remodel 
the  bank  system,  the  power  of  corporations,  the  militia  law,  laws  of 


6« 

limitation,  &c.,  in  the  District,  unless  Virginia  and  Maryland  took  the  lead, 
would  violate  the  "  good  faith  implied  in  the  cession,"  &c. 

That  in  the  acts  of  cession  no  such  "  good  faith"  was  "  implied  by  Vir 
ginia  and  Maryland  as  is  claimed  in  the  Resolution,  we  argue  from  the 
fact,  that  in  1784  Virginia  ceded  to  the  United  States  all  her  northwest 
territory,  with  the  special  proviso  that  her  citizens  inhabiting  that  territory 
should  "  have  their  possessions  and  titles  confirmed  to  them,  and  be  protected 
in  the  enjoyment  of  their  rights  and  liberties."  (See  Journals  of  Congress 
vol.  9,  p.  63.)  The  cession  was  made  in  the  form  of  a  deed,  and  signed  by 
Thomas  Jefferson,  Samuel  Hardy,  Arthur  Lee,  and  James  Munroe.  Many 
of  these  inhabitants  held  slaves.  Three  years  after  the  cession,  the  Virginia 
delegation  in  Congress  proposed  the  passage  of  an  ordinance  which  should 
abolish  slavery,  in  that  territory,  and  declare  that  it  should  never  there 
after  exist  there.  All  the  members  of  Congress  from  Virginia  and 
Maryland  voted  for  this  ordinance.  Suppose  some  member  of  Con 
gress  had  during  the  passage  of  the  ordinance  introduced  the  following 
resolution  :  "  Resolved,  That  when  the  northwest  territory  was  ceded 
by  Virginia  to  the  United  States,  domestic  slavery  existed  in  that  State, 
including  the  ceded  territory,  and  as  it  still  continues  in  that  State, 
it  could  not  be  abolished  within  the  territory  without  a  violation  of  that 
g-ood  faith,  which  was  implied  in  the  cession  and  in  the  acceptance  of  the  ter 
ritory."  What  would  have  been  the  indignant  response  of  Grayson,  Griffin, 
Madison,  and  the  Lees,  in  the  Congress  of  '87,  to  such  a  resolution,  and  of 
Carrington,  Chairman  of  the  Committee,  who  reported  the  ratification  of  the 
ordinance  in  the  Congress  of '89,  and  of  Page  and  Parker,  who  with  every 
other  member  of  the  Virginia  delegation  supported  it  ? 

But  to  enumerate  all  the  absurdities  into  which  the  thirty-six  Senators 
have  plunged  themselves,  would  be  to  make  a  quarto  inventory.  We  de 
cline  the  task  ;  and  in  conclusion,  merely  add  that  Mr.  Clay  in  presenting 
this  resolution,  and  each  of  the  thirty-six  Senators  who  voted  for  it,  entered 
on  the  records  of  the  Senate,  and  proclaimed  to  the  world,  a  most  unworthy 
accusation  against  the  MILLIONS  of  American  citizens  who  have  during  nearly 
half  a  century  petitioned  the  national  legislature  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  Dis 
trict  of  Columbia, — charging  them  either  with  the  ignorance  or  the  impiety  of 
praying  the  nation  to  violate  its  "PLIGHTED  FAITH."  The  resolution  vir 
tually  indicts  at  the  bar  of  public  opinion,  and  brands  with  odium,  all  the 
Manumission  Societies,  the^rs^  petitioners  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the 
District,  and  for  a  long  time  the  only  ones,  petioning  from  year  to  year  through 
evil  report  and  good  report,  still  petitioning,  by  individual  societies  and  in 
their  national  conventions. 

But  as  if  it  were  not  enough  to  table  the  charge  against  such  men  as  Ben 
jamin  Rush,  William  Rawle,  John  Sergeant,  Robert  Vaux,  Cadwallader 
Colden,  and  Peter  A.  Jay, — to  whom  we  may  add  Rufus  King,  James  Hill- 
house,  William  Pinkney,  Thomas  Addis  Emmett,  Daniel  D.  Tompkins,  De 
Witt  Clinton,  James  Kent,  and  Daniel  Webster,  besides  eleven  hundred 
citizens  of  the  District  itself,  headed  by  their  Chief  Justice  and  judges — even 
the  sovereign  States  of  Pennsylvania,  New- York,  Massachusetts,  and  Ver 
mont,  whose  legislatures  have  either  memorialized  Congress  to  abolish  slavery 
in  the  District,  or  instructed  their  Senators  to  move  such  a  measure,  must  be 
gravely  informed  by  Messrs.  Clay,  Norvell,  Niles,  Smith,  Pierce,  Benton, 
Black,  Tipton,  and  other  honorable  Senators,  either  that  their  perception  is 
so  dull,  they  know  not  whereof  they  affirm,  or  that  their  moral  sense  is  so  blunt 
ed  they  can  demand  without  compunction  a  violation  of  the  nation's  faith  ! 

We  have  spoken  already  of  the  concessions  unwittingly  made  in  thisr 


57 

resolution  to  the  true  doctrine  of  Congressional  power  over  the  District. 
For  that  concession,  important  as  it  is,  we  have  small  thanks  to  render. 
That  such  a  resolution,  passed  with  such  an  intent,  and  pressing  at  a  thou 
sand  points  on  relations  and  interests  vital  to  the  free  states,  should  be 
hailed,  as  it  has  been,  by  a  portion  of  the  northern  press  as  a  "  compromise" 
originating  in  deference  to  northern  interests,  and  to  be  received  by  us  as 
a  free-will  offering  of  disinterested  benevolence,  demanding  our  gratitude 
to  the  mover, — may  well  cover  us  with  shame.  We  deserve  the  humiliation 
and  have  well  earned  the  mockery.  Let  it  come  ! 

If,  after  having  been  set  up  at  auction  in  the  public  sales-room  of  the  na 
tion,  and  for  thirty  years,  and  by  each  of  a  score  of  "  compromises,"  treach 
erously  knocked  off  to  the  lowest  bidder,  and  that  without  money  and  with 
out  price,  the  North,  plundered  and  betrayed,  will  not,  in  this  her  accept 
ed  time,  consider  the  things  that  belong  to  her  peace  before  they  are 
hidden  from  her  eyes,  then  let  her  eat  of  the  fruit  of  her  own  way,  and  be 
rilled  with  her  own  devices  !  Let  the  shorn  and  blinded  giant  grind  in  the 
prison-house  of  the  Philistines,  till  taught  the  folly  of  intrusting  to  Delilahs 
the  secret  and  the  custody  of  his  strength. 

Have  the  free  States  bound  themselves  by  an  oath  never  to  profit  by  the 
lessons  of  experience  1  If  lost  to  reason^  are  they  dead  to  instinct  also  1  Can 
nothing  rouse  them  to  cast  about  for  self  preservation  1  And  shall  a  life 
of  tame  surrenders  be  terminated  by  suicidal  sacrifice  ? 

A  "  COMPROMISE  !"  Bitter  irony  !  Is  the  plucked  and  hood-winked 
North  to  be  wheedled  by  the  sorcery  of  another  Missouri  compromise  ?  A 
compromise  in  which  the  South  gained  all,  and  the  North  lost  all,  and  lost  it 
for  ever.  A  compromise  which  embargoed  the  free  laborer  of  the  North  and 
West,  and  clutched  at  the  staff  he  leaned  upon,  to  turn  it  into  a  bludgeon  and 
fell  him  with  its  stroke.  A  compromise  which  wrested  from  liberty  her 
boundless  birthright  domain,  stretching  westward  to  the  sunset,  while  it  gave 
to  slavery  loose  reins  and  a  free  course,  from  the  Mississippi  to  the  Pacific. 

The  resolution,  as  it  finally  passed,  is  here  inserted.  The  original  Resolul 
tion,  as  moved  by  Mr.  Clay,  was  inserted  at  the  head  of  this  postscript  with 
the  impression  that  it  was  the  amended  form.  It  will  be  seen  however,  that 
it  underwent  no  material  modification. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  interference  by  the  citizens  of  any  of  the  states, 
with  the  view  to  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District,  is  endangerino-  the 
rights  and  security  of  the  people  of  the  District ;  and  that  any  act  or 'meal 
sure  of  Congress  designed  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  District,  would  be  a  vio 
lation  of  the  faith  implied  in  the  cessions  by  the  states  of  Virginia  and  Ma 
ryland,  a  just  cause  of  alarm  to  the  people  of  the  slaveholdmg  states, ~and 
have  a  direct  and  inevitable  tendency  to  disturb  and  endanger  the  Union." 

The  vote  upon  the  Resolution  stood  as  follows  : 

Yeas.— Messrs.  Allen,  Bayard,  Benton,  Black,  Buchanan,  Brown,  Cal- 
houn,  Clay,  of  Alabama,  Clay,  of  Kentucky,  Clayton,  Crittenden,  Cuthbert, 
Fulton,  Grundy,  Hubbard,  King,  Lumpkin,  Lyon,  Nicholas,  Niles,  Norvell* 
Pierce,  Preston,  Rives,  Roane,  Robinson,  Sevier,  Smith,  of  Connecticut* 
Strange,  Tallmadge,  Tipton,  Walker,  White,  Williams,  Wright,  Young.  * 
Nays.— Messrs.  DAVIS,  KNIGHT,  McKEAN,  MORRIS,  PREIV 
TISS,  RUGGLES,  SMITH,  of  Indiana,  SWIFT,  WEBSTER. 


T    TIVERSF 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORRO^ 


LOAN  DEPT. 


This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below, 
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1971  4  7 


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REC-nin  JUL1571  -2 


REC'DID   FEB  1  2  73 -H  AM  S  8 


1973  5  4 


BEG  D  LD 


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